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CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
In January 2011 newly elected Florida Governor Rick Scott issued his first executive 
order. This particular executive order put a freeze on all pending agency regulations until 
undergoing review by Scott and his newly created Office of Fiscal Accountability and 
Regulatory Reform.
1
 However, Scott soon found his executive order challenged in court by a 
blind Florida resident who argued that Scott’s order made it difficult for her to apply for state 
food assistance. The case eventually reached the Florida State Supreme Court and five out of 
seven justices agreed that Governor Scott had “overstepped his constitutional authority and 
violated the separation of powers” in ordering agencies to suspend their rulemaking activities.2 
Scott responded to the court’s decision by issuing a new executive order that removed the 
suspension of rulemaking, but Scott still required agencies to submit rules to his Office of Fiscal 
Accountability and Regulatory Reform for review prior to rule publishing. Governor Scott also 
stated in response to the court decision:  
                                                          
1
 “Executive Order Number 11-01: Suspending Rulemaking and Establishing the Office of Fiscal 
Accountability and Regulatory Reform.” Office of the Governor. http://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/scott.eo_.one_.pdf, last accessed February 12, 2012. 
2
 Whiley v. Scott.2011.79 So. 3d 702.  
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You know, think about it. The secretaries of these agencies report to me. 
They work for me at will, then I’m not supposed to supervise them? It doesn’t 
make any sense.
3
 
As illustrated by the above quote, Governor Scott expected a certain degree of latitude and 
autonomy when directing the activity of subordinate executive branch actors. However, the 
Florida state supreme court was explicit in reminding the governor that there are clear limits to 
his authority.  This recent Florida case is illustrative of clashes that can occur between executive 
and judicial power over legal questions of executive authority and administrative control. In the 
U.S. context executive and judicial power work in clear conjunction. Courts adjudicate legal 
disputes and clarify the law, and the executive ensures that the decisions of courts come to 
fruition. Questions over power boundaries can lead to serious legal and political conflicts when 
courts and executives differ on the direction of the law.  
 The executive’s power in relation to the court goes beyond the implementation of court 
decisions. At the federal and state level executives have the ability to select judges that serve on 
courts.  And in some states, executives (and/or the state legislature) have the power to decide 
whether or not judges will remain on the bench. In the Florida example discussed above, the state 
supreme court took an assertive stance and decided to strike down the challenged executive 
action. State supreme court justices in Florida are selected by a judicial nominating commission, 
which submits names to the governor for appointment. At the end of their terms, Florida state 
justices face a yes or no vote in a non-competitive retention election. Would a court be less likely 
                                                          
3
 Alvarez. Lizette. 2011. “Facing Flurry of Lawsuit, a Governor Loses a Round.” August 17. The 
New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/17/us/17florida.html?_r=1, last accessed 
November 4, 2011.  
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to rule against the executive (in a case similar to the Florida example) if the executive had direct 
control over the selection and/or retention of the court’s judges? Additionally, although 
Governor Scott announced his intention to comply with the court order, he still maintained 
substantial control over agency activity given his subsequent executive order that requires 
agency rules to undergo review by his office. If Governor Scott’s office is able to delay and 
prevent the publication of agency rules he finds adverse, has Scott used his institutional 
privileges to circumvent the court’s decision?  
In this dissertation I analyze how variation in executive institutional and political power 
contributes to judicial deference on legal questions of executive branch policy and executive 
authority. The U.S. states provide an ideal environment to examine the interaction between 
courts and executives because of the variation present in state judicial and executive institutions, 
and in state political environments.  In addition to the fact that state courts handle over 95 
percent of litigation that takes place in the U.S., analysis of state institutions allows for 
examination of theories and hypotheses that are difficult to investigate at the federal level due to 
a lack of institutional variation. Claims regarding the effect of differences in judicial selection 
and retention on judicial behavior cannot be tested using federal institutions given the fact that 
all Article III judges are subject to political appointment and granted life tenure. State supreme 
courts, the highest level of court in each state, are selected and retained under a variety of 
methods that include political appointment, political retention, and judicial elections. 
Historically, states have re-adjusted selection and retention mechanisms for state supreme court 
justices because of concerns regarding judicial independence and judicial political insulation. 
 In the pre- and post-revolutionary war periods, a dominant concern was to protect judges 
from the excessive influence of the sovereign (i.e. executive) and thus legislatures played a role 
 4 
 
in the appointment process (Sheldon and Maule 1997).  However, during the economic crises of 
the pre-Civil War period, which coincided with the rise of Jacksonian democracy, reformers and 
state constitutional conventions granted judges more independence from political officials who 
were blamed for economic failures. With a rise in judicial elections during this era, state judges 
become more accountable to the will of state citizens (Shugerman 2010).  Elections, however, 
were dominated by partisan politics and in particular, political machines.  Thus the second wave 
of reform focused on further insulating judges from political influence through the use of either 
nonpartisan elections (for selection and retention) or nonpartisan judicial selection commissions 
with retention elections (Sheldon and Maule 1997, Bonneau and Hall 2009, Phillips 2009). 
While disagreement exists over the optimal way to select state justices, maintaining a balance 
between judicial independence and accountability has been a central goal of reformers. 
Limitations also exist in investigating claims regarding presidential power in relation to 
judicial decision-making at the federal level. Given the presence of a single federal executive 
branch, it is difficult to analyze how federal courts respond to variation in the constitutional 
powers an executive is allowed to yield in a given era. However, state executives across the 
country vary in the extent of bureaucratic and institutional control they exercise over the state 
executive branch. Differences in gubernatorial power reflect competing aspirations on the part of 
state policy-makers for an executive capable of effective management versus an executive with 
limited capability to abuse her political office.  
During the colonial era and beyond, fear of tyrannical executive power motivated the 
development of a weak and/or restricted executive in many states (Lipson 1949, Graves 1956, 
Beyle 1999). However, state executives soon faced problems similar to those of the president in 
regards to their ability to manage their state executive branch. Many states looked toward the 
 5 
 
national level when initiating their own reorganization. In the twentieth century, many state 
governments reformed their executive branch structure to provide governors with greater 
managerial control over executive branch agencies and policy (Contant 1988). In the state 
environment multiple factors, such as limited appointment power, increase agency autonomy 
while simultaneously undermining “executive coordination and control” (Choi, Cho, and Wright 
2004, 378). However, during multiple waves of executive branch reorganizations state 
executives saw dramatic increases in institutional power (i.e. appointment power, veto, budget) 
and were granted extensive powers similar to, and sometimes beyond, those of the president (i.e. 
line-item veto).  Despite the general increase in gubernatorial power, there currently exists 
substantial variation in executive authority across states in areas such as appointment power, 
budgetary control, and state line-item veto power. 
4
 Some state executives have the power to 
appoint the majority of agency officials within the executive branch, whereas in other states the 
executive presides over a highly fragmented executive branch with agency officials facing 
elections or appointment by someone other than the governor. 
Researchers have examined the interaction between courts and the executive using 
federal institutions, however the general structure of federal institutions have, to a great extent, 
remained constant overtime. Using the U.S. states allows for the simultaneous analysis of 50 
unique “separation of powers” institutional systems. The benefit from a state level analysis is not 
simply an increase in numbers and variation, however.  By investigating multiple judicial and 
executive institutions under various specifications during the same time period, researchers are 
able to gain a more comprehensive understanding of judicial deference in relation to a court’s 
executive environment.  For example, are courts less deferential to governors who oversee a 
                                                          
4
 Book of the States. 2010. Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments. 
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fragmented executive branch where gubernatorial authority is diffused? Also, are courts more 
likely to rule in favor of executive branch agencies when the governor (and/or legislature) 
decides judicial retention? Additionally, does judicial deference to executive branch actors vary 
depending on the executive’s ability to unilaterally retaliate against the court? The state 
environment is highly conducive to investigation of the above questions. Importantly, the ability 
to explore the behavior of political actors under different institutional specifications increases the 
validity and reliability of our knowledge regarding current conceptualizations of judicial 
decision-making.  
Chapter Two of this dissertation examines state supreme court decision-making on 
executive branch agencies in all fifty states. The focus of this chapter is to determine how 
differences in state judicial structures affect court decision-making on administrative agency 
cases. I explain that executive branch agencies are more likely to win court challenges when 
political elites (governor/legislature) have increased control over judicial selection and retention 
of state supreme court justices. Justices will not only be responsive to the threats from tenure 
retaliation, but selection mechanisms allow political elites to select justices with a greater 
propensity to rule in favor of government litigants. I examine this relationship using cases 
involving state executive branch agencies adjudicated between 1995 and 1998 from the Brace 
and Hall State Supreme Court Data Project. I find that state supreme courts are more likely to 
rule in favor of executive branch agencies in environments where political elites decide judicial 
selection and retention. Cases involving administrative agencies are typically lower in visibility 
as compared to other legal disputes (i.e. cases involving death penalty, abortion policy). 
However, these results show that when the executive branch is a litigant in court, deference to 
 7 
 
agency litigants is substantially influence by the degree of tenure control exercised by state 
policy-makers. 
Chapter Three examines judicial decision-making in relation to variation in executive 
branch structures. Using cases from the Brace and Hall State Supreme Court Data Project, I 
analyze how judges respond to variation in state executive control over the entire executive 
branch, and variation in state executive control over individual administrative agencies. I explain 
that in environments where the executive has increased mechanisms of bureaucratic control, 
concerns regarding enforcement of judicial decisions and executive retaliation will cause judges 
to show higher support of state executive branch agencies in court.  My findings show that courts 
are in fact responsive to the executive’s degree of institutional control over the executive branch, 
specifically gubernatorial appointment power and rule review power. Less evidence exists in this 
analysis that courts are responsive to executive retaliation, as measured by gubernatorial state 
budgetary control, against the court when ruling on cases involving executive branch agencies. 
When considering the possibility that the likelihood of executive enforcement resistance results 
in strategic behavior on the part of judges, scholars must take into account how the institutional 
capabilities of the state (or federal) executive affects his or her control over government policy. 
Finally, working within the theoretical framework established in Chapter Two and 
Chapter Three, Chapter Four examines judicial decision-making on cases involving direct legal 
challenges to state executive power. In this chapter I collect an original dataset of cases that 
involve challenges to state executive power adjudicated in multiple areas of executive power 
between 1980 and 2010. I explain that justices will be responsive to threats against judicial 
institutions and institutional legitimacy when ruling on cases involving executive power. In 
environments where the executive’s capacity to retaliate against the court is high, state justices 
 8 
 
will exhibit a higher propensity to rule in favor of state executive power. My results indicate that 
courts are more likely to rule in favor of executive power in environments where political elites 
have increased control over judicial retention and in environments where the executive has high 
levels of public of support. In contrast to the findings in Chapter Three, I find that courts are 
responsive to variation in executive capacity for institutional retaliation when ruling on cases 
challenging executive power. Specifically courts are more likely to rule in favor of executive 
power in environments where the executive has increased capability to reduce the state budget. 
As executive power increases, an assertive court may be essential to ensure that executives do 
not abuse their institutional authority. However, if courts are vulnerable to institutional 
retaliation or enforcement resistance, courts seemingly prefer avoiding a legal and political battle 
with their state executive.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW? 
STATE SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Independence from political reprisal gives judges some measure of freedom to make 
difficult, and many times unpopular, legal decisions. Independence is defended on the normative 
grounds that judges should make decisions based on legal precedent and case facts, irrespective 
of outside political or extralegal considerations. Alexander Hamilton relied on the legal and 
constitutional protections that an independent judiciary can provide when arguing in favor of a 
central national government.
5
 More recently, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer stated 
that judicial independence is “the rock upon which judicial institutions rest.”6 Because federal 
judges are granted life tenure, the threat of removal based on majoritarian or political elite 
pressures in response to judicial decision-making is tremendously reduced.  
While lifetime appointment helps insulate the federal judiciary from political pressure, 
state supreme court justices are selected and retained by a variety of means. Once taking office 
they often serve at the pleasure of elected officials or the public. Granting justices limited terms 
provides for greater accountability in regards to their decision-making.  Justices face retention 
decisions by governors and legislatures, or elections where state voters decide justices’ fate. 
However, these various selection and retention methods can threaten the independence of state 
                                                          
5
 Federalist Paper # 78. “The Judiciary Department.” June 14, 1788.   
6
 Stephen Breyer, September 28, 2006, Judicial Independence Remarks by Justice Breyer,   
Georgetown University Law Center, Hart Auditorium, Washington, D.C.   
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supreme courts. Political pressures from state policymakers may induce state supreme court 
justices to act strategically to avoid retaliation for unpopular decisions.  
In this paper, I analyze the impact of selection and retention methods on state supreme 
court decision-making in cases involving state executive branch agencies. I find that state 
supreme court justices show increased support to state agencies when they are either appointed 
or retained by political elites. This finding holds true across a variety of policy areas and 
suggests that institutional design of courts influences the level of deference accorded to 
executive branch agencies in the states.
 7
  
This paper proceeds as follows: first I explain how judicial selection and retention 
methods influence judicial behavior. Next I present my central argument; courts where political 
elites control judicial selection and retention will be most supportive of administrative agencies 
in court.  Then I present a model of state supreme court review of state agency decisions and test 
that model with a dataset of 2200 cases involving executive branch agency litigants.  Finally, I 
conclude by considering the implications of my findings for judicial independence in state high 
courts. 
 
State Supreme Court Selection and Retention 
While some state court judicial systems mirror the federal system with executive 
nomination and legislative confirmation of state justices, this is not the norm (Sheldon and 
                                                          
7
 Legal deference granted to an administrative agency is highly dependent on the standard of 
review (i.e. de novo, abuse of discretion) utilized by the court reviewing agency decision-
making. In this analysis, I use the term deference broadly to indicate judicial support for the 
decision-making and policy actions of executive branch litigants in court.  
 11 
 
Maule 1997). States have four basic ways of selecting state supreme court justices: partisan 
election, nonpartisan election (party affiliation does not appear on the ballot), political 
appointment, and merit selection.
8
 Currently eight states select their justices using partisan 
elections.
9
  Fourteen states select their state supreme court justices using nonpartisan elections 
and eight states utilize gubernatorial and/or legislative appointment to select state supreme court 
justices. Merit selection appointment systems are used in 21 states. Merit selection, first 
proposed in 1913, typically utilizes a judicial selection committee whose members are selected 
by the governor, legislature, and the state/county bar association (Martin 1993, Sheldon and 
Maule 1997).  The committee deliberates and then submits a list of judicial candidates to the 
governor. The governor then appoints a justice from the list provided.
10
   
 For some states, the retention method for state supreme court justices is identical to the 
selection method. All states that use non-partisan elections to select their justices use non-
partisan elections to retain them. However, there is variation among retention methods for judges 
who face partisan elections, political appointment, and merit selection. For example, politically 
                                                          
8
A small number of states utilize district elections instead of statewide elections (Hall 1992a). 
 
9 “Judicial Merit Selection: Current Status.” 2011. American Judicature Society. 
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Judicial_Merit_Charts_0FC20225EC6C2.pdf
., last accessed January 22, 2012. 
 “Judicial Selection in the States; Appellate and General Jurisdiction Courts.” 2009. American 
Judicature Society. http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/Judicial%20Selection%20Charts.pdf, last 
accessed November, 12, 2011. 
10
 In some instances, the judicial nominee selected by the governor must be approved by the state 
legislature (Phillips 2009). 
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appointed judges in California face non-partisan, non-competitive retention elections after their 
initial term. While many state justices chosen through merit selection face retention elections at 
the end of their initial term (Sheldon and Maule 1997, Phillips 2009), in some states that utilize 
merit selection, the governor decides whether the justice will be retained. 
The Impact of Selection and Retention Method on Judicial Behavior  
  Although scholars have examined the impact of institutional design on judicial decision-
making (Nagel 1961, Brace and Hall 1993, Brace and Hall 1995, Choi, Gulati, and Posner 2008, 
Caldarone, Canes-Wrone, and Clark 2009), few have specifically analyzed the relationship 
between state supreme courts and their state executive branch (Frank 1980, Miller 2009). 
Variation in state supreme court selection and retention methods condition the effect of legal 
facts, personal policy preferences, citizen and elite preferences, and political environment on 
state judicial decision-making (Brace and Hall 1995). Particularly, appointed and elected judges 
are both attentive to the preferences of those who play a role in their selection, and those who 
determine their retention (Brace and Hall 1997, Brace and Boyea 2008, Caldarone, Canes-
Wrone, and Clark 2009).  
While many states have moved toward judicial elections, some still utilize political 
appointment and political retention for their state supreme courts. Previous analyses have been 
mixed as to the effect of selection and retention method on state court review of state agencies 
(Swanson 2001, Shepherd 2009). However, research examining state supreme court decision-
making more broadly suggests that political elite control over judicial selection and retention 
should significantly influence the adjudication of cases involving the state executive branch. 
 
 
 13 
 
Judicial Selection Method and Judicial-Behavior 
Compared to appointed judges, elected judges are highly sensitive to public opinion (Brace and 
Boyea 2008) and this concern for public opinion particularly affects their decision-making on 
issues of crime and punishment (Brace and Boyea 2008, Huber and Gordon 2004). Appointing 
judges may free them from electoral pressures, but this manner of selection can open them up to 
the influence of political elites (governor and legislature). A key goal of a political official with 
the power of appointment is to select judges who possess congruent policy preferences (Segal, 
Howard, and Timpone 2000, Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal 2007). When viewed from a 
principal-agent perspective, an executive desires a judicial appointee whose behavior is more 
likely to reflect executive preferences.  When political elites are successful in selecting judges 
with the desired jurisprudence, the need to rely on retention mechanisms to prevent policy drift, 
due to judicial decision-making, is reduced.
11
 Despite the impact of selection method on judicial 
behavior, however, the form of retention plays an important role in understanding the type of 
constraints that justices may face. The influence of judicial retention method is felt whether or 
not their method of selection appears to afford them increased decision-making freedom. 
Judicial Retention Method and Judicial-Behavior 
Similar to the electoral sanctions that elected justices can face from the public, justices 
who rule against the preferences of political actors with the power of reappointment can also face 
the danger of “expulsion from the bench” (Bonneau and Hall 2009, 5). Federal and state court 
scholars have considered how executive and legislative preferences can constrain judicial 
                                                          
11
 Although presidents are very successful in nominating judges who appear to have proximate 
policy preferences, scholars find that judicial preferences are not always stable and can drift over 
time (Segal, Timpone, Howard 2000, Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal 2007). 
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decision-making (Spiller and Gely 1992, Epstein and Knight 1999, Langer 2002). State justices 
whose terms must be renewed by other political officials face the possibility of retention 
retaliation based on their judicial decisions. When state supreme courts are in an environment 
where other political elites have divergent preferences and play a role in judicial retention, there 
exist strong incentives to alter decision-making behavior at the agenda-setting stage and the 
decision on the merits stage (Brace, Hall, and Langer 1999, Langer 2002). The preferences of 
political elites can be an important factor particularly in cases involving governmental actors and 
issues of inter-branch conflict (Langer 2002). Specifically, Brace, Hall, and Langer (1999) find 
that judges subject to legislative and gubernatorial retention are less likely to hear challenges to 
state abortion statutes. Similarly, Langer (2002) finds that justices retained by the governor and 
legislature are less likely to docket cases concerning campaign and election law, an issue 
considered salient to political officials. 
State Supreme Courts and State Administrative Agencies  
Few researchers specifically examine the interaction between state high courts and state 
executive branch agencies. Research that does exist has produced mixed results regarding the 
impact of selection and retention method on the adjudication of cases involving agency activity 
(Hanssen 1999, Swanson 2001, Shepherd 2009).
12
 Hanssen (1999) asserts that politically 
                                                          
12
 One potential reason for the occurrence of various results is that researchers typically either 
focus on selection method or retention method, making it difficult to directly compare results.
 
Hanssen codes state supreme courts justices based on selection method (appointed versus 
elected) and Miller (2009) and Graves (2004) code state supreme court justices based on 
retention method (i.e. partisan election, nonpartisan election, retention election, political elite 
retention). 
 15 
 
appointed judges should exhibit more independent behavior when ruling on cases involving state 
public utility commissions. However, Hanssen does not account for the effect of judicial 
retention in his analysis. Similarly, Swanson (2001) argues that justices who face elections are 
more sensitive to public opinion and therefore will vote in a manner that reflects the ideology of 
state citizens. The lack of clear support for his hypothesis, however, leads Swanson to conclude 
that public ideology and selection mechanisms have very little (or no) effect on state supreme 
court oversight of agencies.  Other scholars argue that judges who face political retention will 
exhibit more constrained behavior in cases involving state government (Miller 2009, Shepherd 
2009). Shepherd (2009) examines state supreme court decision-making on cases involving all 
three branches of state government. Her results show that judicial retention method influence 
state court decision-making on cases involving the state executive branch, however her analysis 
does not empirically, or theoretically, distinguish between types of executive branch cases (i.e. 
cases involving administrative agencies versus cases directly involving the governor). This 
distinction is important given that differences in case type and salience will influence how 
justices respond to their institutional and political environment, particularly in cases involving 
government officials (Langer 2002). Below I discuss how and why judicial selection and 
retention method influences state court review of state executive branch agencies.  
 
The Influence of Inter-Branch Dynamics on Judicial Decision-Making 
The duty of a judge is to hear and decide cases in a court of law. It is safe to assume that 
judges want to make legally sound judicial decisions based on existing law, legal precedent, and 
the specific case facts regarding the litigants who appear in court. Judges, however, are 
influenced by a number of extralegal factors when making legal decisions. Researchers have 
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developed multiple models of decision-making to understand how extralegal factors influence 
judicial behavior (Epstein and George 1992, Brace and Hall 1993, Epstein and Knight 1999, 
Segal and Spaeth 2002, Langer 2002). Life tenure gives federal judges, and some state judges, 
increased decision-making freedom from political retaliation aimed at their tenure. But state 
judges who are selected and retained by political elites and citizens may find their decisional 
freedom constrained by their political environment because of the desire to retain office. 
Whether judges are primarily concerned with furthering policy goals or maintaining political 
power, retaining judicial office is obviously necessary to further their objectives. 
 Government Litigants and Why Litigant Type Matters  
Ideally, litigants should be treated impartially in court, regardless of differences in 
resources and political status, during the disposition of cases. Compared to other types of 
litigants, however, government litigants, including administrative agencies, have greater 
resources, more experience, and increased technical expertise when appearing in court (Canon 
and Giles 1972, Galanter 1974, Crowley 1987, Spriggs 1996, Farole 1999, Caruson and Bitzer 
2004).
13
  These factors are significantly linked to success in court. Particularly, state government 
litigants have a higher rate of success compared to many different categories of litigants 
(Wheeler, Cartwright, Kagan, Friedman 1987, Farole 1999). This advantage holds whether the 
state government litigant is the appellant or respondent (Farole 1999).  
                                                          
13
 Advantages in resources such as money and legal assistance allow government agencies to put 
forth higher quality legal defenses in court. Also, state agencies with jurisdiction over technically 
complex issues possess an informational advantage over justices. Courts may be more willing to 
defer to agencies in matters where administrative agencies possess expertise (Caruson and Bitzer 
2004).  
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Beyond the advantage in resources and expertise of agencies, courts are clearly aware 
that they are making decisions on another branch of their own state government (Wheeler, 
Cartwright, Kagan, and Friedman 1987). Many times judges require the cooperation of agencies 
to implement decisions (Straussman 1986, Spriggs 1996). A court which consistently takes a 
hostile posture towards agency activity may incur increased resistance from officials whose 
agreement and cooperation is required to successfully implement judicial decisions (Johnson 
1979, Moe and Howell 1999a).  
Potential Repercussions for Judicial Decision-Makers  
The type of litigant and case outcomes are clearly important because they can impact 
whether justices experience certain forms of repercussions. Judges are subject to two key forms 
of punishment from those dissatisfied with their rulings; one form targeted at the court as a 
whole, and another targeted at individual judges (Ferejohn 1999). The first type of punishment, 
typically instigated by political elites, is directed at the judiciary as an institution. Political actors 
can change court jurisdiction or alter a court’s operating budget (Ferejohn 1999, Langer 2002, 
Clark 2009). Reductions in budgets can obviously make the job of judges more difficult if they 
lack adequate staff and resources to adjudicate cases. Legislatures can also pass legislation to 
restrict the power of judicial actors (Ignagni and Meernik 1994, Langer 2002, Hettinger and Zorn 
2005). For example, the Ohio state legislature proposed a constitutional amendment that would 
require a 5 vote “supermajority” in order for the state supreme court to find state legislation 
unconstitutional (Bierman 2002, 862).
14
 Legislators in New Hampshire and Florida also 
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 According to Bierman (2002, 863), the representative who proposed this constitutional change 
stated that a supermajority requirement would allow “a little more accountability, a little more 
stability and a little more confidence with respect to the courts.” 
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proposed changes that would reduce court authority and increase legislative authority over court 
rulemaking (2002, 863). According to Hanssen (2000) and Tiller (1998), if administrative 
agencies view judicial intervention as a threat, they will adopt high cost decision-making 
procedures to implement agency policy in order to make judicial monitoring of their activity 
more difficult. In fact, Hanssen (2000) finds evidence that agencies in states with “independent” 
courts are more likely to attempt to insulate their activity from court interference.   
Removal of court jurisdiction, reversal of rulings, and resistance to implementation has 
important implications for the legitimacy of the judiciary as an institution (Clark 2009). 
Institutional legitimacy is particularly important for the judiciary (Gibson 2008) because most 
court rulings are not self-enforcing. Judges must rely on other political actors and the public to 
enforce and adhere to judicial rulings (Carrubba and Zorn 2010). If judicial rulings, or the 
institution itself, are viewed as illegitimate there is the increased potential for attacks upon 
judicial independence or disregard for judicial decisions (Gibson 1989, Clark 2009).  
Punishments directed at the institution for unpopular rulings are a potential risk for all 
judges, regardless of selection and retention method. However, political elite retaliation aimed at 
tenure is directly salient for judges where the institutional rules dictate that political elites decide 
whether they remain in office. The institutional design of courts affects their susceptibility to 
attacks on judicial tenure. Dissatisfied political elites can decide not to retain appointed justices. 
Anecdotal evidence provides multiple examples of state judges who have faced political elite 
reprisal aimed at their tenure as a result of their decision-making.
15
  For example, in May 2010, 
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 Although her term was renewed, South Carolina Justice Jean Toal faced a threat of not being 
retained by the state legislature in 1996 (Langer 2002). The state legislature was apparently 
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Governor Christopher Christie of New Jersey decided not to renew the term of Justice John E. 
Wallace. Apparently, Governor Christie wanted to appoint someone who would “show the 
restraint that was missing from the court.”16 Also, in many states, dissatisfied voters can refuse to 
vote for elected state supreme court justices in the next election. Similarly, voters and interests 
groups can run campaigns against state judges and thereby force judges to actively defend their 
judicial records. 
 The Influence of State Supreme Court Selection and Retention Method on the Review of 
Administrative Agency Activity 
 
Political elites (governors and legislators) want justices responsive to elite preferences. 
Across the states, political elites have more or less control over the selection and retention of 
justices.
17
 Political elite control over judicial selection and retention can make it more likely that 
judges in favor of state administrative agencies for multiple reasons.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“dissatisfied with her willingness to vote out-of-sync with the state legislature, and governor” 
(Langer 2002, 39).  
16
  Richard Perez-Pena, “Christie, Shunning Precedent, Drops Justice From Court,” May 3, 2010, 
The New York Times, accessed September 2, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/nyregion/04christie.html. According to Perez-Pena: “He 
[Governor Christie] described the historically liberal court as “out of control” over the last three 
decades, usurping the roles of the governor and the Legislature in setting social and tax policies.” 
17
 Governors play an important role in the composition of courts even in states that use public 
elections to select their state supreme court justices. Many times it is the governor who fills 
vacancies that occur on elected supreme courts (Nase 1996). 
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In regards to selection, executives and others with the power of appointment can obtain 
their preferred judges on the court through careful screening. Screening of the agent by the 
principal takes place to ensure that the agent will carry out directives in a manner reflective of 
the preferences of the principal (Krehbiel 1991, Bendor, Glazer, Hammond 2001). Screening 
leads to increased support for state agencies in court because governors and legislators have 
selected justices who view cases and the role of the state similarly. Therefore, support for state 
agencies results by way of policy agreement between state supreme courts and political elites.  
Whether a judge is liberal or conservative, political officials prefer justices who possess a 
jurisprudence that entails support for the exercise of state power. Regarding the appointment of 
federal justices, Moe and Howell (1999b, 872) argue that a major goal of presidents (of any 
ideology) is to appoint federal judges “who will uphold and promote the power of the 
presidency.” This rationale can be transferred to the state level because, understandably, state 
governors and legislatures want to select justices more likely to uphold the institutional authority 
of their respective branches of state government in general. Consider a hypothetical situation 
where Democratic Governor Smith is faced with the choice of Judge A or Judge B. Judge A has 
a liberal voting record whereas Judge B has more of a moderate voting record. However, on 
issues of state executive power, Judge B votes in favor of expansion of state executive power 85 
percent of the time, whereas Judge A votes in favor of state executive power approximately 50 
percent of the time. Because of the consistent support of executive power, Justice B may be the 
more attractive choice for Governor Smith.
18
 If political elites are successful in selecting justices 
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 This brief example may at least partially explain the recent nomination of Elana Kagan by 
President Barack Obama. Some journalists noted that Kagan was more moderate compared to 
others on President Obama’s list of potential nominees.  However, Kagan is known for espousing 
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supportive of state policy power, politically appointed justices should exhibit the most support 
for state agencies.
 
 Consequently, agencies in states with appointed state supreme courts will 
have the highest probability of success when they appear in court. 
H1: As political elite control over judicial selection increases, state supreme court 
support for state agencies increases 
While the screening that takes place during selection may increase state supreme court 
support for state agencies that appear in court, retention concerns also influence the decision-
making of state justices. Politically retained justices may fear retaliation for rulings unfavorable 
to the preferences of the state executive and legislature. The deference resulting from potential 
threats to the court’s legitimacy or a judge’s career is not necessarily a behavior that will 
manifest itself in one or two high profile decisions, but rather will be reflected in their overall 
jurisprudence toward state activity. Judges may not be “single-minded seekers of reelection” 
(Mayhew 1974), but accepting a position as a state supreme court justice clearly indicates a 
desire to hold public office. And repeated opposition to state policy could endanger a justice’s 
changes for retention. 
Therefore, justices subject to political retention will be the most supportive of state 
agencies compared to justices who face retention elections or lifetime tenure. Comparatively, the 
degree of support from justices who face partisan and nonpartisan elections will fall in between 
that of politically retained justices and justices who face retention elections or have lifetime 
tenure. Although elected justices are independent from the retention decisions of political elites, 
potentially elected judges (particularly judges who face partisan elections) who depend on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
a legal philosophy that is particularly supportive of increased presidential control over the 
executive branch (Kagan 2001).   
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support of their state party and political leaders during campaigns may also show increased 
deference toward administrative agencies.
19
 Also, because most state supreme court justices are 
chosen from the same constituency that selects the governor and legislature, their preferences 
should not necessarily diverge greatly from state policymakers. 
H2: As political elite control over judicial retention increases, state supreme court 
support for state agencies increases 
 For both hypotheses, political elites include courts retained by the governor and/or 
legislature. Legislatures clearly have a stake in the outcome of cases involving state 
administrative agencies given that the policies that agencies implement are typically crafted from 
statutes developed by the state legislature. So when ruling on cases involving administrative 
agencies, courts retained by legislatures are subject to similar retention pressures as those 
retained by the state executives. In total, courts whose judges’ selection and retention is 
determined by political officials will exhibit increased support for state administrative agencies 
that appear as litigants in court. In the next section, I describe the data used to test my hypotheses 
and the empirical results of my analysis.  
 
Data, Variables, and Methods 
The data for my analysis of state supreme court decision-making on cases involving state 
agencies comes from the Brace and Hall State Supreme Court Data Project. The Brace and Hall 
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 Vining and Wilhem (2011) find that gubernatorial endorsements do in fact significantly 
influence the outcome of state supreme court judicial elections.  
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database contains information on state supreme court cases decided between 1995 and1998.
20
 
The database includes categories for various types of litigants (i.e. private, local government, 
state government). The Brace and Hall database also contains many cases that involve state 
agencies.  Some of the policy categories involve environmental policy, taxes, utility regulation, 
and human/social welfare services.
21
 For my analysis, I use a sample of cases from the Brace-
Hall Database that involve executive branch agencies, listed as either the first petitioner or the 
first respondent.  I remove all cases where both the petitioner and respondent are a state agency. 
Removing these cases leaves a sample of 2,222 cases for my analysis.  
State agencies are very successful when appearing in state supreme court, winning 64 
percent of their cases. Based on the results of a difference of means analysis, state agencies in 
states with politically appointed courts have a win rate of 67 percent (compared to 63 percent for 
agencies in all other states). State agencies in states with politically retained courts win 71 
percent of their cases (compared to a win rate of 63 percent for agencies in other states).
22
 
Below, I describe the variables used in my analysis to examine state agency success in a 
multivariate context. 
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State Supreme Court Data Project. http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~pbrace/statecourt/index.html., last 
accessed April 3, 2012. 
21
 See Appendix A for state supreme court selection and retention methods between 1995 and 
1998. 
22
 Differences of means results for politically retained courts (versus all other courts) are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed test). The p-value for politically appointed 
courts (versus all other courts) is just shy of the traditionally accepted level of statistical 
significance (p=0.11).  
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Key Independent Variables 
The dependent variable, state supreme court support or opposition to the state agency, is 
operationalized as a court outcome in favor (1) or against (0) a state agency. The unit of analysis 
is the individual case. Because the data are binary, I estimate a series of logit models where the 
key independent variables are state supreme selection method, retention method, and finally 
selection and retention methods combined. To operationalize selection method, I utilize a series 
of ranked indicator variables. The different forms of judicial selection are ranked from least 
politically autonomous to most politically autonomous (from political elite control): Political 
Appointment > Merit Selection > Partisan Elections>Non-Partisan Elections. I expect the 
probability of success for agencies in states with merit selected judges to fall in between that of 
politically appointed judges and judges who face elections. Although judicial candidates are 
screened by judicial selection committees within the states that utilize merit selection, political 
elites (usually governors) still play a prominent role in the nomination and eventual confirmation 
of state supreme court justices. In this model courts that face nonpartisan elections, which 
historically were utilized to reduce partisan influences in elections, serve as the base (excluded) 
category. To operationalize retention method I rank the methods of retention from least 
politically autonomous to most politically autonomous: Politically Retained >Partisan 
Elections>Non Partisan Elections > Retention Election > Lifetime Tenure. Justices who have 
lifetime tenure are the base category (excluded) in this estimation. 
23
 Unlike justices in partisan 
and nonpartisan elections, justices in retention elections run unopposed (they face a yes or no 
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  All models are estimated using standard errors clustered by state and controlling for regional 
effects (Northeast, Midwest, West, South). The Northeast region serves as the base category for 
all models.   
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vote for retention) and therefore do not have to campaign against judicial challengers. Justices 
with lifetime tenure are removed from retention decisions from both political officials and the 
public.  
Including separate hypotheses for judicial selection and judicial retention may appear 
redundant because it is difficult to empirically disentangle the impact of judicial selection versus 
judicial retention on judicial behavior. My reasoning for the inclusion of separate hypotheses is 
two-fold. Most states use different methods for selecting and then retaining their justices. For 
example, Illinois and Pennsylvania use partisan election for initial selection, and both states 
switch to retention elections for subsequent judicial terms.  Some states that use merit selection 
use political elite approval to decide retention, whereas many others use retention elections.  
A second reason for separate analyses concerns observational equivalence. Judges 
selected and retained in various ways may behave similarly, however, as explained above, there 
are distinct theoretical reasons why selection method and retention method will increase or 
decrease state supreme court support of state administrative agencies. Some justices may face 
selection in a way thought to increase independence, but their retention method may actually 
have a constraining influence on their decision-making. Although different selection and 
retention methods may produce similar outcomes, it is important to acknowledge the different 
theoretical reasons that selection method and retention method influence state supreme court 
behavior.  
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Table 1.1 Variable Descriptions 
      
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
Politically Appointed Courts  0.14 0.34 0 1 
Merit Selection Courts  0.41 0.49 0 1 
Partisan Elected Courts  0.16 0.37 0 1 
NonPartisan Elected Court  0.29 0.46 0 1 
Politically Retained Courts  0.15 0.36 0 1 
Partisan Elected Courts (Retention)  0.10 0.30 0 1 
NonPartisan Elected Courts (Retention)  0.29 0.46 0 1 
Retention Elected Courts  0.36 0.48 0 1 
Lifetime Tenure Courts  0.10 0.29 0 1 
Summary Statistics for Model Variables  0.07 0.26 0 1 
Merit Selected Courts and Politically Retained Courts  0.07 0.27 0 1 
Strong Rule Review   0.16 0.37 0 1 
Moderate Rule Review  0.36 0.48 0 1 
Weak Rule Review  0.47 0.50 0 1 
Governor-Court Party ID  0.47 0.50 0 1 
Weak Non-Delegation Doctrine  0.13 0.34 0 1 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine  0.46 0.50 0 1 
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine  0.41 0.49 0 1 
Legislative Professionalism  0.19 0.11 0.03 0.57 
Administrative Docket Discretion  0.26 0.44 0 1 
Divided Government  0.53 0.50 0 1 
Agency Petitioner  0.34 0.47 0 1 
State Government Opponent  0.02 0.15 0 1 
Business Opponent  0.27 0.44 0 1 
Environmental Policy  0.03 0.17 0 1 
Taxes   0.19 0.39 0 1 
Utility  0.05 0.20 0 1 
Welfare  0.10 0.30 0 1 
Midwest  0.32 0.47 0 1 
Northeast  0.27 0.44 0 1 
South   0.20 0.40 0 1 
West  0.21 0.41 0 1 
 
 
Control Variables 
My analysis also controls for a variety of political, environmental, and case factors that 
also play an important role in state supreme court decision-making. The congruence of policy 
preferences between state justices and state policymakers should influence the probability that 
state supreme court justices rule for or against state executive branch agencies. To capture policy 
agreement between the state supreme court and the state executive branch, I measure the party 
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congruence between the majority of justices on the court and the governor.
24
  Using party 
identification provides a conservative and parsimonious measure of political elite preferences.   
When there is partisan alignment between the governor and the majority of the state supreme 
court justices, the probability of success for state agencies in court should increase. If the 
majority of justices on the court and the governor are of the same party, they receive a coding of 
(1); if majority of the court and the governor are of opposite parties, they receive a coding of (0). 
I also take into account the presence of divided or unified government.  State supreme court 
justices may be more wary of ruling against a politically unified state government because it is 
more feasible for a unified government to respond and/or retaliate to state supreme court rulings 
(Langer 2002). 
Previous empirical analysis of state supreme court decision-making fails to account for 
variance in state supreme court receptivity to delegation of decision-making authority to 
administrative agencies. Whereas federal court precedent allows broad delegation of decision-
making authority to federal agencies, many state supreme courts have established “strict” 
standards for assessing the validity of delegated legislative authority to administrative agencies 
(Greco 1994, Rossi 1999). Some states require that agencies must be given “adequate standards” 
(Greco1994, 580) from state legislative statutes to guide their activity, whereas other state 
supreme courts simply require that agencies have procedural safeguards in place when 
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 Langer, Laura. National Science Foundation CAREER Grant, SES #0092187 “Multiple Actors 
and Competing Risks: State Supreme Court Justices and the Policymaking (Unmaking) Game of 
Judicial Review.” Washington, D.C., (May 2001-May 2006). ; Lindquist, Stefanie. State Politics 
and the Judiciary Database. National Science Foundation Grant SES #0550618, “Predictability 
and the Rule of Law: Overruling Decisions in State Supreme Courts.” February 2007. 
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implementing legislative policy (Greco 1994).  I expect that state supreme courts with more 
stringent guidelines for delegation of authority will show less deference to state administrative 
agencies that appear in court (Rossi 1999). Using the categorization of state supreme court 
adherence of the non-delegation doctrine developed by Greco (1994) and Rossi (1999), I create 
three indicator variables by dividing states into three distinct categories, “strong”, “moderate”, 
and “weak.”  “Strong” indicates a stricter adherence to the non-delegation doctrine, whereas 
“weak” indicates a state supreme court with more liberal standards for monitoring delegation of 
authority to state administrative agencies (Rossi 1999). States with a “weak” non-delegation 
doctrine serve as the base category. 
For state political environment, I also control for legislative professionalism. In terms of 
legislative professionalism, states with legislatures that have higher levels of professionalism 
may indicate that these legislatures are better equipped to oversee and monitor the activity of 
state administrative agencies. Agencies in states subject to increased control and oversight from 
their state legislature could potentially receive increased deference in court if state supreme 
courts perceive a decreased need for judicial error correction and intervention into agency 
activity. Conversely, state legislatures with reduced institutional capacity of oversight may prefer 
aggressive judicial monitoring of state administrative activity.  I use a measure devised by 
Peverill Squire (2007) to measure legislative professionalism. Squire’s measure of legislative 
professionalism takes into account features such as session length and staff resources (Squire 
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2007). Legislative professionalism is measured on a 0 to1 scale with increasing scores indicating 
increased legislative professionalism.
25
  
 Also, state supreme courts with increased docket discretion may be less likely to hear 
routine challenges and more likely to select more salient cases or cases in which they intend to 
reverse a lower court decision or importantly, overturn the decision-making of a state agency. 
While most previous research controls docket discretion regarding all case types, my analysis 
controls specifically for state supreme court docket discretion for administrative agency cases. A 
dichotomous variable is used to measure docket discretion; (0) for a discretionary docket and (1) 
for a mandatory docket. 
I also control for variables related to aspects of individual cases. Previous research finds 
that appellants have increased success in court compared to appellees (George and Epstein 
1992). In regards to large governmental units, such as state agencies, Farole (1999) and Wheeler 
et al (1987) find that state governments have increased success when they appear as the appellant 
as compared to other litigants who appear in court. Because of increased experience and 
resources, state agencies will be selective in the cases that they bring before state supreme courts 
and be more likely to bring cases before the court if they feel they can win (Farole 1999). Hence, 
I expect that state agencies should have increased success when they appear as the appellant as 
compared to the appellee.  
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 Lindquist, Stefanie. State Politics and the Judiciary Database. National Science Foundation 
Grant SES #0550618, “Predictability and the Rule of Law: Overruling Decisions in State 
Supreme Courts.” February 2007, Sole PI. 
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Table 1.2 State Supreme Courts and Executive Branch Agency Litigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
 
P-Value 
 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
 
P-Value 
 0.460    
Appointment (0.281) 0.05 -----  
 0.114    
Merit Selection (0.170) 0.25 -----  
 0.244    
Partisan Election (0.187) 0.10 -----  
     
   0.408  
Political Retention -----  (0.264) 0.06 
   0.197  
Partisan Election -----  (0.367) 0.30 
   -0.214  
NonPartisan Election -----  (0.286) 0.23 
   -0.131  
Retention Elections -----  (0.209) 0.27 
     
 
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.172  
(0.109) 
 
0.06 
0.100  
(0.114) 
 
0.19 
 
0.220  0.118  
Divided Government (0.128) 0.04 (0.135) 0.19 
     
 
-0.492  -0.509  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.253) 0.03 (0.269) 0.03 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
-0.175  
(0.259) 
 
0.25 
-0.248  
(0.272) 
 
0.18 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.427  
(0.597) 
 
0.25 
-0.286  
(0.554) 
 
0.30 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.355 
(0.133) 
 
0.00 
0.286  
(0.135) 
 
0.01 
 
    
 
Agency Petitioner 
0.274  
(0.143) 
 
0.03 
0.287  
(0.144) 
 
0.02 
 
    
 -0.150  -0.137  
South (0.205) 0.23 (0.310) 0.33 
 0.156  0.263  
Midwest (0.145) 0.14 (0.228) 0.13 
 -0.036  0.115  
West (0.156) 0.41 (0.239) 0.32   
Constant 
0.417  
(0.331) 
 0.643  
(0.351) 
 
Wald χ2 (13) 46.02  (14) 71.57  
N 2222  2222  
Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or losing party (0) Tests are one-tailed. 
Standard errors are clustered by state.   
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Table 1.3 State Supreme Courts and Executive Branch Agency Litigation: Change in Predicted 
Probabilities 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 Note: Changes in predicted probabilities calculated for variables statistically significant variables.  
                     For continuous  variables, changes in predicted probability calculated as change from one standard  
                     deviation below the          mean to one  standard deviation above the mean. For indicator variables,  
                     change in predicted probability calculated as change from 0 to 1. Continuous variables held at  
                    their mean and indicator variables at their mode for calculation of predicated probabilities.  
 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-
Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
     
Appointment 0.10 16% -----  
     
Merit Selection -----  -----  
     
Partisan Election 0.05 9% -----  
     
     
Political Retention -----  0.08 12% 
     
Partisan Election -----  n.s.  
     
NonPartisan Election -----  n.s.  
     
Retention Elections -----  n.s.  
     
 
Governor-Court Party ID 
 
0.04 
 
6% 
 
n.s. 
 
 
    
Divided Government 0.05 9% n.s.  
     
 
    
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine -0.12 -23% -0.12 -23% 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
 
n.s. 
  
n.s. 
 
Legislative Professionalism 
 
n.s. 
  
n.s. 
 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
 
0.08 
 
12% 
 
0.06 
 
9% 
 
    
 
Agency Petitioner 
 
0.06 
 
10% 
 
0.06 
 
9% 
 
    
     
South n.s.  n.s.  
     
Midwest n.s.  n.s.  
     
West n.s.  n.s.  
     
N 
 
2222 
  
2222 
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Results 
The results of the models suggest selection and retention methods play a significant role 
in state supreme court review of state administrative agencies. In Model 1 in Table 1.2, state 
supreme courts are characterized according to method of judicial selection. In Model 2, state 
supreme courts are characterized according to method of judicial retention.  In Model 1, 
politically appointed courts are more likely to vote in favor of administrative agencies, 
(statistically significant at the 0.05 level). Substantively, when appointed state supreme court 
justices are ruling on cases involving state agencies, the likelihood of state agency success 
increases by approximately 16 percent.
 26
 The results also show that partisan elected courts are 
more likely to vote in favor of state agencies as compared to the base category (nonpartisan 
courts). The probability of success in courts that face partisan elections increases by 9 percent as 
compared to nonpartisan courts. Partisan elected judges, who run under a party label, perhaps 
have the greatest electoral connection to executives and legislators. These courts are apparently 
less willing to overturn the decisions of executive branch agencies as compared to courts that 
face nonpartisan elections, which are supposedly more politically insulated.
27
 The results for 
merit selected justices are not estimated precisely in Model 1; directionally however the results 
                                                          
26
 The results are consistent when compared against merit selected courts or partisan elected 
courts as the base category (see Appendix B, Table B1). 
27
 It is important to note however, that although some states have implemented non-partisan 
elections for increased political insulation of the judiciary, research indicates that state supreme 
court judges in non-partisan states are still attentive to the partisan preferences of their 
constituencies in their decision-making on high salience issues such as abortion policy 
(Caldarone, Canes-Wrone, and Clark 2009).   
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suggest that merit selected justices are less likely to rule in favor of state agencies than 
nonpartisan justices (the base category).  
Model 2 in Table 1.2 estimates the effect of state supreme court retention method on state 
agency success in court. According to the results in Table 1.2 courts subject to political retention 
from governors and legislatures are more likely to rule in favor of state administrative agencies 
in court. In fact, the probability of success for administrative agencies in states with politically 
retained courts increases by 12 percent when compared to the base category (courts with lifetime 
tenure).
28
 These findings support the hypothesis that politically retained courts are sensitive to 
retention vulnerabilities when ruling on cases involving executive branch policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 These findings are consistent when politically retained courts are directly compared to 
multiple base categories. Politically retained courts are more likely to rule in favor of executive 
branch agencies as compared to courts retained by nonpartisan elections and retention elections 
(see Appendix B, Table B1.2). The estimates comparing politically retained courts to partisan 
election courts does not achieve the traditional level of statistical significance, however the 
results are in the hypothesized direction.  
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Table 1.4 State Supreme Courts and Executive Branch Agency Litigation: Judicial Selection and 
Retention 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or losing party (0).  
               Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 3  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
 0.693  
Politically Appointed and Politically Retained (0.419) 0.05 
 0.101  
Merit Selection and Politically Retained (0.136) 0.23 
 
  
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.171 
(0.097) 
 
0.04 
 
0.159  
Divided Government (0.117) 0.09 
   
 
-0.476  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.244) 0.03 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
-0.190 
(0.246) 
 
0.22 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.187 
(0.470) 
 
0.35 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.296 
(0.119) 
 
0.01 
 
  
 
Agency Petitioner 
0.293 
(0.142) 
 
0.02 
 
  
-0.152  
South (0.205) 0.23 
 0.084  
Midwest (0.152) 0.30 
 -0.055  
West (0.182) 0.38   
Constant 
0.534 
(0.296) 
 
   
Wald χ2 (12) 60.46  
N 2222  
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Table 1.5 State Supreme Courts and Executive Branch Agency Litigation: Judicial Selection and 
Retention Predicted Probabilities 
 
        Note: Changes in predicted probabilities calculated for variables statistically significant variables. For continuous        
        variables, changes in predicted probability calculated as change from one standard deviation below the mean to one   
        standard deviation above the mean. For indicator variables, change in predicted probability calculated as change from 0 
        to 1.Continuous variables held at their mean and indicator variables at their mode for calculation of predicated        
        probabilities. 
 
 
In order to investigate the joint impact of judicial selection and retention, I estimate an 
additional model that isolates state supreme courts that are subject to appointment and political 
 Model 3  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
   
Politically Appointed and Politically Retained 0.14 21% 
   
Merit Selection and Politically Retained n.s.  
   
 
Governor-Court Party ID 
 
0.04 
 
6% 
 
  
Divided Government 0.04 6% 
   
 
  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine -0.11 -21% 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
 
n.s 
 
Legislative Professionalism 
 
n.s. 
 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
 
0.06 
 
10% 
 
  
 
Agency Petitioner 
 
0.06 
 
10% 
 
  
   
South n.s.  
   
Midwest n.s.  
   
West n.s.  
   
N 2222  
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retention (see Table 1.4).
 29
  In this model I also include a separate variable for courts where 
justices are selected by merit selection and are politically retained.  As expected, the results show 
that state agencies’ success increases substantially in courts where the state justices are both 
politically appointed and politically retained. Compared to other selection and retention methods, 
the probability of success for state agencies increases by 21 percent in courts where justices are 
politically appointed and politically retained (see Table 1.5). Although the estimate is in the 
hypothesize direction, surprisingly the variable for courts which are merit selected and politically 
retained does not achieve statistical significance.
30
 These findings suggest that researchers must 
also take into account the way in which selection and retention methods work together to 
influence court outcomes. Overall, in states where political elites (governors and legislatures) 
                                                          
29
 Creating indicator variables to capture all combinations of judicial selection and retention 
methods creates difficulties for my analysis given the limited degrees of freedom (50) and the 
variety of selection and retention methods that states use.  Nine separate indicator variables are 
required to estimate each combination of selection and retention and some states like California, 
where courts face political appointment and retention elections, are singular outliers in terms of 
combined selection and retention method. 
30
 Although all models in this analysis control from regional effects, it is important to note that 
the states in the “merit selection and politically retained category” are all Northeastern states: 
Connecticut, New York, and Vermont.  Caution should be exercised in interpreting the results 
from the Merit Selection-Political Retention variable given the potential difficulties in 
disentangling the impact of judicial institutional design versus the effect of regional 
characteristics.  
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play a significant role in the selection and retention of state justices, state agencies enjoy a higher 
rate of success in court.
31
  
Control Variables 
   Across all models, agencies in states where the state supreme court adheres to a strict 
non-delegation doctrine have a lower probability of success than agencies in state with more lax 
non-delegation doctrines. Specifically, when moving from a state with a “weak” non-delegation 
doctrine to a state with “strong” non-delegation doctrine, the probability of success for state 
agencies drops by as much as 23 percent (see Table 1.3). This finding is important because no 
previous research has empirically analyzed the impact of state non-delegation doctrine standards 
on state supreme court decision-making. While researchers at the federal level declare the non-
delegation doctrine “dead”, many state supreme courts take a strict posture towards issues 
concerning the boundaries of agency authority.
 32
      
As hypothesized, the results in Model 1 and Model 3 show that partisan agreement 
between the court and state executive influences court decision-making. The estimates show that 
                                                          
31
 In additional to controlling for regional effects, all models were estimated to control for 
individual state effects. The results presented in this analysis are consistent controlling for 
individual state effects, however when controlling for the effect of the Maine, the estimates are 
less precise (although still in the hypothesized direction). Courts in Maine are subject to political 
appointment and political retention and the success rate for agencies in Maine (86 percent) is 
greater than the success rate for the remaining sample (64 percent).  
32
 In Appendix B (Table B1.3, B1.4 I estimate expanded models which control for litigant type 
(state government litigant, business litigant).  In the expanded model I also control for policy 
issues involved (taxes, utility, environmental policy, welfare). 
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courts are more supportive of executive branch policy when a majority of the court shares the 
partisan identification of the governor (statistically significant at the 0.10 and 0.05 level). If a 
majority of the courts’ judges and the governor are of the same party, the probability of success 
for state agencies increases by six percent. The variable estimates for court-governor partisan 
agreement lack precision in Model 2. The results also indicate that state agencies are careful to 
appeal cases which they have a greater chance of winning. Consistent with previous scholarship, 
state agencies that appear as the appellant in court increase their likelihood of success by 
approximately 10 percent (Table 1.2, 1.3). 
Similarly, agencies in states where courts have mandatory dockets from administrative 
agency cases are more likely to win in court. If courts lack docket discretion they potentially 
have to entertain comparatively weak legal claims against state agencies. This fact seemingly 
increases the win rate for agencies in states with mandatory dockets. Results from Model 1 and 
Model 3 show that divided government has a statistically significant effect on court outcomes 
(0.05 and 0.10 level respectively). Surprisingly, the results are opposite to the hypothesize 
direction. According to model estimates, state agencies are more successful in environments of 
divided government. Perhaps the presence of unified government is more likely to encourage 
deferential behavior on the part of state justices when ruling on cases that involve 
constitutionality of legislation. Clearly joint action by the state legislature and governor are 
required to re-legislate in response to court action overturning state legislation. However in cases 
involving administrative agencies, a bigger threat to the court may be non-enforcement or policy 
resistance on part of the governor. Therefore in cases involving executive branch agencies, 
partisan agreement between the court and the executive would be of greater consequence to court 
 39 
 
outcomes than partisan and policy differences between the governor and the legislature. The 
estimates for legislative professionalism lack statistical significance across all model estimates.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This research examines the interaction of the judiciary and the executive branch by 
examining the effect of judicial selection and retention method on case outcomes. Many existing 
analyses of state supreme court decision-making focus on high salience issues such as the death 
penalty or abortion to investigate judicial decision-making. While the importance of these issues 
is beyond dispute, citizens and interest groups are much more likely to personally encounter state 
administrative rules and decisions in their daily lives. The fact that state supreme court justices 
have the final word on the legality of state policy gives state supreme courts a tremendous 
amount of authority. State supreme courts have declared acts of delegation to administrative 
agencies invalid and have even settled disputes over whether the governor has primary legal 
authority over the executive branch.
33
  
Using models that estimate the impact of judicial selection and retention method, I find 
that justices who face political appointment and political retention decisions are most likely to 
rule in favor of executive agencies. These findings are consistent when comparing political elite 
control over judicial tenure against multiple categories of judicial selection and retention 
methods State agencies in environments where there is policy agreement between the court and 
executive, and where the court enforces a weak non-delegation doctrine, are also more likely to 
win their challenges in court. 
                                                          
33
Perdue v. Baker, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 700 (Ga., September 4, 2003). Accessed March 10, 2010. 
http://swdb.berkeley.edu/resources/Court_Cases/georgia/PERDUEetal_v_BAKER_91503.pdf.   
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The results presented here also produce additional questions regarding the relationship 
between state justices’ decision-making and state administration agencies. If justices are strongly 
influenced by the degree of control political elites have over judicial institutions, perhaps they 
are also potentially influenced by the amount of control that policy-makers have over the activity 
of state administrative agencies.  Future research regarding the interaction between state justices 
and state agencies should take into account how differences in the institutional design of the state 
executive branch affects the level of influence governors and legislatures hold over 
administrative policy. The level of influence political elites possess in relation to administrative 
structures potentially impacts the deference they receive from state justices. 
Preserving judicial independence while maintaining judicial accountability has been an 
important justification for the evolving structure of state courts. When adjudicating cases, legal 
facts and precedent are clearly essential in the decision-making process of judges. However, this 
analysis shows that altering the manner in which justices are selected and retained will influence 
the deference that justices show executive branch agencies. Because the vast majority of state 
supreme court justices do not have the independence that comes with lifetime tenure, extralegal 
factors such as the institutional powers of governors and legislatures continue to emerge as an 
important influence on judicial behavior. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A1.1. State Supreme Court Selection 
                                                          
34 In Delaware, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire (since 2000), governors have utilized executive orders to create judicial nominating 
commissions similar to those in merit selection states. However, in these states the state executive exercises a substantial degree of control over 
the membership and procedures of the nominating commissions. For example in Massachusetts the members of the commission serve at the 
discretion of the governor. “Judicial Merit Selection: Current Status.”  
American Judicature Society. http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Judicial_Merit_Charts_0FC20225EC6C2.pdf , last accessed 
April 18, 2012. 
 In 2002, North Carolina passed the Judicial Campaign Act which required that partisan elections for state supreme court justices transition to 
nonpartisan elections (effective 2004). “History of Reform Efforts.” American Judicature Society. 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/reform_efforts/formal_changes_since_inception.cfm?state=NC, last accessed April 20, 2012. 
 In 1994, the Mississippi legislature passed the Nonpartisan Judicial Campaign Act which changed state supreme court elections from partisan to 
non-partisan. “History of Reform Efforts.” American Judicature Society. 
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/Documents/jsreform_1185395742450.pdf., last accessed April 20, 2012. 
 In Michigan and Ohio, partisan affiliation does not appear on the ballot, however in Michigan candidates are selected in party conventions and 
in Ohio, candidates in partisan primaries. 
 
State Supreme Court Selection Methods: 1995-199834  
 
 
Political Appointment 
 
 
Partisan Election 
 
 
Non-Partisan Election 
 
 
Merit Selection 
California (G) Alabama Georgia Alaska 
Delaware (G)* Arkansas Idaho Arizona 
Maine (G) Illinois Kentucky Colorado 
Massachusetts(G)* Louisiana Michigan Connecticut 
New Hampshire (G)* New Mexico Minnesota Florida 
New Jersey (G) North Carolina  Mississippi Hawaii 
South Carolina (L) Pennsylvania Montana Indiana 
Virginia (L) Texas Nevada Iowa 
 West Virginia North Dakota Kansas 
  Ohio Maryland 
  Oregon Missouri 
  Washington Nebraska 
  Wisconsin New York 
   Oklahoma 
   Rhode Island 
   South Dakota 
   Tennessee 
   Utah 
   Vermont 
Wyoming 
   Missouri 
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Table A2.1 State Supreme Court Retention 
State Supreme Court Retention Methods:1995-199835  
 
Political Retention 
 
Partisan Election 
 
Non-Partisan Election 
 
Retention Election 
 
Lifetime Retention 
Connecticut Alabama Georgia Alaska Massachusetts 
Delaware Arkansas Idaho Arizona New Hampshire 
Maine Louisiana Kentucky California Rhode Island 
New Jersey* New Mexico Michigan Colorado  
New York North Carolina Minnesota Florida  
South Carolina Texas Mississippi Illinois  
Vermont West Virginia Montana Indiana  
Virginia  Nevada Iowa  
  North Dakota Kansas  
  Ohio Maryland  
  Oregon Missouri  
  Washington Nebraska  
  Wisconsin Oklahoma  
   Pennsylvania  
   South Dakota  
   Tennessee  
   Utah  
   Wyoming  
   Hawaii  
     
*If New Jersey justices are reappointed by the governor after their initial term, they can serve until the age of seventy. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 In New Jersey, state justices initially serve a term of seven years after gubernatorial appointment. At the end of their seven year term, state 
justices are subject to gubernatorial reappointment upon which they can serve until they are seventy. Because the majority of justices on the New 
Jersey state supreme court have lifetime tenure (5 out 7) between 1995 and 1998, I include New Jersey in the lifetime tenure category for my 
analysis.  New Mexico: New Mexico utilizes a mix of merit selection, partisan and retention elections to select and retain state justices.  After 
their initial appointment by the governor, state justices in New Mexico must run in a partisan election. Winners of the partisan election run in 
retention elections in subsequent elections (Behrens and Silverman 2002). Hawaii: a nonpartisan Judicial Selection Committee decides retention. 
Hawaii is a singular outlier in terms of retention method. In my empirical analysis Hawaii is included within the category of retention elections 
for two reasons. First, retention elections and the retention process in Hawaii is noncompetitive (the justices do not have to run in a campaign 
against another candidate). Second, retention elections and the retention decision in Hawaii both have nonpartisan aspects; retention elections are 
typically nonpartisan and the retention decisions in Hawaii are made by a nonpartisan committee retention committee. However, estimates 
presented in Table 2 are consistent when Hawaii is categorized as either a politically retained court or retention election court.  Massachusetts 
and New Hampshire: Once taking office, justices in Massachusetts and New Hampshire can serve until age 70. 
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Table A1.3 State Supreme Court Selection and Retention Methods (1995-1998) 
 
                      Selection Methods 
 
 
 
 
 
Retention Methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 New Jersey included in this category. 
  
Political 
Appointment 
Partisan 
Election 
Non-
Partisan 
Election 
Merit 
Selection Total 
Political 
Retention 
5 States 0 States 0 States 3 states 8 states 
Partisan  
Election 
0 States 6 States 0 States 0 states 6 states 
Non-
Partisan  
Election 
0 States 0 states 13 States 0 states 13 states 
Retention 
Election 
1 State 3 States 0 states 16 states 20 states 
Lifetime 
Tenure 
2 states
36 0 states 0 states 1 States 3 states 
Total 8 states 9 states 13 states  20 states 
       50 states 
50 states 
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Table A1.4. State Executive/Administrative Agency Categories 
State Executive/Administrative Agency Category Plaintiff Respondent Total 
 Secretary of State 6 39 45 
Other Executive Officer37 36 60 96 
Police 7 27 34 
Taxation 128 248 376 
Human Services, welfare, health agency 149 336 485 
Streets and Highways 21 21 42 
Transportation 100 107 207 
Public Utilities 12 87 99 
Elections 4 18 22 
Environment 33 82 115 
Market 13 16 29 
Communications 1 8 9 
Labor-Management 53 121 174 
Zoning/land use 12 11 23 
Building and Housing 4 11 15 
 Personnel 16 26 42 
 Other38 167 242 409 
Total 762 1460 2222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 This category includes cases involving various state-level departments such as Treasury, State Retirement Board, Insurance Commission, 
Education, and Public Utilities.  
38 This category includes cases from state administrative agencies that cannot be classified using the above categories. Similar to the category of 
“Other Executive Officer,” this category includes a variety of state agencies and policy issues. Some categories of state agencies which appear in 
cases in this category are departments of Natural Resources, Education, Finance, Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, and Consumer Protection, 
and State Lottery Commissions.   
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Table A1.5. Case Distribution by State 
State Number Percentage 
Alabama 25 1.13 
Alaska 67 3.02 
Arizona 12 0.54 
Arkansas 49 2.21 
California 19 0.86 
Colorado 39 1.76 
Connecticut 62 2.79 
Delaware 5 0.23 
Florida 31 1.40 
Georgia 20 0.90 
Hawaii 19 0.86 
Idaho 52 2.34 
Illinois 35 1.58 
Indiana 23 1.04 
Iowa 53 2.39 
Kansas 44 1.98 
Kentucky 32 1.44 
Louisiana 32 1.44 
Maine 96 4.32 
Maryland 39 1.76 
Massachusetts 61 2.75 
Michigan 18 0.81 
Minnesota 33 1.49 
Mississippi  47 2.12 
Missouri 66 2.97 
Montana 40 1.80 
Nebraska 70 3.15 
Nevada 35 1.58 
New Hampshire 21 0.95 
New Jersey 36 1.62 
New Mexico 20 0.90 
New York 46 2.07 
North Carolina 24 1.08 
North Dakota 101 4.55 
Ohio 146 6.57 
Oklahoma 34 1.53 
Oregon 47 2.12 
Pennsylvania 80 3.60 
Rhode Island 84 3.78 
South Carolina 45 2.03 
South Dakota 31 1.40 
Tennessee 21 0.95 
Texas 21 0.95 
Utah 44 1.98 
Vermont 66 2.97 
Virginia 21 0.95 
Washington 31 1.40 
West Virginia 78 3.51 
Wisconsin 51 2.30 
Wyoming 50 2.25 
Total 2222 100 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B1.1 State Supreme Courts and Executive Branch Agency Litigation: Judicial Selection 
(Various Base Categories) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
                  
    
 
 
   Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or losing party (0). Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors  
   are clustered by state. 
 
 
 
 
 Model 2  Model 1  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
 0.346  0.216  
Appointment (0.272) 0.10 (0.264) 0.20 
   -0.129  
Merit Selection   (0.185) 0.24 
 0.129    
Partisan Election (0.185) 0.24 -----         
 -0.114  -0.244  
NonPartisan Election (0.170) 0.25 (0.187) 0.10 
 
    
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.172  
(0.109) 
 
0.06 
0.172  
(0.109) 
 
0.06 
 
0.220  0.220  
Divided Government (0.128) 0.04 (0.128) 0.04 
     
 
-0.492  -0.492  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.253) 0.03 (0.253) 0.03 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
-0.175  
(0.259) 
 
0.25 
-0.175  
(0.259) 
 
0.25 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.427  
(0.620) 
 
0.25 
-0.427  
(0.620) 
 
0.25 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.355  
(0.133) 
 
0.00 
0.355  
(0.133) 
 
0.00 
 
    
 
Agency Petitioner 
0.274  
(0.143) 
 
0.03 
0.274  
(0.143) 
 
0.03 
 
    
 -0.150  -0.150  
South (0.205) 0.23 (0.205) 0.24 
 0.156  0.156  
Midwest (0.145) 0.14 (0.145) 0.14 
 -0.036  -0.036  
West (0.156) 0.41   (0.156) 0.41 
Constant 
0.531 
(0.323) 
 0.661  
(0.323) 
 
Wald  (13) 46.02  (13) 46.02  
N 
 
2222 
  
2222 
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Table B1.2. State Supreme Courts and Executive Branch Agency Litigation: Judicial Retention 
(Varied Base Categories) 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or losing party (0). Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
 0.211  0.622  0.538  
Political Retention (0.380) 0.29 (0.309) 0.02 (0.278) 0.03 
   0.411  0.327  
Partisan Election -----  (0.250) 0.05 (0.275) 0.12 
 -0.411    -0.083  
NonPartisan Election (0.250) 0.05 -----  (0.163) 0.30 
 -0.327  0.083    
Retention Election (0.275) 0.12 (0.163) 0.31 -----  
 -0.197  0.214  0.131  
Lifetime Tenure (0.367) 0.30 (0.286) 0.23 (0.209) 0.27 
       
 
      
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.100  
(0.114) 
 
0.19 
0.100 
(0.114) 
 
0.19 
0.100 
(0.114) 
 
0.19 
 
0.118  0.118  0.118  
Divided Government (0.135) 0.19 (0.135) 0.19 (0.135) 0.19 
       
 
-0.509  -0.509  -0.509  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.269) 0.03 (0.269) 0.03 (0.269) 0.03 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
-0.248  
(0.272) 
 
0.18 
-0.248  
(0.272) 
 
0.18 
-0.248  
(0.272) 
 
0.18 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.286  
(0.554) 
 
0.30 
-0.286  
(0.554) 
 
0.30 
-0.286  
(0.554) 
 
0.32 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.286  
(0.135) 
 
0.02 
0.286  
(0.135) 
 
0.02 
0.286 
(0.123) 
 
0.02 
 
      
 
Agency Petitioner 
0.287  
(0.144) 
 
0.02 
0.287  
(0.144) 
 
0.02 
0.287 
(0.144) 
 
0.02 
 
      
 -0.137  -0.137  -0.137  
South (0.310) 0.33 (0.310) 0.32 (0.310) 0.32 
 0.263  0.263  0.263  
Midwest (0.228) 0.13 (0.228) 0.13 (0.228) 0.13 
 0.115  0.115  0.115  
West (0.239) 0.32 (0.239) 0.13   (0.239) 0.32 
Constant 
0.839  
(0.425) 
 0.429  
(0.341) 
 0.512 
(0.311) 
 
 
Wald χ2 (17)  71.57  (17) 71.57  (14) 71.57  
N 2222  2222  2222  
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Table B1.3. State Supreme Courts and Executive Branch Agency Litigation:  
Extended Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
      Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or losing party (0). Tests  
        are one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
 0.455    
Appointment (0.277) 0.05 -----  
 0.113    
Merit Selection (0.170) 0.25 -----  
 0.249    
Partisan Election (0.185) 0.09 -----  
     
   0.407  
Political Retention -----  (0.266) 0.06 
   0.207  
Partisan Election -----  (0.361) 0.28 
   -0.202  
NonPartisan Election -----  (0.284) 0.24 
   -0.119  
Retention Elections -----  (0.206) 0.28 
     
 
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.172 
(0.108) 
 
0.06 
0.100  
(0.113) 
 
0.19 
 
0.218  0.117  
Divided Government (0.127) 0.04 (0.133) 0.19 
     
 
-0.480  -0.494  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.253) 0.03 (0.270) 0.03 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
-0.171 
(0.258) 
 
0.25 
-0.242 
(0.271) 
 
0.18 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.403 
(0.619) 
 
0.26 
-0.262 
(0.560) 
 
0.32 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.363 
(0.132) 
 
0.00 
0.293 
(0.137) 
 
0.03 
 
    
-0.168  -0.188  
State Gov’t Opponent (0.251) 0.25 (0.255) 0.23 
 -0.157  -0.165  
Business Opponent (0.128) 0.11 (0.130) 0.10 
  
Agency Petitioner 
0.276 
(0.144) 
 
0.03 
0.290 
(0.146) 
 
0.02 
     
     
 0.250  0.211  
Environmental Policy (0.348) 0.24 (0.350) 0.27 
 0.120  0.106  
Taxes (0.160) 0.23 (0.160) 0.25 
 0.003  0.034  
Utility (0.195) 0.50 (0.202) 0.43 
 0.002  -0.012  
Welfare (0.178) 0.50 (0.175) 0.47 
     
 -0.151  -0.143  
South  (0.203) 0.23 (0.304) 0.32 
 0.146  0.247  
Midwest (0.149) 0.16 (0.228) 0.14 
 -0.054  0.088  
West (0.159) 0.37 (0.238) 0.36 
Constant 
0.430 
(0.335) 
 0.654 
(0.353) 
 
Wald χ2 19(65.14)  (20)91.99  
N 
0.017  2222  
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Table B1.4. State Supreme Courts and Executive Branch Agency Litigation: Extended Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
               
 
                   Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or  
                           losing party (0). Tests are one-tailed Standard errors are clustered by state. 
  
 Model 1  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
 0.689  
Politically Appointed and Politically Retained (0.417) 0.05 
 0.091  
Merit Selection and Politically Retained (0.134) 0.25 
   
   
 
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.171 
(0.096) 
 
0.06 
 
0.156  
Divided Government (0.116) 0.04 
   
 
-0.464  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.245) 0.03 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
-0.186 
(0.247) 
 
0.25 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.161 
(0.473) 
 
0.26 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.305 
(0.118) 
 
0.00 
 
  
 -0.186  
State Gov’t Opponent (0.246) 0.25 
 -0.166  
Business Opponent (0.128) 0.11 
  
Agency Petitioner 
0.296 
(0.144) 
 
0.03 
 
  
 0.227  
Environmental Policy (0.344) 0.24 
 0.113  
Taxes (0.159) 0.23 
 0.038  
Utility (0.199) 0.50 
 -0.003  
Welfare (0.175) 0.50 
   
 -0.153  
South  (0.201) 0.22 
 0.072  
Midwest (0.157) 0.32 
 -0.076  
West (0.183) 0.34 
Constant 
0.551 
(0.291) 
 
Wald χ2 (18) 72.43  
N 2222  
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CHAPTER III 
 
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND EXECUTIVE CONTROL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCIES 
 
Introduction 
             Judges have the power to make decisions that can weaken or overturn executive policy; 
however judges must rely on the executive branch for implementation of court decisions.  Do 
judges defer to strong executives for fear of retaliation or enforcement resistance? After all, 
executives must enforce judicial decisions. One way to answer this question is to examine how 
courts treat executive branch litigants. Executive branch agencies play a key role in the policy 
implementation process and aggressive judicial review of executive branch activity, where the 
government is a litigant, could be viewed as a threat to executive power and met with negative 
response from the executive and subordinate executive officials.   
Executives possess many formal tools that affect their ability to influence executive 
branch activity and policy outcomes.  Executive means of bureaucratic control include 
appointment power, rule review, budgetary control, and the ability to reorganize executive 
branch structures (Lewis 2005, Woods and Baranowski 2007, Wiseman 2009). The U.S. states 
provide an ideal setting to examine how variation in executive control influences judicial 
decision-making. State executives enjoy many institutional capabilities similar to those of the 
president; however there is substantial variation in gubernatorial institutional control across 
states. For example, in many states executive branch officials are elected by the public or 
appointed by someone other than the governor. Also some state executives have the power to 
review rules before and after they have taken affect.    
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In this paper I examine whether judges defer more to agencies in states where executives 
have increased formal influence over the executive branch. I begin by discussing existing 
research regarding the relationship between executive power and judicial decision-making. Next, 
I discuss executive mechanisms of administrative control.  I then explain how judicial concerns 
regarding enforcement and institutional retaliation result in increased judicial deference towards 
executive branch agencies in environments where executives have heightened institutional 
privileges. I evaluate the empirical relationship between state executives and judicial decision-
making using cases from the Brace and Hall State Supreme Court Data Project. I conclude by 
discussing the implications that ever-increasing boundaries of executive authority have on court 
power and decision-making.   
 
Administrative Agencies, Executive Control, and Judicial Decision-Making 
  
Almost all of what we know regarding executive and judicial branch interaction comes 
from research at the federal level, and the results of whether judges respond to variation in 
executive control are decidedly mixed (Sheehan 1992, Yates 2002, Stephenson 2004, Smith 
2007). Researchers have examined whether federal agency success in court varies depending on 
whether the agency under review is an executive agency (such as Agriculture, Commerce, and 
other departments whose heads serve on the Cabinet) or an independent agency (such as the 
Federal Communications Commission). The president has greater control over hiring and firing, 
budgets, rulemaking, and reorganization in executive agencies (Moe 1982, Sheehan 1992, Lewis 
2008.) Moreover, decision-making in independent commissions follow a more “judicialized” 
process (Moe 1982, Sheehan 1992, Caruson and Bitzer 2004) that limits presidential influence 
on agency activities. Because the president has more authority in executive agencies than 
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independent agencies, the policy outputs of executive agencies are expected to more closely 
reflect the preferences of the sitting president (Cohen and Spitzer 1996, Smith 2007). 
Scholars have suggested that the proximity of agencies to presidential control will 
influence judicial decision-making. Particularly, judges may apply greater scrutiny to executive 
branch agencies because of concerns regarding decision-making driven by partisan politics 
(Stephenson 2004). While Sheehan (1992) finds some evidence that the U.S. Supreme Court 
exhibits more support for independent agencies than executive agencies, Caruson and Bitzer 
(2004) find no significant difference between the judicial treatment of independent and executive 
agencies. One reason for the divergent findings may be the relative ideology of agencies and the 
courts. Because presidents have greater influence over executive agencies, the success rate of 
executive agencies may be dependent upon the congruence between the president and the 
ideological preferences of the justices (Cohen and Spitzer 1996, Smith 2007).  Cohen and Spitzer 
(1996) argue that if executive branch policy begins to shift under a new presidential 
administration, the U.S. Supreme Court will signal to lower courts to be more supportive of the 
new agency policy direction. However, an important component of their theory is the proximity 
of the policy preferences of the median justice to that of the sitting president (Reagan in the case 
of their analysis). Similarly, Smith (2007) finds that ideological distance between justices and the 
president, under whom the policy under question was enacted, has a greater role in cases 
involving executive branch agencies. He also finds that federal justices overall are more likely to 
vote in favor of executive branch agencies versus independent agencies.
 
Yates (2002) also 
uncovers evidence that U.S. Supreme Court justices are more supportive of executive agencies; 
however this relationship is conditional upon levels of presidential approval. As presidential 
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approval increases, justices are more likely to vote in favor of executive branch agencies (Yates 
2002).  
While existing literature addresses questions involving executive control and judicial 
deference at the federal level, no such research utilizes state institutions to examine this 
relationship and states are arguably the best places to examine this question. Analysis of 
executive and judicial control at the state level is necessary and beneficial for multiple reasons. 
First, examining executive power at the state level not only allows for analysis of variation 
across agencies, but also variation in executive influence over administrative agencies across 
states.  Also, examining the states allows for analysis of how variation in judicial institutional 
design, such as differences judicial selection and retention, affects court decision-making on 
issues involving the executive branch. Finally, assessment of executive power in the states 
allows researchers to compare, and if necessary reassess, previous conclusions regarding judicial 
deference to executive control gleaned from examination of federal institutions. 
 
Institutional Tools of Administrative Control 
 Executive branch agencies interpret and implement government policy so it is 
understandable that an executive desires a high degree of control of the rules, regulations, and 
policy that emerge from administrative agencies. Executives have many institutional 
mechanisms that aid their control over bureaucratic structures. Whereas agencies staffed with 
independent commissioners can limit executive managerial control, increased appointment 
powers allow executives to create an administrative structure responsive to executive preferences 
(Howell and Lewis 2002, Woods and Baranowski 2007). Heightened executive appointment 
power also helps reduce the information disadvantage that the executive may have in relation to 
 54 
 
other executive and legislative branch officials (Ferguson 2003, 165). In addition to appointment 
powers, executives are equipped with the power to reorganize executive branch structures, and 
the capability to review agency regulations before they are published. Rules created by 
administrative agency officials implement law and policy developed by legislatures “and provide 
the technical detail so often missing in statutes” (Kerwin 2003, 7). Multiple presidents have 
issued executive orders that have implemented centralized review and management of agency 
policy through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (Wiseman 2009).
39
 Rules are 
reviewed for multiple purposes such as ensuring their legality or analyzing their economic 
impact (Hahn 2000).  Although one stated goal of various executive rule review programs is to 
examine the economic impact of regulations, presidents are able to utilize their review 
mechanism to alter, or delay publication of, rules that may be adverse to executive preferences.
40
    
Presidents are also able to reorganize the federal executive branch in order to make it more 
responsive to presidential influence (Howell and Lewis 2002). In particular presidents have used 
                                                          
39
 Some of the executive orders include President Carter’s Executive Order 12044 that created 
the Regulatory Analysis Review and a regulatory council to allow for executive coordination of 
government rulemaking (Kerwin 2003, 119). Carter also sought to increase public involvement 
in the rulemaking process through his reforms (Kerwin 2003).  Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 
required agencies to submit regulatory goals to the OMB and “explain how they are consistent 
with the Administration’s regulatory principles” (Croley 2003). Similarly, Clinton’s Executive 
Order 12866 required Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) review of pending 
agency rules and cost-benefit analysis assessments (Kerwin 2003, Croley 2003).  
40
 Wiseman finds that OIRA review of agency activity produces “changes in nearly 70 percent of  
 
the agency rules it reviews” (Wiseman 2009, 1002). 
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their authority to create federal agencies when facing legislative resistance to executive 
preferences from Congress. Scholars find that presidentially created are subject to greater 
executive influence and control as compared to other federal agencies (Howell and Lewis 
2002).
41
 State executives possess many powers of institutional control comparable to those of the 
president. However, there exists much variation in the U.S. states regarding the degree of 
institutional privileges state executives are afforded.  
State Executive Branch and Gubernatorial Power 
 
Throughout the twentieth century, state executives made significant gains in managerial 
control over state bureaucracies. Historically, many state governments were established with a 
fragmented executive branch (Lipson 1949, Graves 1956, 743; Beyle and Dalton 1981, Beyle 
1999). Some of the specific organizational problems faced by state executives were the existence 
of agencies governed by boards and commissions outside of the purview of the governor, limits 
on gubernatorial appointment power, separate agencies performing overlapping functions, and an 
overall lack of “planned growth” of the state executive branch (Garnett 1980, Beyle and 
Muchmore 1983, Blair 1983, Conant 1988). States pursued different paths and methods to 
reorganize their state executive branch, however, a common goal of executive branch 
reorganizations was to increase gubernatorial formal powers (Beyle and Muchmore 1983, Woods 
                                                          
 
41
 For example Howell and Lewis (2002) find that presidentially created executive agencies are 
more likely to be headed by presidential appointees without terms limits as compared to agencies 
created by Congress.  
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2004) and create “new gubernatorial authority where none existed before” (Beyle and Muchmore 
1983, 18).
42
  
For example in 1955, there were 709 separately elected executive branch officials across 
“12 major offices in the states.” 43  Fifty years later this number was reduced to 308. Still 
significant state by state variation exists regarding levels of gubernatorial appointment power 
over agency officials. Many southern states such as Florida, Georgia, and Alabama, elect many 
of their top officials such as treasurer, agriculture commissioner, and insurance commissioner 
(Rossi 1999, 2001). In other states such as New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Alaska, the governor 
is responsible for the selection of a high proportion of top executive branch officials.
44
  A 
governor’s influence over the executive branch is closely tied to her control of the selection of 
executive branch officers (Brudney and Herbert 1986, Woods and Baranowski 2007). However, 
state executive officials that are elected have a base of power independent from the governor. 
Also, many executive branch officials are appointed by someone other the governor, and 
consequently, the governor usually has minimal (or no) control over the tenure and removal of 
officials he or she did not appoint. Thus, if governors gain the power to appoint top agency 
officials, they also increase their political control over that agency (Blair 1983, 118).  
                                                          
42
 Between 1965 and 1987, twenty-two states undertook comprehensive reorganization of their 
state executive branch (Conant 1988). During the waves of executive branch reorganization, the 
number of states which utilized a cabinet system of government increased from twenty-six to 
forty between 1969 and 1982 (Beyle and Muchmore 1983, 13). The cabinet system of 
government greatly concentrates executive power (Garnet 1980, Conant 1988).   
43
 Book of the States. 2006. Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments. 
44
 Book of the States. 2010. Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments. 
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Formal rule review power varies greatly across the states.  Lack of rule review power 
provides agencies with extra insulation from political interference (Poggione and Reenock 
2009); however, with the power of rule review governors are able to monitor and direct agency 
rulemaking activity within the executive branch.  Some governors have the power to review all 
proposed and existing rules, but according to Grady and Simon (2002) nearly half of state 
executives have no formal power of rule review. In a small number of states, the governor is 
required to approve proposed rules before they take effect (Grady and Simon 2002, 657). 
Reviewing rules before they are published allows state executives to take preemptive action to 
halt the implementation of rules they find undesirable.
 
 If agency officials are aware that their 
rulemaking is subject to oversight by political officials, the potential for promulgation of agency 
rules adverse to political elite preferences can be reduced (Gerber, Maestas, and Dometrius 
2005). Scholars also find that the extent of executive resources (such as executive appointment 
power and rule review capabilities) affect the executive’s influence over rule content, budgetary 
allocations, and “major policy changes” in administrative policy (Wood and Baranowski 2007, 
1222).  
The research discussed above clearly shows that executive institutional tools influence 
executive management and policy outcomes in the administrative state. Executive institutional 
powers will also affect how judges adjudicate cases involving executive branch activity. Below I 
discuss the implications that increased executive control of the administrative agencies has for 
judicial decision-making.  
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Why should Executive Institutional Power Induce Deference amongst Judges? 
Courts wield important authority to review the rules and behavior of bureaucrats. Judicial 
intervention is often required to settle disputes involving the activity of administrative agencies. 
Plaintiffs may question whether the legislature could delegate its powers to an executive agency, 
argue that an agency’s actions were beyond its authority, or challenge rulemaking activities 
(Greco 1994, Rossi 2001, Grady and Simon 2002). Administrative, legislative, and executive 
officials expend time, money, and effort to comply with court orders, and as a result, may 
become hostile to judicial intervention (Johnson 1979a, Straussman 1986, Ferejohn 1987, Tiller 
and Spiller 1999).
 45
 An unsupportive or antagonistic executive branch can prove costly for the 
judiciary. 
46
 The effort required to reform policies and procedures under court order can 
sometimes make agencies unreceptive to interventions by courts (Johnson 1979a, Straussman 
1986, Tiller and Spiller 1999). When executives have increased formal control over agency 
activity, executive branch policy and activity should closely reflect executive preferences (Cohen 
and Spitzer 1996, Stephenson 2004, Lewis 2008). In examining the interaction between courts 
and executive agencies, judges will be more deferential to agencies controlled by institutionally 
                                                          
45
 Scholars suggest that agencies will adopt high-cost decision-making procedures (i.e. deciding 
disputes on a case by case basis instead of promulgating a generally applicable rule) which make 
it difficult for courts to closely monitor the procedures used by agencies (Spiller and Tiller 1997, 
Hanssen 2000).  Also, Johnson (1979a) argues that agency preference for the status quo and the 
likelihood of court sanctions are two important factors that determine whether an agency will 
attempt to evade a court ruling. 
46
 Not all court intervention is unwelcome. Court orders can provide bureaucrats with leverage 
when making budget request from the governor and legislature (Straussman 1986). 
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strong executives for two key reasons; the desire to have their decisions enforced and prevention 
of executive retaliation. 
Enforcement Resistance 
Judges hold the power to say what the law means but not the power to enforce or make 
the law (Carrubba and Zorn 2010). Executive and legislative officials can, in various ways, 
undermine the power of the judiciary (Ferejohn 1999, Howell 2003, Clark 2009). Bureaucrats 
and others responsible for executing judicial decisions can choose not to enforce them. 
Legislators can pass statutes to blunt or even overturn court rulings. And, agencies can 
promulgate rules or procedures which sidestep a court’s holding. Executives can become 
resistant to enforcement responsibilities if court decisions are perceived as antagonistic to the 
executive branch (Moe and Howell 1999b).  
Because others enforce their decisions, judges are strategic and consider how their 
decisions will be received by those in power (Epstein and Knight 1998, Langer 2002, Segal, 
Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). Specifically, judges will be more deferential in environments 
where enforcement resistance may be a concern. Howell (2003) identifies characteristics of the 
political environment (i.e. interest group activity, divide government, presidential approval) 
which can affect whether the executive non-enforcement may occur in cases involving executive 
power. In cases involving executive agencies, the executive’s institutional environment also has 
implications for enforcement resistance. Formal tools of bureaucratic oversight allow an 
executive to impose her preferences upon the administrative structure and shift any pre-existing 
policy status quo closer to her policy preferences. These same managerial tools that allow a 
governor to influence the bureaucracy can aid the executive in resisting judicial attempts to 
unfavorably alter executive branch policy.
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Agency officials appointed by an executive can work to ensure that judicial intervention 
does not unfavorably disrupt a gubernatorial or presidential policy agenda. In fact Johnson 
(1979a, 39) finds that the agency interpretation of the state supreme court decisions regarding 
agency activity depended highly on “the attitudes of top-level agency management.” Johnson 
does not provide information regarding how these individuals are selected (appointed or elected), 
however throughout many states, the governor selects individuals for top agency positions.
47
 A 
state executive with increased appointment power can place more like-minded policy officials in 
important positions throughout the executive branch. Many high-profile examples exist 
regarding executive use of bureaucratic tools to resist judicial implementation. For example, 
commentators argue that President George W. Bush was largely able to resist implementation of 
environmental judicial decisions through the use of appointees that supported the Bush 
Administration’s environmental platform. High ranking appointees were able to ensure that 
policy emanating from Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was in line with Bush 
Administration policy preferences, even over the objections of EPA careerists and scientists.
48
 
Obama Administration appointees have also been accused of resisting implementation of court 
                                                          
47
 Book of the States. 2010. Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments. 
 
48
 Herbert, Josef H. 2007, “EPA won’t specify global warming plans,” April 4, USA Today.  
 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-04-24-4209920482_x.htm, last accessed  
 
January 25, 2012.  
 
 United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.  
 
December 2007. Political Interference with Climate Change Science Under the Bush  
 
Administration.110
th
 Congress, 1
st
 Session. http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=481710, last  
 
accessed April 20, 2012. 
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rulings that diverged with the preferences of the Obama Administration in relation to the 2010 
Gulf oil spill crisis.
49
 Bureaucratic resistance can occur in many types of agency settings. 
However certain institutional structures such as independent commissions can insulate agencies 
from executive driven policy control and influence. Therefore presidential or gubernatorial 
enforcement resistance to judicial intervention perceived as adverse to executive policy 
preferences may be more difficult in agencies where top-level agency authority is diffused, and 
executive control is reduced. In fact some legal scholars argue that fragmentation and diffusion 
of executive branch structures is necessary to check and prevent “dangerous” concentrations of 
executive control in separation of power systems (Katyal 2006, Marshall 2006). If executive 
control over agency personnel increases executive influence over agency policy, executives can 
use this increased control over policy outputs to resist attempts by the judiciary to unfavorably 
alter executive branch policy. Therefore judges will act to pre-empt enforcement resistance by 
showing increased deference to executive branch policy. 
Other executive mechanisms of institutional control may also affect judicial deference. In 
regards to courts and executive enforcement, rule review can potentially influence judicial 
decision-making in two ways. First executive centralized rule review can signal detailed and 
specific information to other policy officials, in this case judges, regarding specific policies that 
the executive prefers.  For example, OMB review of agency regulations by the Reagan and Bush 
I Administrations signaled, and enforced, a clear executive preference for deregulation in many 
policy areas (Crowley 2003).  
                                                          
49Hargreaves, Steve, 2011. “Court orders Obama to act on drilling permits,” February 21,  
 
CNNMoney.com,http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/18/news/economy/oil_drilling_permits/index.ht 
 
m, last accessed January 25, 2012.  
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 Second, and important for executive enforcement, executives can use rule review power 
to block divergent policy from emanating from the executive branch.
50
  For example, if the 
executive prefers liberal policy outcomes, she can use her review capabilities to prevent the 
implementation of administrative policies and judicial decisions that attempt to shift policy 
outcomes in a conservative direction.  Awareness of executive preferences in environments with 
rule review creates incentive for bureaucrats to create policy consistent with executive 
preferences (Seidenfeld 2001).  Similarly, in environments where the executive has centralized 
rule review capabilities judges will exhibit restraint in unfavorably altering executive branch 
policy.
51
 
                                                          
50
 For example, in 2011 Rick Scott issued an executive order that essentially required that rules 
receive his approval before being published. Scott issued an executive order that established his 
Office of Fiscal Accountability and Regulatory Reform and required all agencies to suspend 
agencies rulemaking. In addition to creating his rule review office, the executive order stated that 
“the Secretary of State shall not publish rulemaking notices in the Florida Administrative 
Weekly except at the direction of the Office of Fiscal Accountability and Regulatory Reform.” 
“Executive Order Number 11-01: Suspending Rulemaking and Establishing the Office of Fiscal 
Accountability and Regulatory Reform.” Office of the Governor. http://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/scott.eo_.one_.pdf, last accessed February 12, 2012. 
51
 Legal scholars have also examined the subject of judicial review in the wake of increased 
executive control. Particularly, some scholars who express concern regarding increased 
presidential control advocate for decreasing presidential intervention in the rule making process 
(McGarity 1986). Judicial review is seen as a potential check on presidential rule review that 
potentially circumvents statutory directives (Diver 1987, Eskridge and Ferejohn 1992, Araiza 
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I must note that an important argument (or counterargument) is that bureaucratic 
resistance from administrative agencies may be an issue in the regardless of executive power or 
executive preferences. Although bureaucratic resistance can be a constant threat to judicial 
enforcement in many environments, scholars suggest that political and resource support from the 
executive can provide important assistance for bureaucrats who are resistant to judicial 
intervention (Johnson 1979a, Spriggs 1996).  Spriggs states: 
They [presidents] represent a resource agencies can draw upon to justify and 
legitimate policy choices and to resist Court decisions (Bullock and Lamb 1984, 
11-2). Presidents can invite legislation, pass Executive Orders, and provide 
political support for agencies confronting adverse judicial decisions. On the other 
hand, presidents can attempt to compel agency implementation of Court opinions. 
As Sprigg’s quote illustrates, resistance to judicial intervention can require more than 
non-action, resistance (or circumvention) can require outside resources and policy support, 
which an executive with extensive mechanisms of bureaucratic control can facilitate. The 
executive can also provide political cover for agencies to resist court intervention thereby 
elevating the dispute from “the court versus the bureaucracy” to a dispute between the “court and 
the executive.” If political actors or the public views judicial power as intrusive or illegitimate, 
the motivation of political officials to ensure that judicial decisions are properly implemented 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2002, 618). Other scholars argue more favorably for  judicial deference towards presidential 
review of agency action because of perceived benefits such as increased accountability of agency 
rulemaking and the belief that executive agencies are more qualified than courts to “resolve 
statutory ambiguities” (Kagan 2001, Sunstein 2006, 2603). 
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will understandably diminish (Gibson 1989).
52
 Judges care about whether and how their 
decisions are enforced because the acceptance and proper enforcement of judicial decisions has 
important implications for judicial legitimacy (Howell 2003, Gibson 2008, Clark 2009). Lack of 
enforcement from the executive branch can render judicial decisions meaningless and weaken 
the power of the judiciary as an institution. To prevent enforcement resistance courts will be 
more likely to rule in favor of executive policy in environments where the state executive has 
increased institutional privileges.   
Hypothesis 1: As executive powers of administrative control increase, the 
probability of success for executive agencies in court increase.  
Retaliation 
In addition to enforcement concerns, courts will be more deferential in environments with 
stronger executives because of concerns over institutional retaliation. Executive and legislative 
officials can both work to reduce the power of the judiciary as an institution (Ferejohn 1999, 
Howell 2003, Clark 2009). Governors are typically considered the chief policy maker within 
their state (Barrilleaux 1999). Aggressive judicial intervention and monitoring from state justices 
in states where gubernatorial influence over administrative policy is high can be perceived not 
only as a challenge to administrative authority, but also a challenge to executive power. In fact, 
Smith notes that “justices understand that administrative policy is significantly a reflection of the 
                                                          
52
 In fact, the perception that a court is “activist” can actually reduce public support for the   
 
judiciary (Caldiera 1986). 
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president’s policy preferences” (Smith 2007, 6).53 Intrusion into executive authority and policy 
that the executive prefers can invite retaliatory response.  
A direct way to respond to judges is affecting their retention. Governors can also impose 
costs upon judicial selection and retention. In the U.S. states, supreme courts are selected and 
retained in variety of ways. Many states use elections to select and retain justices, and some 
states use political appointment and retention (by the governor and/or legislature) to fill the state 
high court. Political officials with tenure control of the bench can decide not to reappoint jurists 
who take an aggressive stance against state policy making power or officials can decide to only 
appoint judges with a record of deference to government authority. Previous research confirms 
courts appointed and retained by political officials are more likely to rule in favor of state 
executive branch litigants (Johnson 2011a). 
In the face of undesirable judicial intervention, political elites can also take action to 
restrict the power of the judiciary (Ferejohn 1999).  Attempts to restrict judicial decision-making 
include jurisdiction stripping, altering the size of a court, and the imposition of budgetary 
restrictions (Gunther 1984, Ferejohn 1999, Ferejohn and Kramer 2002, Langer 2002, Clark 
2009).
54
 Executives with enhanced control over state budgetary resources seemingly have 
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 In analyses of judicial decision-making on federal agencies, multiple scholars use the 
president’s party identification as a proxy for agency ideology when examining agencies where 
the president’s institutional authority and policy control is greater (Stephenson 2004, Smith 
2007). 
54
 By analyzing attempts at jurisdiction-stripping between 1877 and 2006, Clark (2009) finds that 
the threat of court curbing by Congress can have a constraining effect on judicial decision-
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enhanced capability to take punitive budgetary action towards the court (Wheeler 1988, Douglas 
and Hartley 2001, 2003). This could take the form of either restricting resources for the court 
(i.e. facilities and staff support) or withholding resources required to implement court decisions 
(Douglas and Hartley 2001, Ferejohn  and Kramer 2002). To prevent retaliation from the 
executive,   courts will be more supportive of agencies in environments where the executive has 
increased unilateral control over state resources.  
Hypothesis 2: As executive budget institutional privilege increases, the 
probability of success for executive agencies in court increases.  
Although legislatures are many times viewed as a court’s greatest institutional adversary, 
state executives also have the institutional capability to respond against an aggressive or 
“activist” court. Heightened institutional privileges such as personnel control increase the 
executive’s influence over administrative agencies and policy. In these environments, 
administrative agency decisions should exhibit increased congruence with executive preferences 
and courts will therefore be less likely to overturn executive policy because of concerns 
regarding enforcement resistance and executive retaliation. Because of this increased deference, 
agencies in states with strong governors should have a higher rate of success in court compared 
to agencies in states with institutionally weaker executives.  
 
Data, Variables, and Method 
To evaluate whether courts defer more to administrative agencies in states with strong 
governors, I use data from the Brace and Hall Data Project that includes cases decided between 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
making (Clark 2009). For examples of attempts to restrict judicial power in the states see 
Johnson (2011).   
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1995 and 1998. 
55
 I examine all cases where an executive branch agency is listed as the plaintiff 
or respondent.  I remove all cases where both the respondent and litigant are a state agency. 
Removing these cases leaves me with a sample of 2,222 cases for my analysis. The dependent 
variable, state supreme court support or opposition to the state agency, is operationalized as a 
court outcome in favor (1) or against (0) a state agency. I estimate all models using logit analysis 
with standard error estimates clustered by state. Among the 2,222 cases, 64% (1,430) were 
decided in favor of state agencies.  
Key Independent Variables: State Executive Administrative Control and Resource Control  
  
Governors have a number of different means of influencing administrative agencies, 
although some are more influential and visible than others (Woods and Baranowski 2007). 
Appointment power is continually linked with gubernatorial influence over executive branch 
(Brudney and Hubert 1986, Woods and Baranowski 2007). Also, rule review power allows the 
executive to exert direct control over agency policy that emanates from executive branch 
agencies (Wiseman 2009). To measure gubernatorial power I examine appointment power and 
rule review power. If state agencies have a higher rate of success in states where the governor 
has greater appointment power and rule review power, this is important evidence that the degree 
of executive control over the bureaucracy significantly influences judicial behavior.  
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 The database includes categories for various types of litigants (i.e. private, local government, 
state government). Under the “state government” category there are categories listed as 
“executive/administrative” and this category contains most of the cases that involve state-level 
administrative agencies. These cases involve issues such as environmental policy, taxes, utilities, 
and human/social welfare services.   
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 To measure gubernatorial appointment power I compare gubernatorial appointment 
power of agency leadership in all states across fifteen agencies.
56
 For each agency, I determine 
whether or not the governor appoints agency leadership. If the governor has appointment 
authority, a score of one (1) is given for each particular agency.
57
 If the agency official is elected 
or someone else appoints the agency leadership, a score of zero (0) is given for each particular 
agency. Therefore if a governor cannot select any officials in the fifteen categories, her total 
appointment score is zero. If a governor can appoint all categories of administrative officials, her 
appointment score is fifteen. Higher scores indicate governors with more extensive appointment 
power throughout the executive branch. The mean score for state-level gubernatorial 
appointment power in my sample is 8.26. 
To measure rule review power I divide states into three broad categories; “Strong Rule 
Review”, “Moderate Rule Review”, and “Weak Rule Review.”  Strong Rule Review states are 
states where the governor can review all proposed rules and at least some existing rules (Grady 
                                                          
56
 I use The Book of the States (1995-1998) to collect information regarding the selection method 
of state agency officials. The Book of the States lists the method of selection for administrative 
officials in charge of various administrative functions. The fifteen administrative categories 
chosen for this analysis are agriculture, budget, corrections, education, environmental protection, 
health, insurance, labor, personnel, public utilities, revenue, social services, secretary of state, 
transportation, and treasury. These agencies were chosen to ensure policy area comparability 
across all fifty states.  
57
 This includes agencies where the governor alone has appointment authority and where the 
governor appoints and someone else (i.e. a legislature, board, or commission) approves her 
appointment. 
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and Simon 2002). Moderate Rule Review states are states where the governor can review some 
proposed and some existing or can only review one category (proposed or existing). Finally, in 
Weak Rule Review states, the governor has no formal rule review power (Grady and Simon 
2002). The variables for rule review power are constructed as three dichotomous variables, with 
Weak Rule Review as the base (excluded category). Forty-seven percent of states are in the 
Weak Rule Review category. Thirty-seven percent of states are categorized as Moderate Rule 
Review States and sixteen percent of states are categorized as Strong Rule Review states. 
To operationalize the capacity for threat of executive retaliation I measure whether the 
state executive has the power to reduce the budget without legislative approval.
58
 States where 
the executive can reduce the budget without legislative approval are coded as (1) and states 
where executives do not have this authority are coded as (0). Empirical evidence lends support to 
using this measure of executive budget control to capture the threat of executive retaliatory 
action in response to court rulings. In their analysis of court budgeting in the states, Douglas and 
Hartley (2003) conduct a survey of chief court administrators, legislative budget officials, and 
executive budget officials.  They find that executive budget officials and court administrators 
most frequently mentioned “reducing the funding of the judiciary in the executive budget” as a 
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 Information for state executive control over the budget taken from Budget Processes in the 
States 1989, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2008. The National Association of State Budget 
Officers. http://www.nasbo.org/publications-data/budget-processes-in-the-states, last accessed 
November 11, 2011. This budget reduction capability includes the ability to reduce 
appropriations, reduce expenditures, and/or withhold allotments.  
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gubernatorial action used against the courts (Douglas and Hartley 2003, 448).
59
  Their survey 
also finds that chief court administrators rated “rulings which have a direct impact upon the 
governor personally” as one of the actions by the court most likely to incur executive action 
against the judiciary’s budget (Douglas and Hartley 2003, 448).  
Control Variables 
Variation in judicial deference is also caused by a number of political, environmental, 
and case factors that may be correlated with my key independent variables of interest.  Variation 
in state supreme court selection and retention method has an important impact on state supreme 
court behavior (Langer 2002, Shepherd 2009, Johnson 2011a). Previous research has found that 
state justices are quite responsive to those responsible for their selection and retention on the 
bench, particularly when ruling on cases involving state executive branch agencies (Johnson 
2011a). Courts selected by political appointment should be more likely to rule in favor of 
administrative agencies if political elites are able to select justices whose jurisprudence reflects 
deference for state and governmental policy. Because politically retained courts are subject to 
tenure control from state policy-makers, I also expect that courts retained by governors and 
legislatures will be most supportive of administrative agencies in court. To control for the effects 
of judicial selection and retention I estimate separate models that characterize state supreme 
courts by selection method, retention method, and combined selection and retention method.    
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 According to Douglas and Hartley (2003, 444): “Reducing the funding of the judiciary in the 
executive budget-meaning reducing judicial requests-appears to be used more than any other 
gubernatorial budget power to influence court rulings and policies. Four executive budget 
officers (8.9 percent of 45) and seven court administrators (17.1 percent of 41) indicated that 
governors in their states had used this power to influence the courts.” 
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I expect that as political elite control over judicial selection increases, state courts should 
be more likely to vote in favor of administrative agencies. I create 4 indicator variables to 
capture various selection methods of state supreme courts: Politically Appointed>Merit 
Selection>Partisan Election>Nonpartisan Election. Nonpartisan elected courts serve as the base 
category in this analysis. Similarly as political elite control over judicial retention increases, state 
courts should be more likely to vote in favor of state administrative agencies. I create 5 indicator 
variables to capture state supreme court retention method: Politically Retained>Partisan 
Election>Nonpartisan Election>Retention Election>Lifetime Tenure. Lifetime tenure courts 
serve as the base category in this analysis.   Finally, state justices who are both appointed and 
retained by political officials should be most supportive of state administrative in court. I create 
two indicator variables for courts that are subject to appointment and political retention and all 
other courts serve as the base category: Politically Appointed and Politically Retained> Merit 
Selected and Politically Retained.  
The congruence of policy preferences between state justices and state policymakers 
should influence the probability that state supreme court justices rule for or against state 
executive branch agencies. To capture policy agreement between the state supreme court and the 
state executive branch, I measure the party congruence between the majority of justices on the 
court and the governor.
60
  When there is partisan alignment between the governor and the 
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 Langer, Laura. National Science Foundation CAREER Grant, SES #0092187 “Multiple Actors 
and Competing Risks: State Supreme Court Justices and the Policymaking (Unmaking) Game of 
Judicial Review.” Washington, D.C., (May 2001-May 2006). ; Lindquist, Stefanie. State Politics 
and the Judiciary Database. National Science Foundation Grant SES #0550618, “Predictability 
and the Rule of Law: Overruling Decisions in State Supreme Courts.” February 2007. 
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majority of the state supreme court justices, the probability of success for state agencies in court 
should increase. If the majority of justices on the court and the governor are of the same party, 
they receive a coding of one (1); if majority of the court and the governor are of opposite parties, 
they receive a coding of zero (0). I also take into account the presence of divided or unified 
government.  State supreme court justices may be more wary of ruling against a politically 
unified state government because it is more feasible for a unified government to respond and/or 
retaliate to state supreme court rulings (Langer 2002). 
Whereas federal court precedent allows broad delegation of decision-making authority to 
federal agencies, many state supreme courts have established “strict” standards for assessing the 
validity of delegated legislative authority to administrative agencies (Greco 1994, Rossi 1999). 
Some states require that agencies must be given “adequate standards” (Greco1994, 580) from 
state legislative statutes to guide their activity, whereas other state supreme courts simply require 
that agencies have procedural safeguards in place when implementing legislative policy (Greco 
1994).  State supreme courts with more stringent guidelines for delegation of authority will show 
less deference to state administrative agencies that appear in court (Rossi 1999). Using the 
categorization of state supreme court adherence of the non-delegation doctrine developed by 
Greco (1994) and Rossi (1999), I create three indicator variables by dividing states into three 
distinct categories, “Strong”, “Moderate”, and “Weak.”  “Strong” indicates a stricter adherence 
to the non-delegation doctrine, whereas “Weak” indicates a state supreme court with more liberal 
standards for monitoring delegation of authority to state administrative agencies (Rossi 1999). 
States with a “Weak” non-delegation doctrine serve as the base category. 
For state political environment, I also control for legislative professionalism. States with 
legislatures that have higher levels of professionalism may indicate that these legislatures are 
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better equipped to oversee and monitor the activity of state administrative agencies. Agencies in 
states subject to increased control and oversight from their state legislature could potentially 
receive increased deference in court if state supreme courts perceive a decreased need for judicial 
error correction and intervention into agency activity. Conversely, state legislatures with reduced 
institutional capacity of oversight may prefer aggressive judicial monitoring of state 
administrative activity.  I use a measure devised by Peverill Squire (2007) to measure legislative 
professionalism. Squire’s measure of legislative professionalism takes into account features such 
as session length and staff resources (Squire 2007). Legislative professionalism is measured on a 
0 to1 scale with increasing scores indicating increased legislative professionalism.
61
  
 Also, state supreme courts with increased docket discretion may be less likely to hear 
routine challenges and more likely to select more salient cases or cases in which they intend to 
reverse a lower court decision or importantly, overturn the decision-making of a state agency. 
While most previous research controls docket discretion regarding all case types, my analysis 
controls specifically for state supreme court docket discretion for administrative agency cases. A 
dichotomous variable is used to measure docket discretion; (0) for a discretionary docket and (1) 
for a mandatory docket. 
 I also control for variables related to aspects of individual cases. Previous research finds 
that appellants have increased success in court compared to appellees (George and Epstein 
1992). In regards to large governmental units, such as state agencies, Farole (1999) and Wheeler 
et al (1987) find that state governments have increased success when they appear as the appellant 
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 Lindquist, Stefanie. State Politics and the Judiciary Database. National Science Foundation 
Grant SES #0550618, “Predictability and the Rule of Law: Overruling Decisions in State 
Supreme Courts.” February 2007, Sole PI. 
 74 
 
as compared to other litigants who appear in court. Because of increased experience and 
resources, state agencies will be selective in the cases that they bring before state supreme courts 
and be more likely to bring cases before the court if they feel they can win (Farole 1999). Hence, 
I expect that state agencies should have increased success when they appear as the appellant as 
compared to the appellee.
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Summary Statistics for Model Variables      
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
Gubernatorial Appointment Power  8.26 3.12 0 14 
Gubernatorial Appointment Power (Unilateral)  3.01 3.59 0 13 
Strong Rule Review   0.16 0.37 0 1 
Moderate Rule Review  0.36 0.48 0 1 
Weak Rule Review  0.48 0.50 0 1 
Gubernatorial Budget Power  0.76 0.43 0 1 
Politically Appointed Courts  0.14 0.34 0 1 
Merit Selected Courts  0.41 0.49 0 1 
Partisan Elected Courts  0.16 0.37 0 1 
NonPartisan Elected Courts  0.30 0.46 0 1 
Politically Retained Courts  0.15 0.36 0 1 
Partisan Elected Courts (Retained)  0.10 0.30 0 1 
NonPartisan Elected Courts (Retained)  0.30 0.46 0 1 
Retention Elections  0.36 0.48 0 1 
Lifetime Tenure  0.09 0.29 0 1 
Politically Appointed and Politically Retained Courts  0.08 0.26 0 1 
Merit Selected and Politically Retained Courts  0.08 0.27 0 1 
Governor-Court Party ID  0.47 0.50 0 1 
Weak Non-Delegation Doctrine  0.13 0.34 0 1 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine  0.46 0.50 0 1 
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine  0.41 0.49 0 1 
Legislative Professionalism  0.19 0.11 0.03 0.57 
Administrative Docket Discretion  0.26 0.44 0 1 
Divided Government  0.53 0.50 0 1 
Agency Petitioner  0.34 0.47 0 1 
State Government Opponent  0.02 0.15 0 1 
Business Opponent  0.27 0.44 0 1 
Taxes   0.19 0.39 0 1 
Zoning  0.01 0.12 0 1 
Utility  0.05 0.20 0 1 
Welfare  0.10 0.30 0 1 
Attorney General Salary  77767 16539 50000 115600 
Attorney General Budget  3.45e+07 4.54e+07 2.73e+07 3.59e+08 
Attorney General Budget as Proportion of State 
Expenditures 
  
0.003 
 
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
0.011 
Midwest  0.32 0.47 0 1 
Northeast  0.27 0.44 0 1 
South  0.20 0.40 0 1 
West  0.21 0.41 0 1 
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Table 2.2 State Executive Branch Control and Agency Success in Court 
 
Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or losing party (0). Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by 
state. 
 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
  
Executive Appointment Power                
0.044 
(0.023) 
 
0.03 
0.038  
(0.023) 
 
0.05 
0.030 
(0.022) 
 
0.08 
 0.413  0.296  0.380  
Strong Rule Review (0.204) 0.02 (0.209) 0.08 (0.212) 0.04 
Moderate Rule Review 
0.232 
(0.128) 
 
0.04 
0.172 
(0.157) 
 
0.14 
0.281 
(0.113) 
 
0.00 
 -0.074  -0.170  -0.025  
Executive Budgetary Control (0.164) 0.33 (0.178) 0.17 (0.147) 0.43 
                                                            
 0.332      
Appointment (0.221) 0.07 -----  -----  
 -0.139      
Merit Selection (0.175) 0.21 -----  -----  
 0.046      
Partisan Election (0.192) 0.40     
       
   0.167    
Political Retention -----  (0.289) 0.28 -----  
   -0.011    
Partisan Election -----  (0.385) 0.49 -----  
   -0.255    
NonPartisan Election -----  (0.265) 0.17 -----  
   -0.369    
Retention Election   (0.265) 0.08   
       
     0.736 0.02 
Political Appointed and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.357)  
     -0.191 0.14 
Merit Selection and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.174)  
 
      
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.213 
(0.092) 
 
0.01 
0.095 
(0.110) 
 
0.19 
0.241 
(0.094) 
 
0.01 
 
0.364  0.217  0.301  
Divided Government (0.121) 0.00 (0.122) 0.04 (0.123) 0.01 
       
 
-0.470  -0.531  -0.451  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.256) 0.03 (0.270) 0.02 (0.253) 0.04 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
-0.056 
(0.244) 
 
0.41 
-0.211 
(0.257) 
 
0.21 
-0.080 
(0.237) 
 
0.37 
Legislative Professionalism 
-1.021 
(0.678) 
 
0.07 
-0.749 
(0.602) 
 
0.11 
-0.456 
(0.550) 
 
0.20 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.392 
(0.129) 
 
0.00 
0.339 
(0.128) 
 
0.00 
0.406 
(0.123) 
 
0.00 
 
      
 
Agency Petitioner 
0.261 
(0.141) 
 
0.03 
0.271 
(0.144) 
 
0.03 
0.274 
(0.140) 
 
0.03 
 
      
-0.062  0.011  -0.138  
South (0.172) 0.36 (0.276) 0.48 (0.167) 0.21 
 0.245  0.348  0.146  
Midwest (0.156) 0.06 (0.233) 0.07 (0.153) 0.17 
 -0.028  0.152  -0.091  
West (0.165) 0.43 (0.218) 0.24   (0.195) 0.32 
Constant 
0.019 
(0.398) 
 0.460 
(0.376) 
 0.008 
(0.330) 
 
 
Wald χ2 (17) 65.95  (18)  99.55  (16) 60.16  
N 2222  2222  2222  
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Results 
 
 Table 2.2 includes estimates from three models that examine the influence of 
gubernatorial power on judicial decision-making.
 
Model 1 includes state courts categorized 
according to selection method. In Model 2 state supreme courts are categorized by retention 
method and in Model 3 state supreme courts are categorized according to selection and retention 
method. The results across all models suggest that state supreme courts are more deferential to 
state agencies in environments where the governor has increased formal power. Specifically, the 
results from each model in Table 2.2 show that as gubernatorial control over appointment and 
rule review increases, state courts are more likely to rule in favor of state agencies (statistically 
significant at the 0.05 and 0.10 level). As gubernatorial appointment power increases, the 
probability of success for state agencies in court increases by as much as 11 percent (see Table 
2.3).  This indicates that state agencies in states where gubernatorial appointment power is high 
have a higher probability of success in court compared to agencies in states where the governor 
oversee a highly fragmented executive branch  (i.e. Georgia, which elects many of its top agency 
officials such as Insurance Commissioner, Attorney General, Superintendent of Education).
63
   
                                                          
63
 In Appendix C, I estimate additional models using an alternate measure of state executive 
environmental appointment power. I create an indicator variable that captures whether the state 
executive has unilateral appointment control (meaning the governor appoints alone with no 
outside approval required), or lacks unilateral appointment control over executive branch 
leadership. The estimates in Appendix C (Table C2.1, C2.2) mirror those reported in Table 2.2, 
however the estimates for the key independent variables are more precise.  
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 State agencies in states where the governor has moderate and strong rule review powers 
are also more likely to win in court. The variable for Strong Rule Review is statistically 
significant across all models (at the 0.05 and 0.10 level). In Model 1 and Model 3 the Moderate 
Rule Review variable is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Substantively, when moving 
from a state where the governor has no formal rule review power to a state where the governor 
has moderate rule review powers, the probability of winning for state agencies increases by 9 
percent in Model 1 and eleven percent in Model 3 (Table 2.3). The influence of Strong Rule 
Review on state supreme court decision-making has an even larger effect. Compared to a weak 
rule review state, the probability of success for state agencies increases by a maximum of 15 
percent in a state where the governor has strong rule review powers (Table 2.3). As noted 
previously, executive rule review can signal to gubernatorial preferences to other state officials 
and judges. Awareness of the policy preferences of state policy-makers allows justices to adjust 
their decision-making behavior to prevent a negative or retaliatory response based upon judicial 
rulings.  Overall, the results from the appointment power and rule review variables support the 
hypothesis that state supreme court justices will be more supportive of state agencies in 
environments where the governor has more control over the state executive branch.  
The variable for executive budget control, which captures the threat of executive resource 
retaliation against the court, is not estimated at the traditional levels of statistical significance. 
Surprisingly, the sign for the coefficient estimate is opposite of the hypothesize direction. It is 
possible that for this analysis, unilateral budget reduction capabilities do not accurately capture 
the threat of retaliation from the executive against the court. It is also plausible that courts are 
less sensitive to retaliation from political elites in response to rulings on cases involving 
administrative agencies as compared to arguably higher salience cases involving constitutionality 
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of legislation, morality policy (death penalty, religious issues), or direct challenges to 
executive/legislative power.
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Table 2.3 State Executive Branch Control and Agency Success in State Supreme Court: Change 
in Predicted Probabilities 
 
       Note: Changes in predicted probabilities calculated for variables statistically significant variables. For continuous variables, changes in predicted           
       probability calculated as change from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. For indicator variables, change         
       in predicted probability calculated as change from 0 to 1.  Continuous variables held at their mean and indicator variables at their mode for calculation      
       of predicated probabilities. 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable 
 
∆ 
 
% 
 
∆ 
 
% ∆ 
 
% 
  
Executive Appointment Power                
 
0.06 
 
11% 
 
0.05 
 
8% 
 
0.05 
 
8% 
       
Strong Rule Review 0.09 15% 0.06 9% 0.09 14% 
Moderate Rule Review 
 
0.05 
 
9% 
 
n.s 
  
0.06 
 
11% 
       
Executive Budgetary Control n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  
                                                            
       
Appointment 0.07 12% -----  -----  
       
Merit Selection n.s.  -----  -----  
       
Partisan Election n.s.      
       
       
Political Retention -----  n.s.  -----  
       
Partisan Election -----  n.s.  -----  
       
NonPartisan Election -----  n.s.  -----  
       
Retention Election   0.09 -13%   
       
       
Political Appointed and Politically Retained -----  -----  0.16 25% 
       
Merit Selection and Politically Retained -----  -----  .  
 
      
Governor-Court Party ID 
 
0.05 
 
8% 
 
n.s. 
  
0.06 
 
9% 
 
      
Divided Government 0.08 17% 0.05 8% 0.07 14% 
       
 
      
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine 0.11 -23% 0.13 -23% 0.11 -22% 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
 
n.s. 
  
n.s. 
 
 
 
n.s. 
 
 
Legislative Professionalism 
 
0.05 
 
-9% 
 
n.s. 
 
  
 
n.s. 
 
 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
 
0.09 
 
14% 
 
0.07 
 
11% 
 
0.09 
 
15% 
 
      
 
Agency Petitioner 
 
0.06 
 
10% 
 
0.06 
 
9% 
 
0.06 
 
10% 
 
      
      
South n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 0.21 
       
Midwest 0.06 9% 0.07 11% n.s. 0.17 
       
West n.s.  n.s.   n.s. 0.32 
Constant 
 
 
     
 
N 2222  2222  2222  
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Control Variables 
The control variables provide insight into the multiple influences on state supreme court 
review of their state executive branch. State supreme court selection and retention method has 
consistently been shown to be an important influence on state supreme court behavior, and the 
results in Table 2.2 show this as well. Politically appointed state courts (Model 1) are more likely 
to rule in favor of state agencies as compared to the base category. Substantively, the probability 
of agency success in states with politically appointed courts increases by approximately 12 
percent.  The variable for politically retained courts is in the hypothesize direction, however the 
estimates lack precision. The variable for retention elections is the only variable that achieves 
statistical significance and the coefficient is negative. However the estimates for the political 
retention variables may be an artifact of the choice of base category. Courts with lifetime tenure 
are clearly free from retention pressures that accompany political retention and elections, but 
courts in these states face appointment selection (either political appointment or merit 
selection).
64
 Appointment by political officials (in this instance the governor) may make these 
courts, even though they have life tenure, more likely to rule in favor of government litigants 
than courts. In Model 3, the results show that courts subject to political appointment and political 
retention are more likely to rule in favor of state agencies. Substantively, the probability of 
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 In Appendix C, Table C2.3 I estimate models that vary the base category for state supreme 
court retention method. The results show that the statistical significance for political retention in 
varies depending on the base category in the model. Specifically, the political retention variable 
is positive and statistically significant (0.01 level) when compared against the base category of 
retention elections.  
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success for state agencies in these courts increases by 25 percent (Table 2.3). 
65
 The variable for 
courts subject to merit selection and political retention is not statistically significant.  
Also, state agencies in states where the court adheres to a more strict non-delegation 
doctrine have a lower probability of success (statistically significant at the 0.05 level). When 
moving from a state with a “weak” non-delegation doctrine to a “strong” non-delegation 
doctrine, the probability of success for state agencies decreases by approximately twenty-three 
percent (see Table 2.3). Overall, the results suggest that state supreme courts in states with more 
stringent non-delegation doctrines engage in more aggressive oversight of state agency activity. 
The variable for “moderate” non-delegation doctrine is estimated less precisely and does not 
reach traditional levels of statistical significance. 
  As expected, state agencies are more successful in states that have a mandatory 
administrative docket. The probability of success for agencies that appear in courts with 
mandatory administrative dockets is approximately fifteen percent (Table 2.3). This suggests that 
courts with discretionary dockets are more likely to accept cases where correction of agency 
activity is necessary, compared to court with mandatory dockets who must sometimes entertain 
weak (or even frivolous) challenges to agency decision-making. Also, when state agencies are 
the petitioner in court their probability of success increases by approximately ten percent (Table 
                                                          
65
 The results for the executive appointment power variable and the rule review variables are 
consistent when controlling for individual state effects. However, the estimates for the court 
selection and retention variables are less precise when controlling for the effects of Maine. The 
results remain in the hypothesized direction. Courts in Maine are subject to political appointment 
and political retention and the success rate for state agencies in Maine (86 percent) is 
substantially higher than the remaining states in the sample (64 percent). 
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2.3). State agencies are apparently more selective in their decision to appeal cases to their state 
supreme court and are more likely to appeal cases in which they have a higher probability of 
success. 
The presence of divided government also has a statistically significant effect on state 
supreme court decision-making.  However the results show that agencies are more likely to win 
court challenges in periods of divided government. This finding is counter to the idea that courts 
are more willing to rule against a divided government because retaliation from a divided (as 
opposed to unified government) is more difficult. Possibly, the presence of unified government is 
more likely to increase deferential behavior from judges when they must rule on the 
constitutionality of state legislation. The threat of re-legislation in response to court decision is 
potentially higher in environments where the government is unified.  The variable for legislative 
professionalism is statistically significant in Model 1 (at 0.10 level) and suggests that agencies in 
environments with more professional legislatures do not have an advantage in court because their 
probability of success decreases in environments with more professional legislatures. The 
variable is estimated with less precision in Model 2 and Model 3 and does not achieve the 
traditional level of statistical significance.
 66
  
Agency Level Analysis 
The results from the preceding analysis show that justices are in fact responsive to 
variation in executive control of the executive branch. However, the appointment power measure 
used in the above analysis is a measure of state executive “environmental” power in that it 
measures variation in appointment power across the state executive branch. In order to examine 
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I also explore the alternative hypothesis that the legal capacity of the state environment is 
driving the success rate of agencies in court. See Appendix D for discussion and results.  
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how judicial decision-making is influenced by variation in control in the individual agency that is 
a litigant in court, I create an additional measure of appointment power that captures how agency 
leadership of the agency litigant is selected. This measure is similar to studies by Sheehan (1992) 
and Yates (2002) which categories agencies according to whether they are executive branch 
agencies or independent agencies where the president’s appointment and removal power faces 
greater restrictions. Relying on state codes and titles, individual agency websites, and the Book of 
the States I code for the selection method of agency leadership in 1300 cases. Many cases are 
excluded because of a lack of reliable data regarding the selection of agency leadership during 
the period under analysis (1995-1998). I also attempted to focus on agency types that appear 
across most states (i.e. education, revenue, public utility commissions) for increased 
comparability.  The results of this analysis are presented below in Table 4. I create an indicator 
variable accounting for the selection and structure of agency leadership. Agencies where the 
administrative leadership is chosen by the governor are coded as one (1) and agencies where 
leadership is elected or chosen by someone other than governor are coded as zero. Agencies 
whose leadership consists of elected commissions or commissions where the executive’s 
appointment power is restricted are also coded as zero (0).   
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Table 2.4 State Executive Branch Control and Agency Success in Court: Agency-Level Analysis 
 
 Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or losing party (0). Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
  
Gubernatorial Appointee-Lead Agency               
0.253 
(0.146) 
 
0.04 
0.219 
(0.143) 
 
0.06 
0.249 
(0.145) 
 
0.04 
 0.348  0.269  0.327  
Strong Rule Review (0.316) 0.14 (0.295) 0.18 (0.287) 0.13 
Moderate Rule Review 
0.062 
(0.191) 
 
0.37 
0.045 
(0.198) 
 
0.41 
0.166 
(0.177) 
 
0.17 
 -0.174  -0.228  -0.007  
Executive Budgetary Control (0.190) 0.18 (0.190) 0.12 (0.167) 0.48 
                                                            
 0.055      
Appointment  (0.299) 0.43 -----  -----  
 -0.284      
Merit Selection (0.246) 0.12 -----  -----  
 -0.072      
Partisan  Election (0.248) 0.39     
       
   0.157    
Political Retention -----  (0.333) 0.32 -----  
   -0.116    
Partisan Election -----  (0.460) 0.40 -----  
   -0.257    
Nonpartisan Election -----  (0.407) 0.26 -----  
   -0.554    
Retention Election   (0.375) 0.07   
       
     0.916       0.00 
Political Appointed and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.340)  
     -0.295 0.05 
Merit Selection and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.260)  
 
      
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.141 
(0.146) 
 
0.17 
0.038 
(0.163) 
 
0.40 
0.209 
(0.155) 
 
0.06 
 
0.403  0.206  0.308  
Divided Government (0.189) 0.02 (0.191) 0.14 (0.185) 0.05 
       
 
0.001  -0.140  -0.085  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.316) 0.50 (0.300) 0.32 (0.270) 0.15 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
0.223 
(0.296) 
 
0.23 
-0.003 
(0.286) 
 
0.50 
0.118 
(0.260) 
 
0.32 
Legislative Professionalism 
-1.120 
(0.699) 
 
0.06 
-0.897 
(0.676) 
 
0.09 
-0.495 
(0.685) 
 
0.24 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.486 
(0.212) 
 
0.00 
0.431 
(0.204) 
 
0.02 
0.572 
(0.201) 
 
0.00 
 
      
 
Agency Petitioner 
0.252 
(0.159) 
 
0.06 
0.289 
(0.165) 
 
0.04 
0.278 
(0.157) 
 
0.04 
 
      
-0.357  -0.199  -0.354  
South (0.226) 0.06 (0.335) 0.28 (0.216) 0.05 
 -0.091  0.163  -0.100  
Midwest (0.229) 0.35 (0.310) 0.30 (0.243) 0.34 
 -0.249  0.070  -0.223  
West (0.252) 0.16 (0.338) 0.42  (0.302) 0.23 
Constant 
0.371 
(0.505) 
 0.695 
(0.468) 
 0.010 
(0.420) 
 
 
Wald χ2   (17)36.10  (18) 28.95  (16) 43.88  
N 1297  1297  1297  
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Table 2.5 State Executive Branch Control and Agency Success in Court:  Predicted Probabilities 
for Gubernatorial Appointee-Lead Agencies 
 
 Note: Changes in predicted probabilities calculated as change from 0 to 1 for Gubernatorial Appointee-Lead Agency variable.  Continuous variables   
held at their mean and indicator variables at their mode for calculation of predicated probabilities. 
  
  
 Estimates presented in Table 2.4 are consistent with the findings from the previous 
analysis. Results across Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 state justices are more likely to rule in favor 
of state agencies when leadership is directly chosen by the state executive as compared to 
leadership chosen by other means, and alternative agency structures. When an executive-
appointee controlled agency appears as a litigant in court, the probability of success for the 
agency increases by as much 11 percent compared to other agencies (see Table 2.5). These 
results show that agencies in environments under high executive control have a clear advantage 
in court. Courts show increased deference to executive branch litigants when the state executive 
is equipped with enhanced tools of bureaucratic control.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Chevron decision marked an important shift in 
judicial decision-making on cases involving agency rulemaking.
67
 The case involved a Reagan 
Administration Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation. In their majority opinion the 
Court directed federal courts to defer to “reasonable” agency interpretation of legislative statutes 
that were “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific question.” The Court also stated:  
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 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984). 467 U.S. 837. 
       
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable ∆ % ∆ % ∆ % 
  
Gubernatorial Appointee-Lead Agency               
 
0.06 
 
10% 
 
0.05 
 
8% 
 
6% 
 
11% 
       
N                                                      1297  1297  1297  
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an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, 
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent 
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgment.68 
Scholars have discussed at the length the role of various legal doctrines, judicial ideologies, and 
policy intricacies in explaining the Court’s landmark decision that urged increase deference on 
the part of federal judges. However, viewed within the framework established in my preceding 
analysis, perhaps the Chevron Court was also responding to shifting dynamics in executive 
control over agency policy largely driven by the Reagan Administration. In other words the 
Chevron pronouncements (and their justifications) are endogenous to the expanded 
administrative authority wielded by the president. Although the executive branch was not 
granted any additional constitutional powers during the Reagan Administration, the 
Administration did use existing institutional powers to dramatically increase its political control 
over agency decision-making, particularly through appointment strategy and centralized rule 
review (Kerwin 2003).  The actions of the Reagan Administration communicated Reagan’s clear 
policy preference for conservative policy outcomes and federal deregulation. Judicial attempts to 
undermine the Reagan policy agenda through aggressive judicial review could have precipitated 
an unwelcome conflict between the Court and the Reagan Administration. When faced with a 
challenge to executive branch policy, the Court therefore showed significant deference to 
executive interpretation, and consequentially, executive control.   
While I do not attempt to draw substantive conclusions from one case involving the U.S. 
Supreme Court, empirical analysis of state executive power allows me systematically examine 
judicial responsiveness to executive power in various environments. Scholars have discussed at 
                                                          
 
68
 Emphasis added. 
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length how executives have used their institutional powers to enhance their control over 
executive branch policy. However, scholars had yet to address whether judicial decision-making 
(and anticipation of executive non-enforcement) may be motivated by executive institutional 
dominance of the administrative structure.  The results from the current analysis show that when 
making decisions involving administrative agencies, courts are more deferential to agency 
decision-making in environments where the executive has enhanced mechanisms of bureaucratic 
control. Heightened state executive power results in increased support for executive agencies 
even when controlling for many political, institutional, and legal factors. In states where the 
executive has more extensive appointment power and rule review power, state agencies have a 
higher probability of winning when they appear before their state supreme courts.  Courts are not 
only responsive the executive power across the executive branch, but they are also influenced by 
variation in executive control within individual administrative agencies. 
These results help shed light on an ongoing debate concerning judicial responsiveness to 
executive power. Judicial independence is championed as a normative value, but the power of 
the judiciary is clearly linked with the actions and preferences of other state institutional actors. 
Federal research has examined the relationship between judicial decision-making and executive 
power,  however empirical limitations in institutional variation exists when testing theories of 
institutional conflict using federal institutions. Although previous results have been mixed, my 
analysis shows that judges are responsive to variation in executive power.  
Judicial institutions in federal and state governments were designed to be co-equal 
wielders of governmental power.  However, in the twentieth century state executives have seen 
dramatic increases in their institutional power, particularly in their powers of bureaucratic 
control and oversight. An important question is whether increasing the authority of one 
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institutional actor, in this instance state executives, places the judiciary at a disadvantage in 
exerting its’ own institutional power. As state executives gain more institutional powers, will 
they become increasingly resistant towards the interference of outside litigants and judicial 
intervention? The ability to clarify institutional boundaries of power and “correct” legal missteps 
gives courts a tremendous amount of influence in the policy-making process. However, the 
reality of executive branch enforcement potentially places judges in a precarious position if they 
have to make legal decisions that seemingly encroach upon executive authority.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table C2.1. State Executive Branch Control and Agency Success in Court: Unilateral 
Appointment Power 
 
Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or losing party (0). Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by 
state. 
 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
  
Executive Unilateral Appointment Power                
0.029 
(0.016) 
 
0.04 
0.027 
(0.015) 
 
0.03 
0.029 
(0.014) 
 
0.02 
 0.442  0.302  0.426  
Strong Rule Review (0.217) 0.02 (0.203) 0.07 (0.205) 0.02 
Moderate Rule Review 
0.267 
(0.127) 
 
0.02 
0.171 
(0.153) 
 
0.13 
0.325 
(0.121) 
 
0.00 
 -0.144  -0.221  -0.088  
Executive Budgetary Control (0.174) -0.21 (0.178) 0.11 (0.149) 0.28 
                                                            
 0.454      
Appointment (0.255) 0.04 -----  -----  
 -0.053      
Merit Selection (0.157) 0.37 -----  -----  
 0.168      
Partisan Election (0.198) 0.20     
       
   0.374    
Political Retention -----  (0.262) 0.08 -----  
   0.115    
Partisan Election -----  (0.390) 0.38 -----  
   -0.207    
NonPartisan Election -----  (0.256) 0.21 -----  
   -0.229    
Retention Election   (0.227) 0.16   
     0.867         
Political Appointed and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.353) 0.01 
     0.069  
Merit Selection and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.133) 0.30 
 
      
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.216 
(0.094) 
 
0.01 
0.091 
(0.113) 
 
0.17 
0.230 
(0.091) 
 
0.01 
 
0.320  0.163  0.258  
Divided Government (0.101) 0.00 (0.108) 0.06 (0.100) 0.01 
       
 
-0.510  -0.573  -0.502  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.289) 0.04 (0.298) 0.02 (0.269) 0.03 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
-0.060 
(0.263) 
 
0.41 
-0.222 
(0.276) 
 
0.22 
-0.096 
(0.242) 
 
0.35 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.677 
(0.646) 
 
0.15 
-0.424 
(0.559) 
 
0.22 
-0.238 
(0.508) 
 
0.32 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.343 
(0.108) 
 
0.00 
0.271 
(0.110) 
 
0.01 
0.327 
(0.092) 
 
0.00 
 
      
 
Agency Petitioner 
0.261 
(0.141) 
 
0.03 
0.275 
(0.143) 
 
0.03 
0.279 
(0.140) 
 
0.02 
 
      
-0.173  -0.098  -0.197  
South (0.176) 0.16 (0.276) 0.34 (0.165) 0.12 
 
0.215  0.286  0.139  
Midwest (0.150) 0.08 (0.227) 0.10 (0.141) 0.16 
 -0.053  0.108  -0.096  
West (0.163) 0.37 (0.217) 0.22   (0.173) 0.29 
Constant 
0.283 
(0.414) 
 0.681 
(0.393) 
 0.227 
(0.305) 
 
 
Wald χ2 (17) 74.98  (18)  81.86  (16) 109.34  
N 2222  2222  2222  
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Table C2.2 State Executive Branch Control and Agency Success in Court: Unilateral 
Appointment Predicted Probabilities 
 
Note: Changes in predicted probabilities calculated for variables statistically significant variables. For continuous variables, changes in predicted 
probability calculated as change from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. For indicator variables, 
change in predicted probability calculated as change from 0 to 1.  Continuous variables held at their mean and indicator variables at their mode 
for calculation of predicated probabilities. 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable 
 
∆ 
 
% 
 
∆ 
 
% ∆ 
 
% 
  
Executive Unilateral Appointment Power                
 
0.05 
 
8% 
 
0.04 
 
6% 
 
0.05 
 
8% 
       
Strong Rule Review 0.10 17% 0.07 10% 0.10 16% 
Moderate Rule Review 
 
0.06 
 
10% 
 
n.s. 
 
 
 
0.07 
 
12% 
       
Executive Budgetary Control n.s.  n.s  n.s.  
                                                            
       
Appointment 0.10 17% -----  -----  
       
Merit Selection n.s.  -----  -----  
       
Partisan Election            n.s.      
       
       
Political Retention -----  0.08 12% -----  
       
Partisan Election -----  n.s.  -----  
       
NonPartisan Election -----  n.s.  -----  
       
Retention Election   n.s.    
       
       
Political Appointed and Politically Retained -----  -----  0.18 30% 
       
Merit Selection and Politically Retained -----  -----  n.s.  
 
      
Governor-Court Party ID 
 
0.05 
 
8% 
 
n.s. 
 
 
 
0.05 
 
9% 
 
      
Divided Government 0.08 15% 0.04 6% 0.06 12% 
       
 
      
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine 0.13 26% 0.14 27%         0.12 26% 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
 
n.s. 
  
n.s. 
  
n.s 
 
Legislative Professionalism 
 
n.s. 
  
n.s. 
  
n.s. 
 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
 
0.08 
 
13% 
 
0.06 
 
9% 
 
0.07 
 
13% 
 
      
 
Agency Petitioner 
 
0.06 
 
10% 
 
0.06 
 
9% 
 
0.06 
 
11% 
 
      
      
South n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  
       
Midwest 0.05 8% 0.06 9% n.s.  
       
West           n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  
       
N 2222  2222  2222  
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Table C2.3 State Executive Branch Control and Agency Success in Court: Various Retention 
Base Categories 
 
Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or losing party (0). Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by 
state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
  
Executive Appointment Power                
0.038 
(0.023) 
 
0.05 
0.038  
(0.023) 
 
0.05 
0.038  
(0.023) 
 
0.05 
 0.296  0.296  0.296  
Strong Rule Review (0.209) 0.08 (0.209) 0.08 (0.209) 0.08 
Moderate Rule Review 
0.172 
(0.157) 
 
0.14 
0.172 
(0.157) 
 
0.14 
0.172 
(0.157) 
 
0.14 
 -0.170  -0.170  -0.170  
Executive Budgetary Control (0.178) 0.17 (0.178) 0.17 (0.178) 0.17 
                                                            
 0.178  0.421  0.536  
Political Retention (0.267) 0.25 (0.224) 0.28 (0.213) 0.01 
           0.244  0.359  
Partisan Election -----  (0.256) 0.49 (0.270) 0.09 
 -0.244    0.115  
NonPartisan Election (0.256) 0.17 ------  (0.174) 0.26 
 -0.359  -0.115    
Retention Election (0.270) 0.09 (0.174) 0.17 -----  
 0.011  0.255  0.369  
Lifetime Tenure (0.385) 0.49 (0.265) 0.08 (0.265) 0.08 
 
      
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.095 
(0.110) 
 
0.19 
0.095 
(0.110) 
 
0.19 
0.095 
(0.110) 
 
0.19 
 
0.217  0.217  0.217  
Divided Government (0.122) 0.04 (0.122) 0.04 (0.122) 0.04 
       
 
-0.531  -0.531  -0.531  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.270) 0.02 (0.270) 0.02 (0.270) 0.02 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
-0.211 
(0.257) 
 
0.21 
-0.211 
(0.257) 
 
0.21 
-0.211 
(0.257) 
 
0.21 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.749 
(0.602) 
 
0.11 
-0.749 
(0.602) 
 
0.11 
-0.749 
(0.602) 
 
0.11 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.339 
(0.128) 
 
0.00 
0.339 
(0.128) 
 
0.00 
0.339 
(0.128) 
 
0.00 
 
      
 
Agency Petitioner 
0.271 
(0.144) 
 
0.03 
0.271 
(0.144) 
 
0.03 
0.271 
(0.144) 
 
0.03 
 
      
0.011  0.011  0.011  
South (0.276) 0.48 (0.276) 0.48 (0.276) 0.48 
 0.348  0.348  0.348  
Midwest (0.233) 0.07 (0.233) 0.07 (0.233) 0.07 
 0.152  0.152  0.152  
West (0.218) 0.24 (0.218) 0.24   (0.218) 0.24   
Constant 
0.450 
(0.578) 
 0.460 
(0.376) 
 0.460 
(0.376) 
 
Wald χ2 (18) 99.55  (18)  99.55  (18)  99.55  
N 2222  2222  2222  
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APPENDIX D 
 
Legal Capacity Hypothesis 
 The previous results seemingly confirm my hypotheses regarding judicial deference to 
administrative agencies in environments with increased executive control. However an 
alternative hypothesis is that courts are responding the advantages in legal representation of state 
executive branch agencies. In other words, state agencies in environments with better legal 
representation will have a higher rate of success in court compared to agencies in other 
environments. To test this hypothesis I test three sets of models below using different variables 
to capture “legal capacity.” I use the resources of each state attorney general’s office to measure 
the legal capacity of the state executive branch. The attorney general’s office defends challenged 
executive (and legislative) action in court and provides state officials with legal opinions 
regarding the validity of government policy. In Table D1 I measure legal capacity based on the 
attorney general’s yearly salary (for 1995-1996). In Table D2 I measure legal capacity based on 
the attorney general’s yearly office budget (1995-1996). Table D3 measures legal capacity by 
measuring the attorney general’s budget as a proportion of state general expenditures. Even when 
controlling for attorney general resources the variables for state executive appointment power 
and state executive rule review show that state agencies are more successful in environments 
where the executive has heightened executive institutional powers. Surprisingly there is a 
negative relationship between attorney general resources and agency success. As attorney 
general resources increase, the likelihood of agency success in court decreases. One possible 
explanation for this finding is that agencies in states where the attorney general has fewer 
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resources are more selective in the choice of cases they choose to litigate. Therefore the increase 
in litigation selectivity translates into an increase in court win rates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 95 
 
Table D2.1 State Executive Branch Control and Agency Success in Court: Legal Capacity (AG 
Salary) 
 
Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or losing party (0). Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by 
state. Model estimated with regional indicator variables; however coefficient estimates not included in above model. 
 
 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
  
State Executive Appointment Power               
0.052 
(0.022) 
 
0.02 
0.042 
(0.023) 
 
0.03 
0.036 
  (0.020) 
 
0.04 
 0.424  0.306  0.415  
Strong Rule Review (0.221) 0.03 (0.221) 0.08 (0.229) 0.04 
Moderate Rule Review 
0.219 
(0.120) 
 
0.03 
0.156 
(0.155) 
 
0.16 
0.262 
(0.111) 
 
0.01 
 -0.073  -0.166  -0.031  
Executive Budgetary Control (0.160) 0.32 (0.177) 0.17 (0.147) 0.42 
                                                            
 0.406      
Appointment   (0.213) 0.03 -----  -----  
 -0.120      
Merit Selection (0.169) 0.23 -----  -----  
 0.006      
Partisan  Election (0.180)    049.     
       
   0.176    
Political Retention -----  (0.280) 0.27 -----  
   -0.092    
Partisan Election -----  (0.346) 0.40 -----  
   -0.258    
Nonpartisan Election -----  (0.251) 0.15 -----  
   -0.349    
Retention Election   (0.250) 0.08   
       
     0.787       0.01 
Political Appointed and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.315)  
     -0.201 0.11 
Merit Selection and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.162)  
 
      
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.168 
(0.094) 
 
0.04 
0.075 
(0.114) 
 
0.26 
0.214 
(0.103) 
 
0.02 
 
0.328  0.199  0.274  
Divided Government (0.114) 0.00 (0.124) 0.06 (0.119) 0.01 
       
 
-0.532  -0.574  -0.496  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.264) 0.02 (0.272) 0.02 (0.252) 0.03 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
-0.082 
(0.245) 
 
0.37 
-0.225 
(0.260) 
 
0.20 
-0.076 
(0.242) 
 
0.38 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.267 
(0.764) 
 
0.36 
-0.283 
(0.722) 
 
0.35 
0.294 
(0.656) 
 
0.33 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.395 
(0.127) 
 
0.00 
0.338 
(0.127) 
 
0.00 
0.411 
(0.120) 
 
0.00 
 
      
 
Agency Petitioner 
0.270 
(0.142) 
 
0.03 
0.275 
(0.144) 
 
0.03 
0.281 
(0.141) 
 
0.03 
       
       
       
 
-7.77e-06  -4.85e-06  -7.48e-06  
Attorney General (Salary) (4.39e-06) 0.04 (4.12e-06) 0.12 (4.36e-06) 0.04 
       
       
Constant 
0.424 
(0.466) 
 0.732 
(0.455) 
 0.407 
(0.415) 
 
 
Wald χ2   (18) 85.31  (19) 122.03  (17) 83.52  
N 2222  2222  2222  
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Table D2.2. State Executive Branch Control and Agency Success in Court: Legal Capacity (AG 
Office Budget) 
 
 Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or losing party (0). Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by 
state. Model estimated with regional indicator variables; however coefficient estimates not included in above model. 
 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
  
State Executive Appointment Power               
0.047 
(0.023) 
 
0.02 
0.040 
(0.023) 
 
0.04 
0.033 
(0.021) 
 
0.06 
 0.330  0.239  0.327  
Strong Rule Review (0.222) 0.07 (0.228) 0.15 (0.229) 0.08 
Moderate Rule Review 
0.223 
(0.126) 
 
0.04 
0.158 
(0.158) 
 
0.16 
0.276 
(0.112) 
 
0.01 
 -0.063  -0.172  -0.026  
Executive Budgetary Control (0.155) 0.34 (0.178) 0.17 (0.142) 0.43 
                                                            
 0.428      
Appointment        (0.220) 0.03 -----  -----  
 -0.116      
Merit Selection 0.174) 0.25 -----  -----  
 0.101      
Partisan  Election (0.189) 0.30     
       
   0.168    
Political Retention -----  (0.290) 0.28 -----  
   0.005    
Partisan Election -----  (0.384) 0.50 -----  
   -0.265    
Nonpartisan Election -----  (0.267) 0.16 -----  
   -0.358    
Retention Election   (0.262) 0.09   
       
     0.734       0.02 
Political Appointed and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.366)  
     -0.210 0.11 
Merit Selection and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.171)  
 
      
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.240 
(0.091) 
 
0.00 
0.105 
(0.111) 
 
0.17 
0.254 
(0.093) 
 
0.00 
 
0.345  0.206  0.294  
Divided Government (0.120) 0.00 (0.125) 0.05 (0.123) 0.01 
       
 
-0.506  -0.551  -0.470  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.249) 0.02 (0.269) 0.02 (0.248) 0.03 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
-0.097 
(0.238) 
 
0.34 
-0.239 
(0.258) 
 
0.18 
-0.107 
(0.237) 
 
0.32 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.085 
(0.927) 
 
0.46 
-0.211 
(0.920) 
 
0.41 
0.156 
(0.861) 
 
0.43 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.440 
(0.132) 
 
0.00 
0.362 
(0.132) 
 
0.00 
0.430 
(0.123) 
 
0.00 
 
      
 
Agency Petitioner 
0.265 
(0.141) 
 
0.03 
0.272 
(0.144) 
 
0.03 
0.276 
(0.141) 
 
0.02 
       
       
       
 
-2.96e-09  -1.65e-09  -1.94e-09  
Attorney General (Office Budget) (1.52e-09) 0.03 (1.45e-09) 0.13 (1.51e-09) 0.10 
       
       
Constant 
-0.114 
(0.369) 
 0.433 
(0.369) 
 -0.040 
(0.314) 
 
 
Wald χ2   (18)78.32  (19)  90.89  (17) 96.18  
N 2222  2222  2222  
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Table D2.3. State Executive Branch Control and Agency Success in Court: Legal Capacity 
(Budget as Proportion of General State Expenditures) 
 
Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or losing party (0). Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by 
state. Model estimated with regional indicator variables; however coefficient estimates not included in above model. 
 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
  
State Executive Appointment Power               
0.042 
(0.023) 
 
0.03 
0.039 
(0.024) 
 
0.05 
0.030 
(0.021) 
 
0.08 
 0.359  0.239  0.334  
Strong Rule Review (0.215) 0.05 (0.214) 0.13 (0.217) 0.06 
Moderate Rule Review 
0.222 
(0.131) 
 
0.05 
0.171 
(0.157) 
 
0.14 
0.288 
(0.112) 
 
0.01 
 -0.115  -0.226  -0.073  
Executive Budgetary Control (0.169) 0.25 (0.180) 0.11 (0.147) 0.31 
                                                            
 0.347      
Appointment       (0.221) 0.06 -----  -----  
 -0.123      
Merit Selection (0.172) 0.24 -----  -----  
 0.060      
Partisan  Election (0.189) 0.38     
       
   0.085    
Political Retention -----  (0.301) 0.39 -----  
   -0.056    
Partisan Election -----  (0.385) 0.44 -----  
   -0.340    
Nonpartisan Election -----  (0.271) 0.11 -----  
   -0.449    
Retention Election   (0.282) 0.06   
       
     0.727        
Political Appointed and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.346) 0.02 
     -0.300  
Merit Selection and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.184) 0.05 
 
      
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.202 
(0.094) 
 
0.02 
0.079 
(0.113) 
 
0.24 
0.242 
(0.093) 
 
0.00 
 
0.403  0.217  0.319  
Divided Government (0.189) 0.00 (0.121) 0.04 (0.122) 0.00 
       
 
-0.516  -0.592  -0.498  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.261) 0.02 (0.279) 0.02 (0.262) 0.03 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
-0.069 
(0.244) 
 
0.39 
-0.230 
(0.258) 
 
0.19 
-0.073 
(0.234) 
 
0.38 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.824 
(0.697) 
 
0.12 
-0.545 
(0.614) 
 
0.19 
-0.207 
(0.564) 
 
0.36 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.473 
(0.140) 
 
0.00 
0.445 
(0.150) 
 
0.00 
0.526 
(0.133) 
 
0.00 
 
      
 
Agency Petitioner 
0.263 
(0.141) 
 
0.03 
0.271 
(0.144) 
 
0.03 
0.275 
(0.140) 
 
0.03 
       
       
       
 
-38.632  -46.656  -52.820  
Attorney General (Proportion) (29.990) 0.10 (31.779) 0.07 (29.791) 0.04 
       
       
Constant 
0.143 
(0.426) 
 0.667 
(0.410) 
 0.158 
(0.364) 
 
 
Wald χ2   (18) 55.97  (19) 76.52  (17) 63.80  
N 2222  2222  2222  
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APPENDIX E 
 
Table E2.1. State Executive Branch Control and Agency Success in Court: Extended Model 
Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or losing party (0). Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by state. Model estimated 
with regional indicator variables; however coefficient estimates not included in above model. 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
  
Executive Appointment Power                
0.044 
(0.023) 
 
0.03 
0.038   (0.024)  
0.05 
0.031 
(0.021) 
 
0.08 
 0.399  0.284  0.369  
Strong Rule Review (0.203) 0.02 (0.209) 0.09 (0.211) 0.04 
Moderate Rule Review 
0.225 
(0.127) 
 
0.04 
0.166 
(0.153) 
 
0.14 
0.278 
(0.113) 
 
0.00 
 -0.084  -0.177  -0.033  
Executive Budgetary Control (0.158) 0.30 (0.170) 0.15 (0.141) 0.41 
 0.325      
Appointment (0.220) 0.07 -----  -----  
 -0.134      
Merit Selection (0.174) 0.22 -----  -----  
 0.052      
Partisan Election (0.192) 0.40     
   0.168    
Political Retention -----  (0.289) 0.28 -----  
   0.002    
Partisan Election -----  (0.380) 0.50 -----  
   -0.245    
NonPartisan Election -----  (0.264) 0.18 -----  
   -0.357    
Retention Election   (0.264) 0.09   
     0.727  
Political Appointed and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.355) 0.02 
     -0.195  
Merit Selection and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.175) 0.13 
 
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.209 
(0.092) 
 
0.01 
0.093 
(0.109) 
 
0.20 
0.238 
(0.094) 
 
0.01 
 
0.358  0.213  0.297  
Divided Government (0.121) 0.00 (0.122) 0.04 (0.123) 0.01 
 
-0.461  -0.519  -0.442  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.255) 0.04 (0.272) 0.03 (0.253) 0.04 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
-0.058 
(0.243) 
 
0.41 
-0.209 
(0.258) 
 
0.21 
-0.082 
(0.237) 
 
0.37 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.985 
(0.681) 
 
0.07 
-0.716 
(0.607) 
 
0.12 
-0.430 
(0.552) 
 
0.22 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.400 
(0.132) 
 
0.00 
0.348 
(0.131) 
 
0.00 
0.415 
(0.124) 
 
0.00 
  
Agency Petitioner 
0.264 
(0.143) 
 
0.03 
0.275 
(0.145) 
 
0.03 
0.278 
(0.142) 
 
0.03 
 
-0.195  -0.211  -0.202  
State Gov. Opponent (0.258) 0.23 (0.261) 0.21 (0.256) 0.22 
 
-0.149  -0.157  -0.160  
Business Opponent (0.128) 0.12 (0.128) 0.11 (0.127) 0.10 
 
0.207  0.194  0.195  
Environmental Policy (0.352) 0.28 (0.352) 0.30 (0.354) 0.30 
 0.111  0.113  0.115  
Taxes (0.149) 0.23 (0.149) 0.22 (0.149) 0.22 
 -0.001  0.032  0.032  
Utility (0.198) 0.50 (0.202) 0.44 (0.204) 0.44 
 -0.001  -0.008  0.008  
Welfare (0.171) 0.50 (0.169) 0.48   (0.173) 0.48 
 
Constant 
0.050 
(0.404) 
 0.484 
(0.382) 
 0.036 
(0.333) 
 
 
Wald χ2 (23)  85.31  (24) 133.68  (22) 80.33  
N 2222  2222  2222  
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Table E2.2 State Executive Branch Control and Agency Success in Court: Unilateral 
Appointment Power Extended Model 
 
Note: Dependent variable is whether the agency is the winning party (1) or losing party (0). Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by 
state. Model estimated with regional indicator variables; however coefficient estimates not included in above model. 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
 
P-Value 
  
Executive Unilateral Appointment Power                
0.029 
(0.016) 
 
0.04 
0.028 
(0.015) 
 
0.03 
0.030 
(0.014) 
 
0.02 
 0.429  0.292  0.416  
Strong Rule Review (0.214) 0.02 (0.202) 0.07 (0.204) 0.02 
Moderate Rule Review 
0.260 
(0.128) 
 
0.02 
0.166 
(0.148) 
 
0.13 
0.322 
(0.122) 
 
0.00 
 -0.155  -0.228  -0.096  
Executive Budgetary Control (0.169) 0.18 (0.171) 0.10 (0.146) 0.25 
 0.447      
Appointment (0.254) 0.04 -----  -----  
 -0.049      
Merit Selection (0.156) 0.38 -----  -----  
 0.173      
Partisan Election (0.196) 0.19     
       
   0.376    
Political Retention -----  (0.259) 0.07 -----  
   0.126    
Partisan Election -----  (0.382) 0.37 -----  
   -0.199    
NonPartisan Election 
-----  (0.252) 0.22 -----  
   -0.217    
Retention Election   (0.221) 0.16   
       
     0.861 0.01 
Political Appointed and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.351)  
     -0.069 0.30 
Merit Selection and Politically Retained -----  -----  (0.132)  
       
 
Governor-Court Party ID 
0.211 
(0.093) 
 
0.01 
0.088 
(0.112) 
 
0.21 
0.226 
(0.090) 
 
0.01 
 
0.315  0.160  0.254  
Divided Government (0.101) 0.00 (0.107) 0.07 (0.100) 0.01 
 
-0.503  -0.563  -0.494  
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine (0.287) 0.04 (0.298) 0.03 (0.268) 0.03 
 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine 
-0.062 
(0.261) 
 
0.41 
-0.221 
(0.276) 
 
0.21 
-0.097 
(0.243) 
 
0.34 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.642 
(0.645) 
 
0.16 
-0.390 
(0.562) 
 
0.24 
-0.209 
(0.509) 
 
0.34 
Administrative Docket Discretion 
0.351 
(0.109) 
 
0.00 
0.279 
(0.110) 
 
0.01 
0.333 
(0.090) 
 
0.00 
  
Agency Petitioner 
0.264 
(0.143) 
 
0.03 
0.279 
(0.145) 
 
0.03 
0.283 
(0.142) 
 
0.02 
 
-0.172  -0.198  -0.193  
State Gov. Opponent (0.258) 0.25 (0.260) 0.22 (0.257) 0.02 
 
-0.152  -0.165  -0.166  
Business Opponent (0.127) 0.12 (0.128) 0.10 (0.127) 0.09 
 
0.231  0.208  0.201  
Environmental Policy (0.350) 0.26 (0.348) 0.28 (0.349) 0.28 
 0.120  0.114  0.114  
Taxes (0.146) 0.21 (0.148) 0.22 (0.148) 0.22 
 0.003  0.041  0.043  
Utility (0.199) 0.50 (0.201) 0.42 (0.204) 0.42 
 -0.017  -0.022  -0.014  
Welfare (0.171) 0.46 (0.169) 0.45   (0.171) 0.47 
 
Constant 
0.314 
(0.417) 
 0.705 
(0.395) 
 0.258 
(0.304) 
 
 
Wald  (23) 99.66  (24) 109.35   (22)145.39  
N 2222  2222  2222  
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Table F2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics for Model Variables (Agency-Level 
Analysis) 
     
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
Gubernatorial Appointee-Lead Agency  0.67 0.47 0 1 
Strong Rule Review   0.18 0.38 0 1 
Moderate Rule Review  0.35 0.48 0 1 
Weak Rule Review  0.47 0.50 0 1 
Gubernatorial Budget Power  0.75 0.43 0 1 
Politically Appointed Courts  0.16 0.37 0 1 
Merit Selection Court  0.40 0.49 0 1 
Partisan Elected Courts  0.17 0.37 0 1 
NonPartisan Elected Courts   0.27 0.45 0 1 
Politically Retained Courts  0.16 0.37 0 1 
Partisan Elected Courts (Retention)  0.12 0.32 0 1 
NonPartisan Election Courts (Retention)  0.27 0.45 0 1 
Retention Elections  0.35 0.48 0 1 
Lifetime Tenure Courts  0.09 0.30 0 1 
Politically Appointed and Politically Retained Courts  0.09 0.28 0 1 
Merit Selected and Politically Retained Courts  0.09 0.27 0 1 
Governor-Court Party ID  0.46 0.50 0 1 
Weak Non-Delegation Doctrine  0.13 0.34 0 1 
Moderate Non-Delegation Doctrine  0.47 0.50 0 1 
Strong Non-Delegation Doctrine  0.38 0.49 0 1 
Legislative Professionalism  0.18 0.11 0.03 0.57 
Administrative Docket Discretion  0.23 0.42 0 1 
Divided Government  0.56 0.50 0 1 
Agency Petitioner  0.33 0.47 0 1 
State Government Opponent  0.02 0.13 0 1 
Business Opponent  0.27 0.44 0 1 
Environmental Policy  0.03 0.18 0 1 
Taxes   0.29 0.45 0 1 
Utility  0.07 0.26 0 1 
Welfare  0.08 0.26 0 1 
Midwest  0.29 0.45 0 1 
Northeast  0.28 0.45 0 1 
South  0.21 0.41 0 1 
West  0.21 0.41 0 1 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
COURTS AND EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY: JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING ON 
EXECUTIVE POWER CHALLENGES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Introduction 
 
When do judges rein in executive power? Executives at the state and federal level are 
equipped with many powers and privileges that allow them to manage executive branch 
structures. Their institutional powers facilitate the enforcement of laws and allow executives to 
influence policy outcomes. Executive institutional capabilities include the use of executive 
orders, appointment/removal power, and the veto power. Despite the potency of these 
management tools, it is not uncommon for an executive to find her use of institutional authority 
challenged in court. Litigants who challenge executive power can argue that the executive has 
incorrectly utilized her institutional privileges, or that the executive undertook unilateral actions 
not recognized by the states’ constitution. Alternatively, an executive can petition the court and 
assert that legislators have encroached upon her institutional authority. When faced with these 
legal disputes, judges must determine the legal boundaries of executive power. Ruling on 
executive power can place judges in a politically sensitive position given that the executive is 
responsible for enforcing a ruling that potentially restricts the scope of her own institutional 
capabilities. 
In the federal context, presidents are accorded a great deal of judicial deference in court 
(Schubert 1957, Howell 2003).  Much less is known regarding how courts adjudicate challenges 
to executive authority across various institutional environments. Do differences in the 
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institutional design of courts and executive branch structures influence how judges decide cases 
that involve challenges to executive authority? The variation in the institutional environment of 
the U.S. states is ideal for examining the interaction of judicial and executive power. State 
executives possess many powers similar to that of the president; however across states there is 
considerable variation in gubernatorial use of institutional mechanisms of control (Bowman, 
Woods, Stark II 2010). For example, some governors have the ability to appoint the majority of 
agency heads in the executive cabinet, whereas in other states governors oversee a fragmented 
executive cabinet that includes elected agency heads. Similarly the institutional structure of state 
courts across the U.S. varies substantially. Some state courts face partisan or nonpartisan 
elections, whereas other state supreme courts are selected and retained by political officials 
(governors/legislatures).  
In this paper, I examine judicial decision-making on challenges to executive power in the 
U.S. states. Given the growth in state executive power during the 20
th
 century, it is important to 
understand state court receptivity to expansive uses of executive authority. When ruling on 
challenges to executive power, variation in the institutional and political authority of the 
executive can constrain judicial decision-making and affect whether courts uphold executive 
action.  This paper proceeds as follows: First, I begin by discussing existing literature on judicial 
decision-making on challenges to federal executive power. I then discuss executive power in the 
states and explain that court decision-making will be motivated by concerns of preventing 
institutional retaliation and maintaining institutional legitimacy. Using an original dataset of 237 
cases involving challenges to state executive power adjudicated between 1980 and 2010, I 
empirically analyze the conditions under which state supreme court justices rule in favor state 
executive power. After presenting the results of my analysis, I conclude by discussing the 
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importance of understanding how variation in judicial and executive branch structures affects 
judicial deference to executive power. 
 
Executive Power and Judicial Behavior 
Scholars have long examined the interaction between executives and judges at the federal 
level. Although much of this literature focuses on presidential appointments of judicial nominees 
(Abraham 1992, Binder and Maltzman 2002), many researchers have addressed judicial 
decision-making on direct legal challenges to presidential power (Schubert 1957, Ducat and 
Dudley 1989, Yates 2002, Howell 2003). Federal judges have the advantage of serving life 
tenure and therefore are not subject to retention control by the executive. However, many other 
factors in their political and institutional environment shape how federal courts respond to 
executive power challenges (Moe and Howell 1999a).  Federal judges are influenced by public 
opinion (Ducat and Dudley 1989, Yates and Whitford 1998), policy areas (King and Meernik 
1999), and enforcement concerns (Carrubba and Zorn 2010) when adjudicating cases involving 
the president. Schubert (1957) examines U.S. Supreme Court rulings on cases involving 
executive orders, appointments/removals, public lands, and foreign affairs dating back to the 
early 19
th
 century. Schubert’s (1957) analysis illustrates the complex legal considerations that 
justices face in delineating the boundaries of executive power and he shows that overall the 
federal judiciary appears very supportive of executive power. Ducat and Dudley (1989) conduct 
one of the first empirical analyses of judicial decision-making on executive power. Working 
within Neustadt’s (1980) argument regarding the importance of presidential prestige, Ducat and 
Dudley (1989) find that federal district judges are more likely to rule in favor of presidential 
power as presidential approval ratings increase. In a similar analysis, Yates and Whitford (1998) 
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also uncover a positive relationship between presidential success in the U.S. Supreme Court and 
upward trends in presidential approval. 
Moving away from Neustadt’s (1980) focus on presidential power of persuasion, Howell 
(2003) develops a formal model of presidential unilateral action involving the court. He also 
empirically analyzes judicial decisions on challenges to executive orders. According to Howell 
(2003) courts are more likely to rule against presidents in environments where political 
opposition to the president is greatest; in environments with interest group mobilization and in 
the presence of divided government. Similar to the findings of Ducat and Dudley (1989) and 
Yates (2002), Howell (2003) finds that federal courts are more likely to rule in favor of 
executives in environments with increasing public approval ratings. The results from these 
studies lend support to Ferejohn’s supposition that “the president has been most dangerous to the 
judicial branch when he was most popular; that is when his connection to the people was the 
strongest” (Ferejohn 1999, 381).  In order to stave off the ire of a popular executive, courts are 
willing to show increased deference to executive authority.  
Scholars have also examined how the public, in conjunction with the executive, works to 
constrain judicial decision-making on legal disputes outside of cases involving direct challenges 
to executive power (Carrubba and Zorn 2010, Schorpp, forthcoming).   Carrubba and Zorn 
(2010) consider how the threat of public sanction in response to executive non-compliance 
influences judicial decision-making.  They argue that the threat of executive non-compliance 
limits the Court’s discretion where the U.S. government is a party. The public can provide an 
“indirect enforcement” mechanism (Carrubba and Zorn 2010, 823) whereby the president will 
comply with a court’s ruling if she fears reprisal from the public. Similarly, Schorpp examines 
state supreme court decision-making on civil and criminal cases and finds that ideological 
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congruence between the state executive and public can act to constrain state supreme court 
decision-making, particularly if preference divergence is present between the court and state 
executive (Schorpp, forthcoming).  
The specific executive action and policy under review also influences whether judges 
vote in favor of executive power. Research on court behavior in relation to presidential power 
seemingly confirms Wildavsky’s (1966) two presidencies theses concerning executive autonomy 
in foreign affairs issues. Multiple analyses show that presidents are far more successful when 
executive foreign power is challenged in court compared to domestic policy (Ducat and Dudley 
1989, Yates and Whitford 1998, King and Meernik 1999, Howell 2003).  Lastly, factors such as 
partisan congruence between judges and the president (Yates and Whitford 1998, Howell 2003) 
and issue saliency (Howell 2003) also shape the success of presidential power in court.  
Although these studies provide valuable information regarding the interaction of judges 
and the executive branch, a substantial limitation exists in federal level analysis in that federal 
institutions exists within a single separation of powers system. Examining the judicial decision-
making on executive power in the states is beneficial in that it allows for the investigation of 
court outcomes across a wide variety of court and executive branch institutional arrangements. 
Comparative institutional analysis provides a more thorough and comprehensive understanding 
of the factors that underlie judicial deference in cases involving government litigants. Certain 
claims regarding judicial behavior in relation to the executive environment are difficult to 
examine utilizing federal institutions. One cannot examine how variation in judicial selection and 
retention influences federal court decision-making on questions of executive power given that 
district judges, circuit judges, and U.S. Supreme Court justices face identical selection and 
retention mechanisms. Give the presence of a single executive branch it is difficult to examine 
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how differences in executive privileges and executive branch structures directly affect the 
president’s ability to retaliate against the court. Using the “natural laboratory” of the state 
environment (Hall 2001), I can examine how differences in the balance of institutional power 
and structural design affect judicial decision-making on issues of executive power.  Below I 
briefly discuss executive power in the states and factors that influence state supreme court 
decision-making on cases involving government action.  
State Executive Power 
The power of state executives has increased substantially throughout the 20
th
 century as a 
result of institutional reforms to increase the efficacy and coordination of executive branch 
structures (Conant 1988).  Most state executives have seen increases in budgetary power, term 
lengths, veto power, and an overall increase in institutional control over the executive branch 
(Beyle and Muchmore 1983). The manner in which state executives are able to use their 
institutional power varies substantially. For example, currently all governors have the ability to 
veto legislation and the majority of governors (44) have the power of line-item veto.
69
 However 
the use of the line-item (or partial) veto is not uniform across states. In some states, governors 
can only use their line-item veto power to appropriations. Also some state executives can only 
use the item veto to cancel entire legislative provisions whereas a small number of states provide 
their governors even more enhanced control and allow state executives to veto certain words in 
                                                          
69
 Budget Processes in the States: 2008. National Association of State Budget Officers. 
http://nasbo.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=AaAKTnjgucg=&tabid=80., last accessed April 2, 
2012. 
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legislation. State executives also use unilateral tools such as executive orders and executive 
proclamation to direct executive branch activity and call special legislative sessions.
70
 
Extensions of state executive power can potentially have direct impacts on the lives of 
state citizens and the implementation of public policy.  For example in 2007 Texas Governor 
Rick Perry issued a controversial executive order that would have required that girls entering the 
sixth grade take the Human Papillomavirus Virus (HPV) vaccine.
71
 Also, in April 2011 Idaho 
Governor C.L. Otter issued an executive order forbidding state agencies from implementing any 
portion of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the federal healthcare legislation 
signed by President Obama in 2011.
72
 Specifically, Otter’s executive order stated that “no 
executive branch department, agency, institution or employee of the State shall establish or 
amend any program or promulgate any rule to implement any provisions of the PPACA.” 
                                                          
70
 According to Ferguson and Bowling (2008), state executives across 49 states issued nearly 
3,500 executive orders between 2004 and 2005. The authorization for executive orders varies 
across states; some state executives have statutory and constitutional authorization to issue 
executive orders. The capability to issue executive orders is “implied” in the remaining states 
(Ferguson and Bowling 2008, s22). 
71
 The Texas state legislature later overturned Perry’s executive order. Gabriel, Trip and Denise 
Grady. 2011. “In Republican Race, a Heated Battle Over the HPV Vaccine.” September 13. The 
New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/us/politics/republican-candidates-battle-
over-hpv-vaccine.html, last accessed April 15, 2012.  
72
 “Executive Order No. 2011-03.” The Office of the Governor. April 20, 2011. 
http://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/execorders/eo11/eo_2011_03.html, last accessed April 15, 
2012. 
 108 
 
State executive authority and institutional privilege also affects gubernatorial influence in 
various policy arenas. Researchers find that formal powers of appointment, program review, and 
rule review power increase gubernatorial influence over the state executive branch (Brudney and 
Hebert 1987, Woods and Baranowski 2007). Also, informal sources of powers such as personal 
background and public approval increase gubernatorial success and influence in administrative 
and legislative politics (Dilger, Krause, and Moffett 1995, Dometrius 2002, Ferguson 2003).  
 My goal is to determine whether these institutional and environmental characteristics 
translate into executive success in the judicial arena. Studies of judicial decision-making on cases 
involving state policy-makers provide important evidence regarding how state judges respond to 
their institutional and policy environment.   
State Supreme Courts and State Policy-Makers 
 Unlike federal judges, most state supreme court justices do not have life tenure. Although 
a small number of state judges have life tenure, most state judges are subject to partisan and 
nonpartisan elections, retention elections, and retention decisions from political elites. When 
ruling on cases involving statutes or state policy-makers, state judges are often concerned with 
whether their rulings, or their institution, will be the target of political retribution from state 
officials (Brace, Hall and Langer 1999, Langer 2002, Johnson 2011a, 2011b). Differences in 
their political and institutional surroundings have substantial influence on state judicial behavior 
on cases involving state/government litigants. Justices subject to retention decisions from 
political elites are much more likely to uphold state legislation (Langer 2002).  Also, in 
environments where the threat for institutional retaliation is higher (i.e. in states where it is 
comparatively easier to revise the constitution) state justices are more likely to uphold 
challenged statutes (Langer 2002).  
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 Recent findings show that justices are responsive to variation in executive institutional 
control when ruling on cases involving the state executive branch agencies (Johnson 2011b). 
Specifically, in environments where executives have increased appointment and rule review 
powers, executive branch administrative agency litigants are more likely to win their court 
challenges (Johnson 2011b).  In addition to concerns regarding retaliation, judges are willing to 
retreat from ruling against state policy-makers because the court’s institutional legitimacy may 
suffer in the aftermath of a dispute with government officials (Langer 2002). Similarly, courts 
will be aware of retaliatory and legitimacy threats directed towards their institution when 
adjudicating cases involving executive power.  
 
Judges and State Executives in Court 
  According to Schubert (1957, 317) executive action is typically given the assumption of 
validity so the “burden of proof” shifts to the challenger to prove that a legal violation has taken 
place. Features of the state political and institutional environment will substantially influence 
whether state supreme courts are willing to uphold exertions of executive power. Courts in the 
U.S. operate in a separation of powers structure where they must rely on the executive for 
enforcement of court decisions. U.S. courts also depend on the legislature (and executive) to 
provide the judiciary with adequate operating resources. The institutional dependency of courts, 
and the preferences of other political actors, can constrain the ability of judges to act in 
accordance with their sincere policy preferences (Spiller and Gely 1992, Segal, Westerland, 
Lindquist 2011).  In other words, courts that prefer to rule against executive or legislative power 
may instead alter their decision-making behavior to prevent retaliation from policy-makers.  In 
environments where concern over institutional retaliation and legitimacy are high, and judicial 
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decision-making is therefore constrained, courts will exhibit a higher propensity to rule in favor 
of executive power.  
Executive and Judicial Institutional Design and Retaliation 
Judges are influenced by a myriad of factors such as ideology (Segal and Spaeth 2002), 
their institutional environment (Brace and Hall 1990, Epstein and Knight 1998), and importantly 
the identity and status of the litigants (Galanter 1974). Cases involving challenges to executive 
action can place judges in an undesirable situation.  In fact, Howell (2003, 139) argues that when 
ruling on cases involving executive authority, judicial power is at its most “vulnerable.” In these 
cases, courts can check the power of the executive, but it is the executive who must then enforce 
the court ruling. When faced with a case that potentially draws the court into a political dispute 
with policy officials, judges must be forward thinking regarding political and public response to 
their decisions. If political officials are discontented with court rulings, judges can encounter 
threats to their individual tenure, court resources and ultimately court autonomy (Ferejohn 1999).  
For example, executives in states with judicial elections could withhold endorsements during re-
election campaigns if the executive is displeased with a pattern of court rulings. Features of the 
institutional and political environment will greatly influence how judges respond to the perceived 
susceptibility of the courts to these threats.  
A direct method of retaliation against courts is facilitated through control over judicial 
tenure. Previous research finds that both selection and retention method of judges influences 
their decision-making, particularly on cases involving executive branch litigants (Shepherd 2009, 
Johnson 2011a, 2011b). Specifically, political elites can select judges that have a jurisprudence 
that reflects a record of voting in favor of executive and government power. However, it is the 
method of retention that will make justices vulnerable to tenure retaliation in response to court 
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rulings.  Political elites disgruntled with aggressive judicial behavior can simply decide not retain 
justices for additional terms.
 73
 Judges who are retained by political elites have greater incentive 
to rule in manner that favors state policy-makers, as compared to courts not subject to political 
retention. Therefore judges who face retention decisions from the governor and/or legislature 
will be most likely to rule in favor of executive power.
 
 The argument that courts retained by 
governors will be hesitant to rule against executive power is quite intuitive. The proposition that 
courts retained by legislatures are less willing to rule against executive power may be less 
straightforward. In fact in cases where there is a direct dispute between the governor and 
legislature, state courts that face legislative retention may understandably be more inclined to 
rule against the state executive. However, outside of cases involving disputes between the 
governor and the legislature (where their interests are in clear opposition) there are multiple 
reasons why justices subject to legislative retention may be wary of ruling against the governors. 
 In general, state supreme court judges subject to political retention clearly face a different 
political landscape than other judges. The reality of retention decisions by the governor or 
legislature forces judges in these environments to be more sensitive overall to the preferences 
and institutional powers of political officials when compared to judges retained by different 
                                                          
73
The most recent example of this occurred in May 2010 when Governor Christopher Christie of 
New Jersey decided not to renew the term of Justice John E. Wallace. Governor Christie wanted 
to select a judge who would “show the restraint that was missing from the court.”  Richard 
Perez-Pena. 2010. “Christie, Shunning Precedent, Drops Justice From Court.” May 3.  
The New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/nyregion/04christie.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1333647598
-PG0AbR+1gR25X3JByPTBdw, last accessed September 2, 2010. 
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means (elections or lifetime tenure). In many cases involving executive power, the dispute can be 
framed in terms of a nongovernment opponent versus a government opponent. When framed in 
this manner it is reasonable to assume that courts retained by the legislature will be more 
favorably inclined to rule in favor of government power (given that typically in these cases the 
interests of the executive and the legislature are not in opposition). Therefore even in 
environments where courts are subject to legislative retention, courts will show increased 
deference to executive power when compared to courts in environments where political elites 
lack retention power.  
Hypothesis 1: As political control over judicial retention increases, the 
probability of executive power being upheld in court increases. 
In addition to retaliation aimed at the tenure of judges, courts face retaliation aimed 
against the institution and the enforcement of judicial decisions. This includes attempts to alter 
the structure of judicial institutions that can weaken the efficacy of judicial decisions or weaken 
the judiciary as an institution. One way political elites can negatively affect courts is through 
punitive budgetary action (Wheeler 1988, Douglas and Hartley 2001, 2003).  Although the 
federal government (and some state governments) place restrictions on the ability to reduce the 
salaries of judges, officials can direct punitive or retaliatory budget actions toward court staff and 
facility resources (Douglas and Hartley 2001, Ferejohn  and Kramer 2002). Also, if court 
decisions require state funding and resources, executives can resist providing the funding 
necessary for proper implementation of court decisions (Douglas and Hartley 2001). This allows 
executive branch officials to essentially circumvent court rulings and reduce the efficacy of the 
court. Increased unilateral control over state budgets provides executives with a retaliatory tool 
to respond to unfavorable court rulings. When state executives have expansive control over state 
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budgets, I expect courts to be sensitive to retaliatory budget threats and exhibit increased 
deference to executive authority in court.  
Hypothesis 2: As executive budget institutional privilege increases, the 
probability of executive power being upheld in court increases.   
Institutional Legitimacy and Executive Prestige 
 
In order to engender implementation of its rulings courts depend heavily upon the 
widespread view that its decisions, and the institution itself, are legitimate. Gibson states, 
“institutions perceived to be legitimate are those with a widely accepted mandate to render 
judgments for a political community” (Gibson 2008, 61). Public support is an important 
component of judicial institutional legitimacy (Gibson and Caldeira 1992, Clark 2009).  
Specifically, does the public support the continuance of the court as institution even when 
confronted with decisions they find adverse?   
Research confirms that state courts and federal courts (which lack a direct electoral 
connection) are responsive to public opinion in the course of their decision-making (Fleming and 
Wood 1997, Brace and Boyea 2008). Given that courts are responsive to public opinion, state 
supreme courts decision-making will also be affected by the public’s orientation toward the state 
executive. A court which rules against an executive with high public support could face backlash 
from the public that can negatively affect the legitimacy and the esteem in which the judiciary is 
held if the executive attempts to leverage popular support to resist enforcement of court rulings 
(Howell 2003). If executive approval reflects the mood of the public (Edwards 1976), and judges 
“behave in anticipation of a lack of public support” (Clark 2009, 974), it follows that judges will 
be hesitant to rule in a manner that runs counter to public preferences. Court unpopularity could 
negatively affect court effectiveness in producing compliance with its decisions. However, as 
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prestige of the executive wanes, this creates an environment where judges can be more 
aggressive in taking action to restrict executive power (Ducat and Dudley 1989, 101). State 
executives with increased public standing should be more successful when their authority is 
challenged in court. 
Hypothesis 3: As state executive prestige increases, the probability of executive 
power being upheld in court increases 
 
Data, Variables, and Methods 
To test my hypotheses regarding judicial deference and executive power, I used 
LexisNexis and Westlaw to collect an original dataset of cases involving challenges to executive 
power between 1980 and 2010 in the areas of appointment/removal power, executive 
orders/proclamations, executive privilege, and the executive veto power. These executive powers 
are chosen because they represent multiple arenas of power for the governor. Executive authority 
involving executive orders and executive privilege are powers typically directed within the 
executive branch. Alternatively, the veto power can cause power disputes with the state 
legislature. Also, these powers are similar to the presidential powers examined in federal-level 
analyses (Ducat and Dudley 1989). My search was restricted to cases where either a litigant 
claims an exertion of executive power was invalid or cases where the governor (or executive 
branch subordinate) argues that executive power in one of the aforementioned areas was violated 
or encroached upon. I focus on cases where the courts reach a decision on the merits of the 
executive power claim.
74
  The dataset of executive power challenges includes 237 cases across 
                                                          
74
 For example if a court rules that a gubernatorial appointment to an executive agency is valid, 
this is coded as (1) to indicate a ruling in favor of executive power.  Alternatively, if a court rules 
 115 
 
49 states.
75
 Of the 237 cases in my dataset, state supreme courts ruled in favor of executive 
power in 62 percent of cases (147/237). The case per state average is 4.74. Alabama has the most 
cases in the dataset (22), whereas ten states have one case appear in the dataset.
76
 Maine is the 
only state with no cases in the dataset.
77
 The dependent variable in my analysis is whether a state 
supreme court rules in favor (1) or against (0) executive power.  
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous I estimate a series of logit models with standard 
errors clustered by state.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that the governor’s item veto of a legislative provision is invalid, this case outcome is coded as 
(0), indicating a ruling against gubernatorial power.   
75
 Ninety-eight cases in the dataset involve executive appointment/removal powers, 72 cases 
involve executive vetoes, 40 cases involve executive orders, 19 cases involve executive 
privilege, and 10 cases involve executive proclamations. Two cases in the dataset involve both 
executive orders and executive appointments. In the multivariate analysis these cases are 
categorized as appointment power cases because state supreme courts relied on provisions on 
executive appointment and removal powers to settle these disputes.     
76
  Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, 
Texas. See Table F3.1 (Appendix F) for information regarding the distribution of cases by state. 
77
 The lack of cases from the state of Maine does not necessarily indicate that there were no 
challenges to executive power in the state during the period under analysis. The lack of cases 
only indicates that there were no challenges to executive power in the Maine state supreme court 
in the aforementioned executive power areas.  
 116 
 
Figure 3.1 
 
 
 
Independent Variables 
The key independent variables in my analysis are political elite control of judicial 
retention, executive budgetary control, and executive prestige. I operationalize judicial retention 
in two ways. First I create a dichotomous measure of political retention; states where political 
elites retain the court are coded as (1) and states where justices are not subject to political 
retention are coded as (0).
78
 For my second measure I use ranked indicator variables to allow for 
                                                          
78
 The state supreme court of New Jersey presents a slight difficulty in coding at the aggregate 
level. State supreme court justices in New Jersey are appointed by the governor, serve a seven 
year term, and then face reappointment from the governor. If the governor reappoints the justice 
he or she serves until the age of seventy. Three cases in my dataset involve the New Jersey State 
Supreme Court. In order to accurately capture the impact of political retention on aggregate 
behavior, I estimated models categorizing New Jersey in various ways. I estimated models 
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greater model specification.  States are ordered as followed; Political Retention > Partisan 
Election > Nonpartisan Election > Retention Election> Lifetime Tenure. Courts with lifetime 
tenure serve as the base category. 
79
  
In order to operationalize state executive budget control, I code for whether or not the 
governor has the power to reduce the state budget without legislative approval.
80
 States where 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
coding New Jersey as a politically retained state court, and a state court with lifetime tenure. I 
ultimately decided to categorize New Jersey based upon the tenure of the majority of the judges 
on the court.  Specifically, if the majority of judges serving on the New Jersey court had 
achieved life tenure, the court was categorized in the life tenure category. If the majority of 
judges were still subject to political retention, the court was categorized in the political retention 
category. In two New Jersey cases, the majority of the judges still faced political reappointment, 
and in the remaining New Jersey case the majority of the justices had life tenure. The results of 
each model are consistent even under various specifications for New Jersey. 
79
 As mentioned previously direct tenure retaliation for unfavorable rulings is facilitated through 
political elite control over retention and it is this mechanism that induces judicial deference in 
cases involving executive power. On the other hand, through the use of political appointment, 
political elites can select judges more likely to rule in favor of government policy.  In such a 
situation where a court is politically appointed, retention mechanisms need not be present for 
justices to support governmental action in court. Although empirical limitations exist in the state 
environment when attempting to disentangle the effect of judicial selection versus judicial 
retention I estimate a model of judicial decision-making that categorizes state supreme courts 
according to selection method (see Appendix F, Table F3.2).  
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the executive can reduce the budget without legislative approval are coded as (1) and states 
where executives do not have this authority are coded as (0). Empirical evidence lends support to 
using this measure of executive budget control to capture the threat of executive retaliatory 
action in response to court rulings. In their analysis of court budgeting in the states, Douglas and 
Hartley (2003) conduct a survey of chief court administrators, legislative budget officials, and 
executive budget officials.  They find that executive budget officials and court administrators 
most frequently mentioned “reducing the funding of the judiciary in the executive budget” as a 
gubernatorial action used against the courts (Douglas and Hartley 2003, 448).
81
  Their survey 
also finds that chief court administrators rated “rulings which have a direct impact upon the 
governor personally” as one of the actions by the court most likely to incur executive action 
against the judiciary’s budget (Douglas and Hartley 2003, 448).  
In order to capture the “prestige” (or public approval) of the state executive, I collect data 
concerning the current governor’s vote share in the previous election.  Larger vote share 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
80
 Information for state executive control over the budget taken from Budget Processes in the 
States 1989, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2008. The National Association of State Budget 
Officers. http://www.nasbo.org/publications-data/budget-processes-in-the-states, last accessed 
November 11, 2011. This budget reduction capability includes the ability to reduce 
appropriations, reduce expenditures, and/or withhold allotments. 
81
 According to Douglas and Hartley (2003, 444): “Reducing the funding of the judiciary in the 
executive budget-meaning reducing judicial requests-appears to be used more than any other 
gubernatorial budget power to influence court rulings and policies. Four executive budget 
officers (8.9 percent of 45) and seven court administrators (17.1 percent of 41) indicated that 
governors in their states had used this power to influence the courts.” 
 119 
 
indicates a greater public mandate and I expect that as gubernatorial vote share increases, state 
supreme courts should be more likely to uphold executive power in court. The optimal way to 
measure to prestige of the state executive is to measure public approval for each executive 
around the time each case is litigant in court. However for many state-years under analysis 
gubernatorial public approval data is unavailable. For the years where gubernatorial public 
approval is available, I estimate an additional model using the state executive average public 
approval for the case year (see Table 3). I am able to estimate a model using gubernatorial public 
approval data for 187 cases using data from the U.S. Officials’ Job Approval Rating (JARs) 
database.
82
 
                                                          
82
 I use gubernatorial public approval taken from the U.S. Officials’ Job Approval Ratings 
(JARs) database, http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/jars.html , last accessed March 1, 2012. The 
database contains information regarding the public approval ratings of state executives taken 
from various state polls. The poll question used for my analysis concern “standard job 
performance” ratings from respondents. The values in the public approval measure reflect the 
percentage of respondents who gave a positive response. Responses of “very good,” “ good,” 
“approve,” and “excellent” across polls are grouped into positive responses (U.S. Official Job 
Approval Ratings by State Codebook.  http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/jars.html , last accessed 
March 1, 2012. If multiple public approval polls where taken for a given year, the polls were 
averaged to get a public approval rating. If only one poll is available, the rating from the single 
poll was used. If public approval information was not available for the year in which the case 
was litigated, public approval data was taken from year immediately prior to or following the 
year in which the case was litigated. For example, if a case is litigated in 1994, but the most 
recent poll data for the governor involved in litigation is from 1993, the 1993 poll data is used. 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Summary Statistics for Model Variables      
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
Political Elite Retention  0.10 0.30 0 1 
Partisan Retention  0.18 0.44 0 1 
Non Partisan Retention   0.21 0.41 0 1 
Retention Election    0.41 0.50 0 1 
Lifetime Tenure  0.10 0.30 0 1 
State Executive Budget Reduction Power  0.81 0.39 0 1 
State Executive Vote Share  55.18 6.29 39 74 
Governor-Court Party Identification  0.54 0.50 0 1 
Divided Government  0.49 0.50 0 1 
Civil Appeal Docket Discretion (Mandatory)  0.17 0.38 0 1 
Original Proceeding Docket Discretion (Mandatory)  0.25        0.44  0 1 
Legislative Opponent  0.27 0.44 0 1 
Executive Power Appellant  0.33 0.47 0 1 
Appointment Power Challenge  0.41 0.50 0 1 
Executive Branch Appointment Challenge  0.26 0.44 0 1 
Judicial Branch Appointment Challenge  0.14 0.35 0 1 
Legislative Branch Appointment Challenge  0.01 0.09 0 1 
Veto Challenge  0.30 0.46 0 1 
Line-Item Veto Challenge  0.26 0.44 0 1 
Executive Order Challenge  0.16 0.37 0 1 
Executive Proclamation Challenge  0.04 0.20 0 1 
Executive Privilege Challenge  0.08 0.27 0 1 
State Executive Public Approval Rating (Year Average)  51.46 12.49 17 79 
Midwest  0.16 0.36 0 1 
Northeast  0.20 0.40 0 1 
South   0.37 0.48 0 1 
West  0.27 0.45 0 1 
State Executive Appointment Power  5.16 1.70 1 9 
Veto Power (Beyle Measure)  4.54 1.04 0 5 
Line- Item Power  0.91 0.29 0 1 
 
 
Control Variables 
 In addition to my key independent variables, I also control for additional factors that I 
suspect are correlated with the decision of courts to rule in favor of state executive power. 
Although concerns over retaliation and institutional legitimacy may induce judicial deference, 
courts may also rule in favor of the state executive because of congruence of policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
This substitution was required for a minority of cases utilized in the public approval estimation 
(13 out of 187).  
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preferences. In this instance, courts are not ruling in favor of executive power because of 
concerns regarding institutional retaliation and legitimacy, rather the case outcome is a result of 
opinion sharing. To control for policy agreement between the court and governor, I control for 
whether a majority of the judges on the court are of the same party as the governor. Observations 
where the majority of the judges and governor are of the same party are coded as (1) and 
observations where the majority of judges and the governor are of a different party are coded as 
(0).  
Courts will be more likely to rule against the executive in periods of divided 
government. Scholars suggest that the threat of retaliation for courts is higher when the 
government is unified because in a unified government it may be easier for political officials to 
respond collectively against the court (Langer 2002).  When partisan opposition to the governor 
is high, I expect courts to be more aggressive in restricting executive power. Because partisan 
opposition to the governor is highest when he lacks a party majority in either chamber I code for 
the simple divided government; states receive a coding of (1) if the governor’s party is in the 
minority party in both chambers of the state legislature. In all other instances, states receive a 
coding of (0).
83
  
Characteristics of the litigants will also affect whether or not courts rule in favor of 
executive power. Because of advantages in experience and selectively in litigant behavior, many 
scholars find that the government is more successful in cases where they are acting as the 
petitioner (Sheehan, Mishler, Songer 1992). However, similar to Yate’s (2002) analysis of 
presidential legal success, when the state executive, or executive branch party, is petitioning 
                                                          
83
 I also estimate models where I control for different types of divided government however, the 
results are consistent when varying the operationalization of divided government.  
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the court, state supreme courts should be less likely to rule in favor of executive power. Although 
a petition from the state executive herself may seemingly make a state court more likely to rule 
in favor of the executive, it is actually advantageous to rule in favor of the executive branch 
when the executive branch is the respondent.  In cases where the state executive is the 
respondent, a court can rule in favor of the state executive and simultaneously uphold a lower 
court ruling, if present, by ruling against the petitioner (Yates 2002).  
Cases involving disputes between legislative and executive power can be particularly 
volatile for judges. State justices have expressed that they prefer not to be dragged into power 
disputes between the executive and legislative branch.
84
 In these disputes courts must rule either 
against the legislative branch or the executive branch, either of which could respond negatively 
against the court for an adverse ruling.
85
  I expect state executives to be less successful when the 
                                                          
84
 For example, in the case of Orton A. Jones et al v. John D. Rockefeller et al. 1983.446. S.E. 2d 
714, a case involving an ongoing dispute between the state legislature and executive branch, the 
West Virginia Supreme Court states: “Although we will not avoid our duty, we note our concern 
in routinely being called upon to resolve disputes in this continuing tug of war between the 
coequal executive and legislative branches of government.” 
85
 When faced with a conflict between the legislature and state executive, some courts appear to 
“split to difference” and rule in such a way so that neither branch gains over the other. For 
example, in some cases involving item/partial veto cases the state legislature will bring the 
executive to court arguing that the executive’s use of the item veto is invalid. However in the 
same case, the state executive will subsequently argue that the provision which she vetoed was 
unconstitutional.  In this situation courts will sometimes rule that item veto was invalid and that 
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party opposing the executive is composed of state legislators. Judges may face greater risks in 
terms of retaliation when ruling against the legislature as compared to other individuals or 
organization that may bring disputes against executive power.  
 In my analysis it is necessary to control for state supreme court docket discretion. I 
control for whether the court has a mandatory or discretionary civil appeals docket. I also control 
for the court’s docket discretion in original proceedings. In many cases involving executive 
power, the petitioner demands the governor halt an action or take a particular action. For 
example in an appointment power case, a litigant may file a writ of quo warranto to have the 
court remove a particular gubernatorial appointee from office
86
. In many states this type of case 
can be filed as an original proceeding to be heard originally in state supreme court. In fact, 28 
percent of the cases (67/237) in my analysis reach the supreme court through original proceeding 
jurisdiction. In some instances, a court’s original proceeding docket is classified separately from 
its civil proceeding dockets.
87
 In other words some state courts may have a discretionary civil 
docket and a mandatory original proceeding docket. To take into account the docket structure I 
include separate indicator variables for civil and original proceeding docket discretion. I expect 
that in environments where courts have mandatory dockets for civil proceedings and original 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the provision vetoed was invalid. For example see, Lawton Chiles v. Robert Milligan.1995. 659 
So. 2d 1055.  
86
 For example see State of Florida v. Diane K. Kiesling. 1994. 632 So. 2d 601.  
 
87
 Information for civil and original proceeding docket discretion retrieved from Court Statistics 
Project, State Court Caseload Statistics, 1980-2008. National Center for State Courts. 
http://www.ncsc.org/. , last accessed February 15, 2012.   
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proceedings state executives will be more successful. In these environments judges may have to 
entertain more frivolous challenges against executive power.  
 State executive success should vary according to the particular executive action being 
challenged.  Gubernatorial appointment power should most likely be upheld, whereas the state 
executive’s veto power should have the lowest probability of success. Although gubernatorial 
appointment power in the states is subject to greater restriction as compared to the president, 
many state executives are granted extensive appointment powers to governmental offices.  
However, challenges to the governor’s veto power involve legislative power disputes where 
courts may grant the governor less autonomy. I expect the governor’s rate of success for 
challenges to executive privilege, executive order/proclamation to fall in between that of 
gubernatorial appointment and veto power. I present the results of my analysis below.
88
 
 
 
 
                                                          
88
 One concern with many models of judicial decision-making is the presence of selection bias. 
In other words are there underlying factors that affect litigant behavior and the agenda-setting 
behavior of courts, which subsequently affect case outcomes (Zorn 2002, 162).  For example, 
perhaps litigants will not bring cases challenging executive power in environments with popular 
executives who many institutional powers. Alternatively, perhaps executives will not petition 
cases to their state supreme courts in environments where they are currently unpopular with the 
public. To the extent that these potential biases are uncontrolled for, I suspect that my models 
provide conservative estimates regarding judicial decision-making on cases involving executive 
power. Subsequent analyses should empirically investigate the factors that predict whether 
executive challenges appear in state supreme courts.  
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Table 3.2 Executive Power Litigation in Court 
 
       Note: Dependent variable is whether the court rules in favor (1) or against (0) executive power. Tests are  
         one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by state.  
 Model 1  Model 2  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P-Value Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P-Value 
Court Retention Method     
  
Politically Retained                 
1.262 
(0.775) 
 
0.05 
1.531 
(0.898) 
 
0.04 
   0.160  
Partisan Election -----  (0.501) 0.38 
   0.505  
NonPartisan Election -----  (0.435) 0.12 
Retention Election 
 
----- 
 0.229 
(0.356) 
 
0.26 
     
Executive Power                                                   
 0.772  0.791  
State Executive Budgetary Reduction Power (0.366) 0.02 (0.379) 0.02 
     
Executive Prestige     
 0.048  0.048  
State Executive Vote Share (0 .029) 0.05 (0.029) 0.05 
 
    
Political Environment     
Governor-Court Policy Agreement 
0.179 
(0.306) 
 
0.28 
0.172 
(0.318) 
 
0.30 
 
-0.134  -0.100  
Divided Government (0.308) 0.33 (0.300) 0.37 
 
    
Court Structure     
Civil Appeal Docket 
0.318 
(0.308) 
 
0.15 
  0.274 
(0.300) 
 
0.18 
Original Proceeding Docket 
-0.264 
(0.275) 
 
0.17 
-0.191 
(0.296) 
 
0.26 
     
Case Facts     
 -0.583  -0.591  
Legislative Opponent 
 
(0.368) 
-0.938 
0.06 (0.381) 
-0.930 
0.06 
Executive Power  Appellant (0.325) 0.00 (0.344) 0.00 
 
-0.380  -0.445  
Executive Order (0.514) 0.23 (0.546) 0.21 
 
0.114  0.094  
Executive Proclamation (0.644) 0.43 (0.638) 0.44 
 -0.322  -0.346  
Executive Privilege  (0.602) 0.30 (0.673) 0.30 
 -0.758  -0.822  
Veto  (0.352) 0.02 (0.380) 0.02 
     
 -2.052  -2.357  
Constant  ( 1.503)  (1.619)  
     
Likelihood Ratio (Model 1 nested in Model 2)  (3).90, p=.83   
Wald χ2 (13) 51.74  (16) 56.69  
N 237  237  
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Results 
 
 The results from my empirical analyses strongly suggest that institutional design of the 
court and executive branch, and state executive prestige substantially, affect the adjudication of 
executive power challenges in court.
89
 Model 1 estimates the influence of political retention on 
                                                          
89
  I also estimate models that control for regional effects. Results controlling for regional effects 
are consistent with results reported in Table 3.2 (see Appendix F, Table F3.3). To account for 
possible individual state effects, I estimate 49 separate models where one state is removed from 
each analysis. Results from each analysis are consistent with results report in Table 3.2; 
however, Alabama and Florida both exert statistically significant effects. Because Alabama and 
Florida have a disproportionate number of cases in the dataset, I estimate an additional model 
that simultaneously controls for the effects of Alabama and Florida (see Appendix F, Table 
F3.4). When controlling for the effects of Alabama and Florida the new results reflect the 
findings in Table 2, however the estimate for the Partisan Elections indicator variable is now 
more precise and has a statistically significant effect on court rulings on executive power. This 
means state courts retained by partisan elections are less likely to rule in favor of executive 
power in court (as compared to base category, courts with lifetime tenure). Results from the 
fixed effects analysis suggest that this new finding is the result of controlling for the influence of 
Alabama (where judges are retained in partisan elections).  The fact that elected state supreme 
court justices are selected from the same electorate as the governor would lead one to assume 
that these justices would be more likely to vote in favor of executive power. However, these 
justices also have autonomy from direct retention retaliation and this fact could explain why they 
are sometimes are more aggressive in ruling against the state executive as compared to justices 
with lifetime tenure. Importantly, courts with life tenure are selected by political elites and this 
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state supreme court decision-making. Model 2 incorporates additional indicator variables for 
state supreme court retention methods. State supreme courts with lifetime tenure are the base 
category in Model 2.
90
 According to the findings in Model 1 and Model 2, state supreme courts 
that are subject to political retention decisions from political elites are more likely to rule in favor 
of state executive power in court. In fact, states with politically retained justices, the probability 
of a ruling in favor of executive power increases by 21 percent (see Table 3.3). Cases in states 
where justices are subject to political retention comprise approximately 10 percent of the overall 
sample and these courts rule in favor of executive power at a rate of 80 percent (20/24).  
However the success rate for executive power is in all other cases is only 60 percent (127/213).
91
 
These results support the hypothesis that justices are responsive to potential threats regarding 
from political elites regarding judicial tenure.  
The sample size for this analysis presents limitations for examining (at the aggregate-
level) the interactive effect between divided government courts retained by their state 
legislatures. However examination of the data reveal that judges retained by legislatures are more 
likely to rule in favor of executive power (11/13), and in the majority of cases where the court is 
retained by the state legislature, governors either have a majority in one or both houses of the 
state legislatures (10/13). This finding suggests that legislatively retained judges are particularly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
fact may make these courts more inclined to rule in favor of executive power as compared to 
some elected courts.  
90
 I also estimated Model 2 (Table 3.2) using various categories as the base category. Results 
using Partisan Election, Nonpartisan Election, Retention Election, and Political Retention as the 
base category are consistent with the findings presented in Table 3.2.  
91
 This difference is statistically significant at p-value=0.02 (one-tailed test). 
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wary of ruling against executive power in environments with higher levels of partisan agreement 
between the executive and legislature.  I previously noted that state executive success should 
decrease in states where courts are retained by the legislature if a case involves a direct conflict 
between state legislators and the governor. Interestingly, the majority of the cases from states 
where courts are retained by the legislature do not involve a legislative litigant (11/13). These 
factors all appear to contribute to the high rate of success for executive power in environments 
with state high courts subject to legislative retention.
 92
 The estimates for state supreme courts 
subject to Partisan, Nonpartisan, and Retention Elections in Model 2 are less precise and are not 
estimated within the traditional levels of statistical significance.
93
  
                                                          
92
 I also estimate a model interacting cases involving a legislative party (opposing executive 
power) and courts subject to legislative political retention (Legislative Retention x Legislative 
Opponent). The results indicate that courts retained by legislatures are less likely to rule in favor 
of executive power when legislators are a litigant (statistically significant at the 0.10 level, one-
tailed test).  I also estimate a model interacting divided government and courts subject to 
legislative retention (Divided Government x Legislative Retention). The results indicate that 
courts retained by legislatures are less likely to rule in favor of executive power when the 
governor lacks a majority in either chamber of government. However caution should be 
exercised when interpreting this finding given the small number of cases (n=2, n=3 respectively) 
that comprise both interaction terms. 
93
 I also estimate models to examine whether there is an interactive effect between courts 
retained in partisan and nonpartisan elections, and gubernatorial vote share in the previous 
election. Specifically, courts subject to competitive elections may be more sensitive to public 
mood towards the state executive. Increased sensitivity towards public mood would translate into 
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The results from Model 1 and Model 2 both indicate that state supreme courts are more 
likely to rule in favor of executive power in environments where executives have increased 
unilateral control over the budget.  The influence is quite substantial; the probability of success 
for state executives in court increases by 26 percent in environments where the state executive 
has increased budget reduction capability.  These results lend support to the finding of Douglas 
and Hartley (2003) that court officials are aware that state executives will sometimes use their 
budgetary power in response to adverse rulings.
94
   
 Estimates in Table 3.2 also confirm that state executive popularity substantially affects 
whether state courts rule in favor of executive power (statistically significant at the 0.05 level). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
an increased propensity to vote in favor of executive power in court as gubernatorial vote share 
rises.  However, examination of the coefficients and marginal effects for the interaction of 
partisan/nonpartisan elections and gubernatorial vote share suggest that varying gubernatorial 
vote share (two standard deviations) does not affect the probability that courts subject to 
competitive elections will vote in favor of executive power in court (within 95 percent 
confidence). To precisely discern whether courts subject to competitive judicial elections are 
more responsive to changes in gubernatorial popularity, it may be necessary to conduct an 
individual level analysis of judicial behavior that takes into account closeness to an upcoming 
judicial election (Huber and Gordon 2004) and partisan congruence between an individual judge 
and the state executive.  
94
 In Appendix G I explore an alternative hypothesis that judges are not necessarily responding to 
institutional vulnerability from executive budgetary control but potentially a culture of judicial 
deference created by general differences in executive power (see G3.1). The results of the 
analysis president in Appendix G are consistent with the findings presented in Table 3.2.   
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Courts are more likely to rule in favor of executive power as gubernatorial vote share increases. 
Specifically, if gubernatorial vote share increases by approximately 12 percent (a two standard 
deviation change) the probability of a state supreme court ruling in favor of executive power 
increases by 15 percent. The results in Table 3 provide estimates using gubernatorial public 
approval data to measure state executive prestige instead of gubernatorial vote share. Although 
the model is not estimated with the full sample of cases because of missing data, the results 
mirror the findings regarding the effects of executive prestige using gubernatorial vote share. 
State executives with higher approval ratings are more likely to have their power upheld. As 
gubernatorial public approval ratings increases (one standard deviation below the mean to one 
standard deviation above the mean), the probability of a ruling in favor of executive power in 
court also increases by 15 percent. Similar to findings from federal level analysis (Dudley and 
Ducat 1989), state justices are less willing to restrict the power of a popular state executive. 
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Table 3.3 Executive Power Litigation in Court: Public Approval Models 
 
      Note: Dependent variable is whether the court rules in favor (1) or against (0) executive power. Tests are  
        one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P-Value Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P-Value 
Court Retention Method     
  
Politically Retained                 
1.579 
(0.775) 
 
0.02 
1.821 
(0.828) 
 
0.01 
   0.396  
Partisan Election -----  (0.543) 0.23 
   0.381  
NonPartisan Election -----  (0.420) 0.18 
Retention Election 
 
----- 
 0.132 
(0.459) 
 
0.39 
     
Executive Power                                                   
 1.046  1.071  
State Executive Budgetary Reduction Power (0.478) 0.01 (0.486) 0.01 
     
Executive Prestige*     
 0.034  0.034  
State Executive Public Approval (Year Average) (0.013) 0.00 (0.013) 0.00 
 
    
Political Environment     
Governor-Court Policy Agreement 
0.081 
(0.347) 
 
0.41 
0.103 
(0.368) 
 
0.39 
 
-0.355  -0.359  
Divided Government (.3460) 0.15 (0.347) 0.15 
 
    
Court Structure     
Civil Appeal Docket 
0.704 
(0.339) 
 
0.02 
0.666 
(0.293) 
 
0.01 
Original Proceeding Docket 
-0.260 
(0.352) 
 
0.23 
-0.165 
(0.372) 
 
0.32 
     
Case Facts     
 -0.724  -0.735  
Legislative Opponent 
 
(0.386) 
-1.110 
0.03 (0.393) 
-1.127 
0.03 
Executive Power Appellant (0.376) 0.00 (0.412) 0.00 
 
-0.546  -0.578  
Executive Order (0.543) 0.13 (0.574) 0.15 
 
-0.632  -0.560  
Executive Proclamation (0.525) 0.11 (0.535) 0.15 
 -0.447  -0.384  
Executive Privilege  (0.683) 0.26 (0.707) 0.29 
 -0.898  -0.852  
Veto  (0.451) 0.03 (0.465) 0.04 
 -1.005  -1.308  
Constant  (0.801)  (0.832)  
     
Likelihood Ratio (Model 1 nested in Model 2)  (3).55, p=.91   
Wald χ2 (13)60.74  (16) 64.33  
N 187  187  
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Table 3.4 Executive Power Litigation in Court: Predicted Probabilities (from Table 2, Model 2) 
           Note: Changes in predicted probabilities calculated for variables statistically significant variables. For continuous  
           variables, changes in predicted probability calculated as change from one standard deviation below the mean to one  
           standard deviation above the mean. For indicator variables, change in predicted probability calculated as change from  
           0 to 1. Continuous variables held at their mean and indicator variables at their mode for calculation of  
           predicated probabilities.  
  
Variable 
∆ 
 
Percent 
Change 
Court Retention Method   
  
Politically Retained                 
 
+0.16 
 
21% 
   
Partisan Election n.s. n.s. 
   
NonPartisan Election n.s. n.s. 
Retention Election 
 
n.s. 
 
n.s. 
   
Executive Power                                                 
   
State Executive Budgetary Reduction Power +0.16 26% 
   
Executive Prestige   
   
State Executive Vote Share +0.10 15% 
 
  
Political Environment   
Governor-Court Policy Agreement 
 
n.s. 
 
n.s. 
 
  
Divided Government n.s. n.s. 
 
  
Court Structure   
Civil Appeal Docket 
   
n.s. 
 
n.s. 
Original Proceeding Docket 
 
n.s. 
 
n.s. 
   
Case Facts   
   
Legislative Opponent 
 
              -0.12 
 
15% 
Executive Power Appellant -0.20 25% 
 
  
Executive Order n.s. n.s. 
 
  
Executive Proclamation n.s. n.s. 
   
Executive Privilege  n.s. n.s. 
   
Veto  -0.17 21% 
   
 
  
N 237  
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 The estimates for the variables for political environment are in the hypothesized direction 
however, they lack precision and do not achieve the traditional levels of statistical significant. I 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between governor and court partisan 
congruence, and court rulings in favor of executive power. I also cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that there is not a relationship between divided government and court rulings on 
questions of executive power. 
The identity of the litigants of the case and the particular executive power challenged also 
have an important influence on executive success in court. As hypothesized, when executive 
power is challenged by legislators the probability of a court ruling in favor of state executive 
power drops substantially (significant at the 0.05 level). When legislators oppose executive 
power in court, the probability that the court rules in favor of executive power decreases by 15 
percent. Courts are well aware of the political sensitivities involved when navigating disputes 
between the executive and legislative branches. Although courts are more likely to rule in favor 
of executive power overall, these findings suggest that judges are willing to rule against the 
executive to potentially avoid conflicts with the legislative officials.  
 Also, when the state executive (or executive party) petitions the court in favor of 
executive power, judges are much less likely to rule in favor of executive power. In fact, the 
probability of a ruling in favor of executive power decreases by 25 percent in these instances. 
These results are consistent with Yates’ (2002) finding that judges are less likely to vote in favor 
of the president (or president’s party) when the president is the appellant. This finding does not 
necessarily indicate that executives (or executive officials) bring extremely weak cases to court. 
It more than likely reflects that comparatively, courts are more likely to rule in favor of executive 
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power when an outside litigant is challenging the executive’s authority given the assumption of 
validity executive power usually enjoys (Schubert 1957).  
Results from the model also show that executive success in court varies according to 
executive power challenged. When compared to the base category (appointment power), 
executives are less likely to win in cases that involve challenges to their veto power. This finding 
is understandable given that many veto power cases involve legislative litigants. Although courts 
must be attentive to retaliation from the executive, the legislature can also act against a court are 
perceived as antagonistic or hostile to legislative authority. The estimates for other executive 
powers (executive orders, proclamation, and executive privilege) are not statistically significant; 
however the lack of precise estimates may be a result of the smaller sample size for these 
categories. Overall the results of the various models show that retaliation and legitimacy threats 
substantially influence whether a court votes to rule in favor of executive power. 
 
Appointment Power and Veto Power 
 The two largest executive power categories in this analysis are appointment power 
challenges and veto challenges. The types of challenges within each of these categories are not 
uniform. However, many challenges to gubernatorial appointment power involve challenges to 
judicial branch appointments. In one example from the analysis, a citizen challenged a judicial 
appointment by the governor of Alabama on the grounds that the appointment violated the state’s 
Anti-Nepotism Act (the judicial appointee was the brother of the governor’s wife). 95  For 
appointment power cases, most challenges involve executive branch appointment. In my dataset 
sixty-two cases involve executive branch appointments, 33 cases involve judicial branch 
                                                          
95
 State of Alabama and Harry Lyon v. Hubert Taylor. 1983. 437 So. 2d 482. 
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appointments, and 3 cases involve agencies that were either a part of the legislative branch or the 
agencies whose institutional placement could not be readily determined.  State supreme courts 
should be most supportive of appointment power concerning the governor’s own branch 
compared to appointments to other branches of government. Although just shy of statistically 
significance, results from a difference of means analysis suggests that courts are more likely to 
rule in favor of gubernatorial power when the case involves an executive branch appointment (p 
value=0.14) . The results in Model 1 (Table 3.5 reflects these findings).  
Most governors have the ability to issue line-item or partial vetoes; however this 
alternative form of veto comes in many forms across states. While some cases in the executive 
power dataset involve challenges to gubernatorial use of regular vetoes, the majority of veto 
cases in my analysis involve disputes over executive use of the item (or partial) veto. Sixty-one 
out of 72 cases involve item/partial veto. A difference of means analysis suggests that executives 
appear to be at a disadvantage in court when cases involve an item veto (p value=0.12). This 
finding is confirmed in Model 2 (see Table 3.5) which shows that state courts are more likely to 
rule against state executives in cases that involve the line-item veto power as compared to 
regular vetoes (statistically significant at the 0.10 level). The examination of veto and 
appointment power cases illustrates that it is important to consider distinctions within state 
executive power categories when assessing judicial deference to executive authority.  Although 
courts are highly supportive of executive power, judicial support declines as executive authority 
reaches into other branches of government.  
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Table 3.5 Executive Power Litigation in Court: Appointment & Veto Models 
 
            Note: Dependent variable is whether the court rules in favor (1) or against (0) executive power. Tests are  
            one-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
 
 
Model 1  Model 2  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P-Value Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P-Value 
Court Retention Method 
    
  
Politically Retained                 
1.554 
(0.917) 
 
0.05 
1.539 
(0.902) 
 
0.04 
 
0.177  0.147  
Partisan Election (0.502) 0.36 (0.501) 0.39 
 
0.577  0.491  
NonPartisan Election 
(0.456) 0.10 (0.454) 0.14 
Retention Election 
0.285 
(0.385) 
 
0.22 
0.201 
(0.354) 
 
0.29 
 
    
Executive Power                                                   
 0.754  0.808  
State Executive Budgetary Reduction Power 
(0.386) 0.03 (0.372) 0.01 
 
    
Executive Prestige     
 0.050  0.048  
State Executive Vote Share 
(0.030) 0.05 (0.029) 0.05 
 
    
Political Environment     
Governor-Court Policy Agreement 
0.168 
(0.320) 
 
0.30 
0.187 
(0.319) 
 
0.28 
 
-0.111  -0.093  
Divided Government 
(0.298) 0.35 (0.301) 0.38 
 
    
Court Structure 
    
Civil Appeal Docket 
0.287 
(0.306) 
 
0.17 
0.187 
(0.292) 
 
0.26 
Original Proceeding Docket 
-0.228 
(0.296) 
 
0.22 
-.0193 
(0.283) 
 
0.26 
 
    
Case Facts     
 
-0.604  -0.606  
Legislative Opponent 
 
(0.382) 
-0.908 
0.06 (0.393) 
-0.921 
0.06 
Executive Power Appellant 
(0.345) 0.00 (0.354) 0.00 
 
-0.183  -0.382  
Executive Order 
(0.640) 0.39 (0.804) 0.31 
 
0.375  0.214  
Executive Proclamation 
(0.678) 0.29 (0.574) 0.35 
 
-0.087  -0.236  
Executive Privilege  
(0.752) 0.45 (0.984) 0.41 
 -0.562    
Veto (All) 
(0.425) 0.09 ------  
 
  -.0865  
Line- Item Veto 
-------  (0.667) 0.10 
   0.083  
Appointment Power (All)  
------  (0.746) 0.45 
 
0.447    
Executive Branch Appointments 
(0.433) 0.15 -------  
 -2.735  -2.424  
Constant  
( 1.772)  (1.805)  
Wald χ2 (17) 57.43  (17)  63.17  
N 237  237  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
This project examines state supreme court decision-making on legal questions of 
executive power. The overall increase in executive power throughout the 20
th
 century makes 
investigation of judicial decision-making on questions of executive power a timely analysis. 
Given the dramatic increases in executive power, it would seemingly be the responsibility of the 
courts rein in executive authority that violates constitutional and statutory law, or individual 
rights. However, aggressive action against executive power could be met with multiple forms of 
retaliation against the court. It is this threat of retaliatory or negative action towards the court that 
appears to increase judicial deference.  
Although many scholars have analyzed judicial behavior on cases involving presidential 
power, my analysis examines judicial decision-making on cases involving executive power 
within a variety of institutional and political environments. Using an original dataset of state 
supreme court cases involving challenges to executive power, I find that the decision by state 
courts to uphold executive power is driven by institutional and political factors linked to 
institutional retaliation and threats to judicial legitimacy. State executive power is more likely to 
be upheld in environments where state supreme courts are politically retained, where executives 
have increased budget control, and states with politically popular state executives. State courts 
are also much more likely to rule in favor of executive power in cases involving appointment 
challenges as compared veto power challenges. The results presented above reflect the findings 
from federal level research regarding the effects of presidential approval ratings on judicial 
behavior (Ducat and Dudley 1989, Yates 2002). The reported results also supports previous 
research regarding state supreme court responsiveness to their institutional environment when 
rulings on cases involving executive branch actors (Johnson 2011a, 2011b). 
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Many scholars have studied factors that contribute to the growth of state executive power 
and its influence. However, a comprehensive understanding of executive power is incomplete 
without examining how courts define and delineate the authority an executive is allowed to yield. 
Although state executives have a high success rate in the legal arena, there are many recent 
examples of state high courts taking governors to task for overreaching with their executive 
powers. In June 2011, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that Governor Nikki Haley’s 
executive order, which attempted to force the state legislature into session, was invalid.
96
 The 
Florida State Supreme Court ruled that Governor’s Rick Scott executive order which put a freeze 
on agency regulations in process went beyond the recognized executive authority of Florida 
governors.
97
 Additionally, in November 2011 the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that Governor 
Jan Brewer must reinstate the head of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, whom 
the governor attempted to remove.
98
 State executives are typically viewed as the policy leader in 
each state. As governors across the country confront challenges related to the governance of their 
state citizenry, executives should become increasingly more assertive in utilizing tools of 
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 Severson, Kim. 2011. “S. Carolina Supreme Court Rules Against Governor.” The New York 
Times. June 6. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/us/07carolina.html?_r=2, last accessed 
January 25, 2012. 
97
 Zink, Janet. 2011. “Florida Supreme Court rules against Gov. Rick Scott in rulemaking case.” 
Tampa Bay Times. August 7.  http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/florida-supreme-court-
rules-against-gov-rick-scott-in-rulemaking-case/1186234 , last accessed October 19, 2011. 
98
 Bingham, Amy.2011. “Ariz. Court Sides with Dems in Redistricting, Deals Blow to Gov. Jan 
Brewer.” Abcnews.com. November 18. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/11/ariz-court-
sides-with-dems-in-redistricting-deals-blow-to-gov-jan-brewer/, last accessed February 3, 2012).  
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executive action. As executives attempt to expand their boundaries of power, legal clashes 
between courts and state executives will most likely persist, if not increase, in the future.  
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
 
Table F3.1. Case Distribution by State 
 
State Number Percentage 
Alabama 22 9.28 
Alaska 6 5.06 
Arizona 3 1.27 
Arkansas 3 1.27 
California 5 2.11 
Colorado 6 2.53 
Connecticut 1 0.42 
Delaware 2 0.84 
Florida 22 9.28 
Georgia 2 0.84 
Hawaii 2 0.84 
Idaho 1 0.42 
Illinois 2 0.84 
Indiana 1 0.42 
Iowa 7 2.95 
Kansas 1 0.42 
Kentucky 5 2.11 
Louisiana 1 0.42 
Maine 0 0.00 
Maryland 5 2.11 
Massachusetts 13 5.49 
Michigan 7 2.95 
Minnesota 7 2.95 
Mississippi  8 3.38 
Missouri 1 0.42 
Montana 1 0.42 
Nebraska 1 0.42 
Nevada 2 0.84 
New Hampshire 3 1.27 
New Jersey 3 1.27 
New Mexico 8 3.38 
New York 6 2.53 
North Carolina 5 2.11 
North Dakota 1 0.42 
Ohio 4 1.69 
Oklahoma 6 2.53 
Oregon 4 1.69 
Pennsylvania 4 1.69 
Rhode Island 6 2.53 
South Carolina 6 2.53 
South Dakota 2 0.84 
Tennessee 2 0.84 
Texas 1 0.42 
Utah 2 0.84 
Vermont 4 1.69 
Virginia 3 1.27 
Washington 9 3.80 
West Virginia 8 3.38 
Wisconsin 3 1.27 
Wyoming 3 1.27 
Total 237 100 
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Table F3.2 Executive Power Litigation in Court: Regional Controls 
 
       Note: Dependent variable is whether the court rules in favor (1) or against (0) executive power. Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors   
          are clustered by state. 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P-Value Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P-Value 
Court Retention Method     
  
Politically Retained                 
1.439 
(0.788) 
 
0.04 
1.677 
(1.138) 
 
0.07 
   0.485  
Partisan Election -----  (1.002) 0.31 
   0.617  
NonPartisan Election -----  (0.996) 0.27 
Retention Election 
 
----- 
 0.219 
(0.970) 
 
0.41 
     
Executive Power                                                   
 0.703  0.699  
State Executive Budgetary Reduction Power (0.394) 0.04 0.402 0.04 
     
Executive Prestige     
 0.049  0.050  
State Executive Vote Share (0.029) 0.05 0.030 0.05 
 
    
Political Environment     
Governor-Court Policy Agreement 
0.203 
 (0.308) 
 
0.25 
0.204 
(0.329) 
 
0.26 
 
-0.177  -.0160  
Divided Government (0.313) 0.27 (0.299) 0.29 
 
    
Court Structure     
Civil Appeal Docket 
0.169 
(0.378) 
 
0.33 
 0.154 
(0.350) 
 
0.33 
Original Proceeding Docket 
-0.334 
(0.342) 
 
0.16 
-0.326 
(0.316) 
 
0.15 
     
Case Facts     
 -0.636  -0.620  
Legislative Opponent 
 
(0.382) 
-0.847 
0.05 (0.394) 
-0.842 
0.06 
Executive Power Appellant (0.344) 0.01 (0.365) 0.01 
 
-0.470  -0.539  
Executive Order (0.601) 0.22 (0.614) 0.19 
 
0.171  0.220  
Executive Proclamation (0.700) 0.40 (0.693) 0.38 
 -0.409  -0.389  
Executive Privilege  (0.614) 0.25 (0.703) 0.30 
 -0.898  -.0878  
Veto  (0.391) 0.01 (0.403) 0.02 
     
Regional Controls     
 0.003  -0.357  
Midwest (0.510) 0.50 (.965) 0.36 
 -.146  -0.458  
South (0.514) 0.39 (0.913) 0.31 
 0.433  0.204  
West (0.392) 0.13 (0.904) 0.41 
 -2.059  -2.212  
Constant  (1.638)  (1.668)  
Likelihood Ratio (Model 1 nested in Model 2)  (3).90,  p> χ2=.83   
Wald χ2 (16) 51.38  (19)  59.65  
N 237  237  
 142 
 
Table F3.3 Executive Power Litigation in Court: State Controls 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
       Note: Dependent variable is whether the court rules in favor (1) or against (0) executive power. Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors are              
       clustered by state. 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P-Value Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P-Value 
Court Retention Method     
  
Politically Retained                 
1.265 
(0.785) 
 
0.05 
1.544 
(0.915) 
 
0.05 
   -0.522  
Partisan Election -----  (0.408) 0.10 
   0.502  
NonPartisan Election -----  (0.465) 0.14 
Retention Election 
 
----- 
 0.338 
(0.362) 
 
0.18 
     
Executive Power                                                   
 0.756  0.765  
State Executive Budgetary Reduction Power (0.368) 0.02 (0.377) 0.02 
     
Executive Prestige     
 0.047  0.048  
State Executive Vote Share (0.029) 0.05 (0.029) 0.05 
 
    
Political Environment     
Governor-Court Policy Agreement 
0.243 
(0.301) 
 
0.21 
0.250 
(0.309) 
 
0.21 
 
-0.239  -0.228  
Divided Government (0.304) 0.19 (0.310) 0.23 
 
    
Court Structure     
Civil Appeal Docket 
0.292 
(0.331) 
 
0.19 
0.243 
(0.341) 
 
0.24 
Original Proceeding Docket 
-0.231 
(0.294) 
 
0.21 
-0.182 
(0.328) 
 
0.29 
     
Case Facts     
 -0.524  -0.551  
Legislative Opponent 
 
(0.367) 
-0.984 
0.08 (0.390) 
-0.977 
0.08 
Executive Power Appellant (0.370) 0.00 (0.372) 0.00 
 
-0.395  -0.556  
Executive Order (0.558) 0.24 (0.574) 0.17 
 
0.232  0.147  
Executive Proclamation (0.635) 0.36 (0.642) 0.41 
 -0.241  -0.421  
Executive Privilege  (0.627) 0.35 (0.678) 0.27 
 -.0711  -0.904  
Veto  (0.363) 0.03 (0.377) 0.01 
     
Outlier Controls     
 0.656  1.379  
Alabama (0.269) 0.01 (0.362) 0.00 
 -0.414  -0.505  
Florida (0.315) 0.09 (0.381) 0.09 
 -2.000  -2.225  
Constant  (1.497)  (1.622)  
Likelihood Ratio (Model 1 nested in Model 2)  (3)3.10, p> χ2=. 83   
Wald χ2 (15)39.49  (18)42.59  
N 237  237  
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Table F3.4. Executive Power Litigation in Court: Judicial Selection Method Model 
  
Note: Dependent variable is whether the court rules in favor (1) or against (0) executive power. Tests are one-tailed.      Standard errors  
are clustered by state. Base category in Model 2 is nonpartisan elected courts. Although the effect of the political appointment variable  
in Model 1 is statistically significant, the substantive effect from this variable (+.05, 7% change) is smaller than the substantive effect  
of political retention in Table 2, Model 1 (+.16, 21% change). 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P-Value Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P-Value 
Court Selection Method     
  
Politically Appointed*               
0.478 
(0.377) 
 
0.10 
0.262 
(0.494) 
 
0.30 
   -0.128  
Merit Selection -----  (0.403) 0.38 
   -0.430  
Partisan Election -----  (0.495) 0.19 
     
Executive Power                                                   
 0.798  0.785  
State Executive Budgetary Reduction Power (0.357) 0.13 (0.356) 0.02 
     
Executive Prestige     
 0.047  -0.888  
State Executive Vote Share (0.028) 0.04 (0.313) 0.05 
 
    
Political Environment     
Governor-Court Policy Agreement 
0.127 
(0.309) 
 
0.34 
0.109 
(0.319) 
 
0.37 
 
-0.230  -0.218  
Divided Government (0.316) 0.23 (0.329) 0.25 
 
    
Court Structure     
Civil Appeal Docket 
0.477 
(0.388) 
 
0.11 
0.381 
(0.384) 
 
0.16 
Original Proceeding Docket 
-0.407 
(0.268) 
 
0.06 
-0.364 
(0.291) 
 
0.11 
     
Case Facts     
 -0.618  -0.651  
Legislative Opponent 
 
(0.364) 
-0.920 
0.05 (0.379) 
-0.888 
0.05 
Executive Power  Appellant (0.323) 0.00 (0.313) 0.00 
 
-0.302  -0.412  
Executive Order (0.514) 0.28 (0.540) 0.23 
 
0.048  -0.021  
Executive Proclamation (0.649) 0.47 (0.648) 0.49 
 -0.216  -0.293  
Executive Privilege  (0.666) 0.37 (0.724) 0.34 
 -0.679  -0.770  
Veto  (0.348) 0.03 (0.370) 0.02 
     
 -1.961  -1.707  
Constant  (1.424)  (1.449)  
     
Likelihood Ratio (Model 1 nested in Model 2)  (2).04, p> χ2=.83   
Wald χ2 (13)  51.90  (17) 51.70  
N 237  237  
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APPENDIX G 
 
 
 
Culture of Deference Hypothesis 
 
 In the preceding analysis I describe factors that may make courts vulnerable to retaliation 
from the state executive and explain how those factors influence judicial outcomes. In terms of 
institutional power, I attribute state justice responsive to variation in executive resource control 
as reflecting judicial concern over retaliation. However, an alternative argument is that judges 
are not responding to the threat of retaliation in regards to state executive control over resources, 
but rather variation in executive power in general. In other words, the level of executive power 
across multiple spheres can create an environment of judicial deference, or activism, in relation 
to executive power challenges.  In order to analyze whether judges are responding specifically to 
resource control, I estimate models that control for varying levels of state executive appointment 
power and veto power (Table G3.1). 
 Using information from the Book of the States, I create a variable that measures whether 
the government appoints administrative leadership across 10 different policy areas; secretary of 
state, treasurer, agriculture, corrections, education, insurance, labor, public utilities, taxation, and 
transportation. If the governor appoints agency leadership the governor receives a score of one. If 
someone else selects agency leadership (or the agency leadership is elected) the governor 
receives a score of zero. The lowest score a governor can receive is zero and the highest score a 
governor can receive is ten. I use two separate measures for veto power. The veto measure in 
Model 1 is an indicator variable that measures whether or not the state executive has the item 
veto power. However, because this measure is potentially biased against executives that do have 
the item veto power (because the majority of veto cases involve the item veto) I estimate an 
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additional model that uses Beyle’s measure of veto power. Beyle’s measure utilizes a 0 to 5 scale 
that captures whether the executive has the item veto power and the majorities required to 
override executive vetoes. See Table G3.2 for a full description of Beyle’s veto power variable.  
In both models, the variable for budgetary control is statistically significant (p<0.5, p<0.10), 
whereas state executive appointment power and veto power do not appear to have a significant 
effect on court outcomes.  The results from Model 1 and Model 2 support the hypothesis that 
when ruling on cases directly involving executive power, justices are responding to the threat of 
retaliation from executive resource control and not simply differences in the general executive 
power environment. 
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Table G3.1. Executive Branch Litigation in State Supreme Court: Executive Power Environment 
 
            Note: Dependent variable is whether the court rules in favor (1) or against (0) executive power. Tests are one-tailed. Standard errors  
          are clustered by state.  
 Model 1  Model 2  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P-Value Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P-Value 
Court Retention Method     
  
Politically Retained                 
1.459 
(0.910) 
 
0.05 
1.447 
(0.914) 
 
0.06 
 -0.026  0.093  
Partisan Election (0.539) 0.48 (0.507) 0.42 
 0.308  0.293  
NonPartisan Election (0.484) 0.26 (0.465) 0.26 
Retention Election 
0.038 
(0.457) 
 
0.47 
0.008 
(0.429) 
 
0.50 
     
Executive Power                                                   
 0.765  0.745  
State Executive Budgetary Reduction Power 0.765 0.02 (0.374) 0.02 
     
Executive Prestige     
 0.051  -0.896  
State Executive Vote Share (0.030) 0.05 (0.335) 0.04 
 
    
Political Environment     
Governor-Court Policy Agreement 
0.184 
(0.318) 
 
0.28 
0.186 
(0.319) 
 
0.28 
 
-0.064  -0.055  
Divided Government (0.320) 0.42 (0.319) 0.43 
 
    
Court Structure     
Civil Appeal Docket 
0.336 
(0.326) 
 
0.15 
0.336 
(0.314) 
 
0.14 
Original Proceeding Docket 
-0.262 
(0.311) 
 
0.20 
-0.283 
(0.310) 
 
0.18 
     
Case Facts     
 -0.600  -0.610  
Legislative Opponent 
 
(0.377) 
-0.908 
0.06 (0.378) 
-0.896 
0.05 
Executive Power Appellant (0.336) 0.00 (0.335) 0.00 
 
-0.456  -0.463  
Executive Order (0.548) 0.21 (0.548) 0.20 
 
0.048  0.046  
Executive Proclamation (0.633) 0.47 (0.636) 0.47 
 -0.336  -0.337  
Executive Privilege  (0.693) 0.31 (0.697) 0.31 
 -0.850    
Veto (All) (0.386) 0.01 ------  
 -0.036  -0.036  
State Executive Appointment Power (0.073) 0.31 (0.073) 0.31 
 0.400    
State Executive Veto Power (0.644) 0.27 ------ 0.18 
   0.159  
State Executive Veto Power (Beyle Measure) ------  (0.176)  
 -2.493  -2.901  
Constant  (1.966)  (2.141)  
     
Wald χ2 (18)73.64  (18) 75.78  
N 237  237  
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Table G3.2. Executive Branch Litigation in State Supreme Court: Executive Power 
Environment; Beyle Veto Measure
99
 
 
 
 Beyle Veto Power Measure: 1980 
        
 
0 No Veto Power 
         
 
1 No item veto, simple legislature majority needed to override veto 
     
 
2 Governor has no item veto, special majority needed to override veto 
     
 
3 Governor has item veto, more than simple majority required to override veto 
    
 
4 Governor has item veto, majority of legislature needed to override 
     
 
5 Governor has item veto, at 3/5 of legislature needed to override 
      Beyle Veto Power Measure: 1988-2007 
       0 No Veto Power 
         
 
1 No item veto, simple legislature majority needed to override veto 
     
 
2 Governor has no item veto, special majority needed to override veto 
     
 
3 Governor has item veto, more than simple majority required to override veto 
    
 
4 Governor has item veto, majority of legislature (elected) needed to override 
    
 
4.5 
 
Governor has item veto, majority of legislature (elected) needed to override; 
2/3 of elected needed for override of appropriations bills  
5 Governor has item veto, 3/5 of legislature (elected) or 2/3 of (present) legislators) needed to 
override. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
99
 Beyle, Thad. Gubernatorial Power. The Institutional Power Ratings for the 50 Governors of 
the United States. http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/gubnewpwr.html, last accessed April 16, 2012. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
                This dissertation has examined the interaction of judicial and executive power in the 
U.S. states. The results from each analysis showed that the institutional design of judicial and 
executive institutions affect judicial deference in cases involving challenges to executive branch 
policy and power. In Chapter Two I examined state supreme court decision-making on cases 
involving state executive branch agencies and found courts subject to political appointment and 
political retention decisions from the governor and/or legislature are more likely to rule in favor 
of executive branch agencies. Other factors such as state court adherence to the non-delegation 
doctrine and policy agreement between the court and executive also affected whether courts rule 
in favor of executive agency litigants in court.  
               The third chapter of this dissertation also examined state supreme court decision-
making on state executive agencies. However the focus of this analysis was how state supreme 
courts respond to variation in executive control within, and across, the executive branch 
structure. The premise of this analysis was that courts would be more likely to rule in favor of 
executive branch agencies in environments with institutionally powerful governors because of 
concerns of enforcement resistance and executive retaliation against the court. Findings of this 
analysis did not support the hypothesis that judges are responsive to the threat of executive 
retaliation in executive agencies cases, however the results did show that courts are more likely 
to rule in favor of executive branch agencies when the executive has increased appointment 
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power and rule review power. Courts were more likely to rule in favor of executive branch 
agencies when the state executive has more appointment control within individual executive 
branch agencies and across the entire executive branch structure.   
              Chapter Four investigated state supreme court decision-making on cases that involved 
direct challenges to state executive power. These cases included challenges to executive 
appointment power, veto power, executive orders/proclamations and executive privilege. When 
ruling on these cases, which are arguably of higher salience compared to administrative agencies 
cases, I explained that courts faced political retention decisions would be more likely to rule in 
favor of executive power. I also stated that courts will be more likely defer to executive authority 
when the executive has increased budget reduction capacity and higher levels of public support. 
Contrary to results from Chapter Three, the findings from this analysis showed that courts are 
responsive to variation in executive control over state resources. The discrepancy in this result 
from Chapter Three and Chapter Four could partly stem from differences in case salience. Judges 
may be more likely to fear institutional retaliation in cases that have direct implications for 
executive power as compared to cases involving administrative agency policy, which are usually 
less visible to the public and political officials. The results from Chapter Four also confirmed the 
hypotheses that politically retained courts are more likely to rule in favor of executive power and 
that politically popular executives have an advantage in court when their power is challenged. 
              Previous studies have examined how political environments can make courts vulnerable 
to threats regarding executive enforcement of judicial decisions and multiple types of retaliation. 
However, my dissertation contributes to existing conceptions of judicial behavior by illustrating 
that executive institutional power and capacity are important in understanding how courts rule 
when adjudicating cases involving the executive branch. Political support from the public and 
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legislatures may provide executives the leverage to respond against unfavorable court rulings. 
However, the institutional capacity of the executive to negatively affect court resources or 
restrict agencies from promulgating policy unfavorable to executive policy preferences is also an 
important component of the court’s calculus when deciding to defer to the executive branch.  
             As mentioned previously, the development of executive power in the U.S. states 
illustrates a tension between creating an executive capable of managing state policy and 
preventing a dangerous concentration of institutional authority in the hands of the executive. 
However, the trend in state institutional development reflects a willingness on the part of state 
officials to grant governors enhanced mechanisms of bureaucratic and institutional control. As 
states have allowed executives to increase their institutional capacity for action and policy 
influence, it would seemingly be left to state courts to ensure that governors do not overreach 
and abuse their authority. However, the results from the preceding analyses showed that if 
increased institutional powers result in judicial anticipation of executive enforcement resistance 
and/or executive retaliation, courts are less willing to rule against executive activity. Judicial 
vulnerability to executive power is problematic given the normative expectation of judicial 
independence. In regards to judicial independence, few would argue that concerns surrounding 
institutional retaliation and/or enforcement resistance are proper legal considerations that should 
influence court outcomes. The success of litigants who challenge executive policy is seemingly 
not only influenced by the legal facts of the case, but also by the institutional vulnerability of the 
court in which litigants raise their claims.  
              Also, recent trends in state government illustrate that officials are attempting to increase 
accountability of the court to political officials by granting the state executive more power to 
control the makeup of state high courts. Specifically in 2011 state legislatures proposed multiple 
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constitutional amendments and statutes to alter the selection of state supreme courts to increase 
executive control over judicial appointments.
100
 Some of these proposals include increasing the 
state executive’s power to select the membership of nominating commissions; allowing the 
governor to the ignore the recommendations of the nominating commission; or completely doing 
away with merit selection and allowing the governor (along with the legislature) to directly 
appoint and retain state justices. With increased control over judicial appointment and retention, 
executives can appoint more judges who support executive policy preferences and executive 
power, and dismiss judges who oppose state government action. If these attempts to reshape state 
judiciaries are successful and executives continually gain more institutional privileges, litigants 
who challenge executives (and executive power) will find themselves at a clear disadvantage in 
court.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
100
 For example, a proposed constitutional amendment in Arizona would allow the governor to 
select the lawyer members of the judicial nominating commission instead of the state bar. 
Proposals in Arizona, Oklahoma, and Tennessee would specifically allow the governor to ignore 
the list of candidates provided by judicial nominating commissions.  “Attacks on Merit 
Selection.” 2011. The New Politics of Judicial Election 2009-
2010.http://newpoliticsreport.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/JAS-NewPolitics2010-
Online-Imaged.pdf, last accessed April 20, 2012.  
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